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TORTS P.

46.

Held: P cannot recover. The violation of an ordinance constitutes actionable
negligence only· when it injures someone of the class to be protected by the
ordinance's enactment. This city ordinance was not enacted for the benefit of P,
nor for school children in general. It was rather enacted so that the public might
know where one alights from or boards buses. The fact that there was no sign did
not have any direct relationship to the driver's care and so is not actionable
negligence. Nor was the driver bound to keep P on the bus since t~o passenger on a
common carrier may alight at any stop which he desires, be he inf&.i"!'~ or adult.
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.r~/ .~ f erns
False Imprisonment
rf¥''> . c,;l'·* . The elements of the tort of false imprisonment are: (1 ) an unprivileged :i,mpr:i. §O:-l-,c f r•'>
.1 ;_nt actual 0 2: ca.ns.t.z:uc_
tiJr.e; (2) defendant must have ~u_tended t h e imprisonment, a.e1d
f"i)

(3) _£laintiff must have knowu. he was .imprisQned.
It is false imprisonment to . force someone to leave by the back way when he is ~d L· .
ling to leave voluntarily by the customary :front way. 153 Va. 348, 149 S.E. h53.

TOm'S
Fals e Imprisonment
182 Va. 605
P went to Norfolk to visit her brother who was in the service. She and her brothe t
inadvert ently entered a place c f not very good r e putation. D, a police officer, ask e
he r i f t he man she was with was her husband. She said, 11 No." Then D told her she
wo uld have to leave to1.rn. She replied that she was not going to l eave town, that s110
came a long way to see her brother, and gave the officer r e ferences in her own town.
D then said she was under arrest, and she ask ed him why, and D sarcastically repli ed ,
"Oh, you wouJ.dn't understand."
He ld: Arrest not privileged. P was corru11itting no crime in the presence of the offic er. • He deliberately refused to investigat e when P offer ed evidence to clear h er-·
s elf of suspicio n . The trial court committed error VJhen tt r educed the damag es from
$1,000 to $400. The court took judicial notice that ther e we r E:) thousands of wives ,
sist ers, and sweethearts visiting the boys in camp, a nd that the very gr eat ma jority
of them wer e moral and l aw-abiding .
TORTS
Fa ls e Impri s onr.1ent
199 F. (2d) 720, 723-724
,C ircuit Judge Soper stat es t hat ther e i s ·?- ruh~ of l CJ.w in eff ect if.! Virginia and
els ewher e that if an owner, acting in t he ex ercis e of hi s right to protect his property, ha s r easonable grounds to believe that another is st ealing it, he is justif i ed
i n det a ining the suspect .in a r Gasona blo manner a nd for a r easona ble time for inve st i gation . It wa s r eversible er r or f or t he Ijistrict Court to r efu se to give s uch an
instruction.
TORTS
Fals e . Impris onment
Evidenc q
188 Va . 485
A, wl10 wa s D' s manag <::; r, s aw P st oal an itrcm i n D' s s tore worth 75¢. P stat ed that
he did not s teal it but purchas ed it earli er in t he day. A ca lled the police who a t
A's direction searched P. and found trw ar t icle . Latt:r a war rant wa s sworn out. P
was tried for petty l a rc eny a nd a cr:tuitt ed • . P i s now suing D fo r f a ls e imprisonment.
Q.l. Wa s the arr es t privileg ed? Held: No, as th~:) offic ;~ r had no wa rrant and the
mis demeanor was not committ8d in his pr osenc .) .
Q.2. P expr e s s ly sued for compens a.t or y damages only. Ma:r D introduc e evidenc e tha t
A s aw P s t eal t he artic l r:! :' Eeld: li~~wv e r.s no 1 Tlv:1t is immat erial sinc e the arre st
,.;as not privileged. Not e 1: If P w0ru a sking f or punitiv e damages, such evidence
would be a dmissible in mitigation of punitive damage s. Not e 2 : If this wer e a ma l i cious prosecution suit, such evidenc e would be admi ssibl8 to show proba ble cause .
Q.). I f P ha d bee n convict.:;d of t he cri me , wo ul d evide nc e of such conviction be admis s ible ? No . It \-TOuld b~ i rrel evant as t he conviction did not make t he arr est privileged .
Q.h. I n t he ins t ant c as6 P was ac quitt ed . Hay P introduc e that f a ct into evide nc E
No , f or t h.:1t fact i s a l so i mm.:J.t eria l r:1s to tho e.mount o:' c ompensa tory damages a nd i s
again confus ing ma licious prosecuti on (wher e t he IJl ::linti ff mus t s how a f avorabl e t e r mination) with f al se ':lrr cs t ::md f alse impr isonrovmt .
1 S .E. (2d) 292
. TORTS
Co nver s i on
~<-r'>•t- Where: a bank wr ongfu lly s ;:;lls s tock t hat has b0en pl edged with it , what i s the meaE
ure of damages ? And who i s .entitl od to divi dends dt::c l ar e;d aft er t he c onv ersion but
befor e pl edgo r ha s noti c e of th o co rN,3r sio n?
11 Thc current r ul e i s t o ascertain t lt<
; hi ghos t m ~lrlwt va lLte of s t ock unlawfully con-·
v ert ed by a pledgec- bctw_el: :.tb-G ·· t..e of.. conv er s i on and a r ea so nabl e time aft er the
owner ha s r ec eiv ed noti c ,; of _i t." Dividends G'lrncd ·tft er th\:l conver s ion bel ong to t h
cor1V"8r t c r , -'lS when th .::: j udem·~ nt i s sat isfi ed t ith: p?.s s ·.~s to t he co nvert er by :re la~iG .
back a s of th'=! d;;1t e of the convursion .
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':\HI'S
Conve rsion
Property
.
10 S.E. (2d) 551
f bought some standing timber from D who later wold some of the same timber t o X,
h~'l0 !' 8 upon P sued D for conversion.
(1) Do es such an action lie?- -H-eld: -:f.es., .sine -;,
t l18 timber was constructively sevGred at tim e it was sold if to be removed at onc e c .
,,::L thin a reasonable time . Note that realty cannot be converted. (2) What i~:; the

m8'·t surb of damage s'? (a ) The measure of damages is the value of the property at tho
time J.nd place of conversion. (b) If there is no mark et at that place, then th e va lue is to be determined by the marke:t price at the ne.irest market less the c ost of
getting it ther e .
TORI'S
Punitive Damag e s
184 S.E. 186
Following a disput e , X, a man, chas ed Y, a boy, X being in his car and Y on his bi·
cycle . X wilfully but not malj,ciollsly ran Y d own and injured him. Is an instructior.
en punitive damages proper? Held: Yes. "T c;~.lan dama es
alic e
n?ed not be "'hcym. Whenever the assault is of a wanton netture, manifesting a wilful.
disr ega rd of th e rights of others, the party a ggrieved is entitled to exemplary dam "
a ges. ·The; absence of actua l malice does not de feat th.a right t o recover such darnag~::.
Exemplary damages are als o cc:tlled punitive damag es or, vulgarly, 11 smart money • 11
Consent
190 Va. 162
TORTS .
X, a mature married woman, became pregnant and begged D, an abortionist, to perfo::." r,
an illegal operati.:.:n. D complied, and X died as a result. X' s pers onal representative sued D f or $15,000 (the then maximum) und er the dea th by wrongful act statute.
Held: Judgment f o r D. To him who consents no lega l 1o1rong is done. The law will
not a id a party who ha s fl outed it. It is im.rn.::1t erial that under the Va. abortion
statut es the woman is not an accomplic e . She ha s neverth8le ss actively urg ed the pel
petration of a crime , and the l aw vJill not r eward h er. If X could not recover had st
lived·, h er personal r epresenta tive c annot r ec ov er. Not e : This cas e was distinguishE
fr om the type of case where a statute is pa ss ed primarily f or the protection of a cer
tain cla ss of s oci ety (ns the statutory r a pe statutes) a.nd th e injured person is a
member of that cla ss.
TORTS
Defense of Prc perty--RiE;ht t o Kill Dog s Atta cking Chicke ns 181 Va. ?79
Held tha t one is within his rights in kil ling dog s th at a re in the act of attackinr
cfiickens, when ther o i s no •Jther rcas on:=tf.>l e 11my t o prvtect the f owls. One do e s not
have t o me rely drivE: them away a nd give them a nother cha nce. F'G\-Jl-killing dogs are
no bette r than sheep-killing do ~s just becaus e the y pnfer chicken t o mutton or l amb.
TORTS
Legal Authority
180 .va. 222
p owned a f arm 1-vith a fine spring on it. The Comrnor::vwa lth of Virginia owned land
nearby upon which it oper ::r.t ed a fish hatclll.. ry. It needed mor l"; ·1-1a t er f or the hatche r :
s u it du g a ditch f or a pipe t u be l ai d t o a spri ng Gn Stat e l a nd. The ditch ran t cwithin 30 f eet of P 1 s s pring . It wa s limes tcmo c -:)untry J.nd noc" ssary t o blast. P
begg ed the man in cha.rgo not t o bla st, t elling him it might ruin his spring , and it
did . P .sued D, .the ma n in cha rr;e , persona lly .
Held: Sinc e D wa s per fo rming a St at l~ functi on in a prc p er ma nne r, he has th e immunity (; f th e St :1t e . IJ wa s t aking or d8rs from his supcrj_ r:r, and not from outside rs.
Not e : If D had ne t been authori zed t o bletst, or had p e rs -:; na lly us ed t oo gr eat a
charg~ , the n he would haVG b ee n per sona lly lia bl b, but i n th 13 abov e case the act uf
the St a t e anJ t hE: act of D wor e one a nd t h•::: s arnu a nd insepelr a ble .
TORTS
Legal Authurit y
187 S.E. 481
X, a polic e vffic er u..'1der the l m·!S of Virc ini'l , cau[.ht Y in the act of stGaling $1
worth of c ual from an int t;rst at o s hi pment . By f eder a l l aw :my th eft of gouds in int erstat e c om.rnerc e is a f el ony . X att urnpt eJ. t o ar r est Y. Y r a n. X shc t Y and seriously injur ed him. Is X lia ble '?
Held: No , neither civilly nor crimina lly if th e r (:) was m: c)th er wa y t o prevcmt his
esca pe (a jury question). X has a s muc h ri ~S ht as a ny individual t o e ff ect Y' s a rresi
Quot i ng Hinor: 11 Supposinc a f el ony t o hav e beG n com.r nitt od and the pa rty who is t o b<
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F.n 'ested t o be guilty of it, . private persons are indemnified f or killing, like off i ··
c e rs . But if there had been no f elony, or the person slain is innoc ent, how pr obab>
so ever t he caus e of suspi cion, the slaye r is guilty of mans laughter at l east." Compare 17 8 S .E. 8. Not e : One is not privileged to kill on mer e suspicion of fc,lony
where no fe l ony ha s actually occurred. (Petrie v. Cart>vright, 114 Ky. 103). Btr t. ii'
an off ~~ r easonably _b elieve s that a f elony has been committed a nd reasona bly beJ.i ev e s that X committed it, he ca n legally make an a rr est a nd us e a ny amount of forc e:
nec essa ry short of killing or inflicting s erious bodily harm.
Ry the better view a n offic e r is not privileged to kill to prev ent the escape of a
f elon unless the f elony is one of the more aggrava t ed ones for whic h the penalty may
be d eath. Thes e f elonies are rape, murder, robbery with a dang e rous .wea po n, kidnapping , a rson, att empt ed rape , burgl a ry, and tr eason.
TORTS
Lega l Authority -- C.r imina l Law -- Arrest -- Self-Defens e 192 Va . 598
D wa s a polic e offic e r of th8 town of Emporia . He saw X in a ca r a t 2 a.m. and by
polic e. siren ca lled u pon him to stop . Ins t ead, X speeded up to 70 miles an hour, a nc·
D follow ed. X' s ca r c ame t o a s t op 2 mile s outs i de Emporia , a nd D pulled up a l ongsic
it a nd t old X h e was unde r arr r~ st. X r esist ed a rr e s t and fi nally broke awa y f rom t h,
offic e r. D ca lled t o him t o ha l t . 'Nhe n X reached f or hi s pocket, D shot a nd killed
him. P1 1r1ho i s X' s pe r sona l r epr csent<'ltive , sued D. 1tJha t j ud§;111ent?
Held: For P. This a r rest f or a misdemeanor was a t t empt ed me r e tha n .a mile outsi dt
the city limits a nd, as t he l aw was th e n, w:ts illegal. X ~n s privileged t o r e sis t ar
illegal a rr est. D had not de s i s t ed from hi s illegal purpo s e, a nd he ha d no right t o
s hoot X.
Not e : By V#l9-73 p.::tssed i n 1950 a n of f ic t: r in actua l purs uit may a rr est a fl eei ng
misdemeana nt in the a dj oining cit;l or c ~J unty i n whic h it ma y be nec essar y t o go , or r
fe l on a nywher e i n th e; st a t e , ev e n though t;e has no v.rar rant.. Sinc e a n offic er i s not
justified t o shoot t o ki ll a fl e eing rnis de:;meana nt, even if he has authority t o arres·i
him, the d ecision abov e would still be t he s a me .
TORTS
Legal Author ity -- Hust Polic e St op f e r Red Lights ?
194 Va . 418
P su ed th e D Bus Co . and c, a polic e off ic er. Th o l a tt er went through a r ed light
in a ca r eful ma nner blowi ng hi s s iren a nd f lashing his light s while answering an emer
g~nc y c a ll.
The driver o f t he bus negli~ ently f a iled t o s ee or hea r t h e appr oaching
polic e c a r and ente r ed the inters ection on the gr e en light. The jur y f ound f or P
against t h e D Bus Co . a nd exone r a t ed C of a ll li ability. On~y t h e Bus Co . a ppeal ed .
Va. Code pr ovisions a pplicable a r e V#46-180 , 11 It shall be unl aHful f or any pers on
•••••• t o (vi ol a t e ) a ny of the pr vvisions of t hi s c hapt er ." (Regulatio n of Tr a ffic);
Vl/46-181 provi des th at thi s chapt er shall apply t o t he dr i ver s of all v ehicles owned
or oper a t ed by the Stat e c r any city, t own or ot he r politica l subdivis i on of t hi s
State , sub j ect t v trw speci f ic exc e ptions s e t f or t h i n t hi s chapt er . The r e is no ex·
pr ess r i ght gi v e n t o such v ehicle s t v go t hr c·ugh r ed l i 1;hts .
Hel d : C i s lia bl'e also a s a ma t t e r of l aw. 'rhc verdi ct i n his f av or wa s s et a s i d.
a nd final judgment wa s entered against bot h D a nd C, a s wo.s done i n 3 S . E. (2d ) 419
in the Plt:Jading porti on of t he s e notus . In ba l anc ing convenie nc e s i t may be bett er
t o l et a c rimina l esc ape or a fi r e t c gai n headvmy t ha n t o ,j eo pa r diz e t he l i v es of
peopl e r el ying on gr een light s , as Ha s ·rlone in this v e ry ca s e . " If th e polic e a r e t '
be permitt ed t o di s r q;ard r ed t r af fic light s , t hi s danger ous ri ght mus t be gi v ei; by
the l egi s l a t ure-:: and n,)t by this c ourt ."
·
TORI'S
Legnl Author ity- - Nunic i pa l Co rpvr "1t i c-ns- - Constitut i onal Law 194 Va . 836
The Elizabeth Rivt;r Turmel Dis tric t and Commi ssi v n wa s creat ed by t he St a t e Legi sl<
turu and authoriz ed t o c uns truct a tunnel unde r t he Rive r. D di d pa rt of the wor k
a nd , without negligenc e on his p ~r t , JN~l.ged P ' s prc perty by r emoving part vf it s sul
j a c e nt support. I s D lia ble?
He l d : No. ''A contr::tctrJr or agent l avJfully ~c t i ng un behal f of a pr i ncipa l t o whor
the r ight "o f emine nt doma in has bec.:n acc or deJ , in ma king a pr opvs ed public impr ov eme nt, ca nnot b e hf}l d personally lia ble f or d8lll;If8S if such impr ov ement i s made wi t hoL

I

I
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negligence on his part. 11 Otherwise, contractors 1-vould not wish to bid on such work.
P' s r emedy, if he has one, is agains t the party for whom D did the work and who mi gl-:t
;·~· e 1.-:.atl e under the law of eminent domain.
TORTS
Legal Authority -- Criminal Law -- Arrest
V#l9-78.1
By statute any police officer may, at the scene of any motor vehicle accident, or
i n the appr ehension of any person charg ed with the theft of any motor vehicle upon
t he highways of the Commonwealth, upon reasonable grounds to believe , based upon personal investigation including information obtained from eye-witnesses, that a crime
has been committed by any person then and there pres ent, apprehend such person without a warrant of arrest.
TORTS
Standard of care -- Sudden Emergency Rule
When one is confronted by a sudden emerge ncy not due t o his own fault and he acts
r easonably under the circumstances, though, looking back; it can-bo-sGen that if he
had done something els e it would havG bc;;eh better, he is not liable .
TORI'S
Standard of .Car e -- Sudden Emer gency
190 Va. 421
Mrs. X was pushing ~ baby carriage while walking east on the paved portion of a
hi ghway on her right. D was driving a truck on the right side of the highway going
east, and he swerved t o his left in order t o pass Nr s . X. He did not s~asonably turn
t o th e right after passing her. P was drivi ng a truck in a westerly direction on the
same highway, a nd, as the two vehicles apprcachGd at such a r at e of speed tha t the ga
between them would be clos ed within three s econds, P had t he fo llowing options : (l)
Turn t o his right onto a narrow shoulder, wher e he would pr obably run into a culvert
and demolish hi s ca r, . (2) Put on his emer gency brakes and pr obably be run into headon, or (3) Turn t o hi s l eft sharply and go into an open fiel d . He turned t o lus l eft
but, jus t as he did so, D r ealiz ed he w.".! s on the t..;rong side of the r oad and suddenly ·
turned t o his right, so th~t the cars collided head-on 1v.ith disastrous r esults. P
sued D, and the jury f ound i~ P 1 s f avor. \'lfas this proper?
Hel d : Yes. P is not guilty of contributory negligenc e a s a matter of l aw. He was
confront ed with a sudden emergency f or whi ch he was not t o blame and is not negligent
merely because , as events turned out, he di d the wrong thing.
TORTS

Standard of Care--Sudden Emer genc y--Imput ed Negligence
192 S.E. 800
attr~ctive widow (before t he accident) was r eturning to State Teachers Colleg e aft er Christmas vacation in a Ford truck operated by X. The D Bus Company 's bus pas sed the truck, and X follow ed t h8 bus too clos ely. Wher e the road in
question went over the N & ~v tracks t here was a na rrow a rched bridge . The bus wa s
going at 45 miles an hour. Because of the arch t he driver of the bus did not see .m
appro achi~ car until it was almost upon him, a nd t he bus driver slammed on the air
brakes, cauSing the bus to stop suddenly a nd Cous i ng X to collide therewith. P wa s
injured. De
s es: ' (l) Sudden emer gency and (2) i mputed negligenc e from joint e~t er
prise, as X' s
ught er and ot her stude nt s were all goil1g t o Stat e Teacher s College .
Held: Where s dd en emer gency i s due t o def Gndant' s own f ~u ltJ h.e cannot evok e the
rule . Driver' s n ligence i s not i mput ed to passenger i n 2.bsence of right of pa ss enger to control vehi l e . henc e judgment for P agai nst the D Bus Compa ny.

P, a young and

TORTS
In the fo l l owi ng case no r ecover y was allovmd, bec ause defendant had us ect. due car e
for t he pl aintiff' s safet •
TORTS
St andar d of Car e
189 Va . 219
p was struck by a whi sky bo tt.l c whil.: -: 1.Jatchi ng a ' Jr estlinfi cont es t in Norfolk.
There were about 3, 000 spectators . It is not known who t hr ew the bottle or why it
was thrown. Thirteen policemen and f ive ushers vJere on dl.lty t o keep otder. Drinking
was not allowed on t he pr emises , and soft ~rinks wer 8 sold only i n paper cups . P
sued t he promotor, D, and a jury f ound fo r P.
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f-Ield: Reversed. The evidence fails to s how that D has violated any duty owed to i·
.Svct1 i f he should have had more guards and had had them, the accide nt would not nec eE
:·;a ~cily have been prevented.

Henc e D1 s violation (here not proved) of duty was not tL.
.f-'roximat e cause of the injury. D is not an insurer of P' s s a f ety and cannot possibly
·:~.~-,t .i ci pat e ,jus t whe n and where some irresponsible party may do something he shouldn ' t.
St andard of Care
182 Va . 77
P was a little tot aged three years and very fond of soda pop. D >-.r as a tinner and
was r epairing a roof. He had some commercia l hydrochloric acid in a Pepsi-Cola bottle
on his truck. While D was on the roof' :working, P sa1.J the open bottle of "Pepsi-Ccla"
and without further formality attempted to get outside of it. This suit is f or r t sulting injuries.
Hdd: (two judges: dissenting) This was just an unfortunat e accident. D was not
guilty o f any negligenc e . In spite of the fact that small childre n '\-Jere known t o b e
about, .he could not r ea sonably hav e anticipat ed that anything of this nature would occur. Note: Had he l eft the bottle on the gr ound, the r esult might well have been
differt:nt.
~ ' CHTS

TORTS
St a nda rd of Care
187 Va . 677
P h.J.d purchased a bus ticket. 'fher e was quite a crowd ar ound the bus platforms, a nd
she did not n otic e that thes e platforms wer e E:l evat ed fiv e i nohos abov e s treet l ev el.
She f ell and was injur ed v.rhen she unexpect r;;dly stepped over the 5-inch curb. She c o r:~
t ended tha t the D Bus Co . was negligent in having th8 5-inch el ev-'9.tion and in not h.;n·..
ing chains t o pr event people from falling.
Held: No neglig <:; nc '~ pr ov ed. Th es e " s-'lw t coth" typ<;S of platforms hav e been genera lly adopted, and ther e is no evidenc o what ever t o show tlv1t any other type of platf orm would be s afer. Chains a r (.; used i n Washingt·.m, D. C., but the object is t o f o re ~
people int o a single line , u.nd not f or Gaf cty. P must havo been entirely obliviou s
of he r surroundings not t o notic e her gene ral surrounding s despit e the crowd , and is
hence barred from a r ec ov ery on tha t gr ound 2-.l one .
Note : 'lrJhile a corrunon ca rri er of pas::;enger s owes the highe s t degr ee of practical
care f or the protection of it s pa ss e:ngor<; in the oper .'1tiun of its bus es a nd cars, it
was c onceded in this c ase tha t c nly or dinar y car e i s 01:JCld in the c onstruction and
ma inte nanc e of its s t a tion f acilit i e s.
TORTS
Standard of Care
191 Va. 685, 690
What is the tes t of liability under the d oct rine of entru.,tment?
It i s whethe r the owner of a motor v ehicle. knew or had reasonable cau se t o know
that he was entrusting it t o a n unfit drive r likel y to cause injury t o others. In
the case of intoxica tion there must be knowl edge t hat the driver's habits are such
that he is like ly to dri ve while he is intoxicat ed. Testimony merely tha t a c erta in
person will take a drink any tirnt: hL; could get it is not su ff icient to show such
knowledge . 11 That dx:pr e ssion, frt;quontly heard, indicat es n wi l l ingness r a ther th_?-n
a practic e , and is too vagu e t o convic t him of being addicted t o the habit." "If onlJ
t eets.>taler G could be employed, many v.:~hic l os wou.ld probably sta nd idle . 11
TORTS
St andard of Care
191 Va. 758
In an accident case: the c ourt instruct ed the jury that th ~ l aw pr ohibit ed driving
an automobile in sucb a manner as not t o have the sam0 under complete control.
Held: Error . 11 No human being ca n keep his automobil e in compl et e c ontrol while it
is in moti on." The correct st-:m d.ard is pr oper c vntrol -- not complet e control.
TORTS
St andard of Ca r e
1 92 Va. 776
T owned a we ll that got out of or der . P cam8 ..,.Jith a 35- fo ot crane t o pull out the
pipe in the well. D owned high t cnsi•,n uninsulo.ted wire s 35 f e0t high and 6 f eet t o
the s ide of the vmll. P wa s injured by electric current j umping fr om th e wires t o
the crane . He sued 'I' a nd D.
Held f or defendant s . T·1e wir.::~s were as appar ,·,nt t o P as t u T. Ther e is no duty t o
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,.;a:rn of obvious dangers. D owed no duty to insulate wires at such a height 1-vhere h ~·
Lad no reason to s~ppose anyone would come into contact with them. Compare next c a1: ;
T'O ftTS
Standard of Care
194 Va. ~64
P was electrocuted w.hen he was >-JOrking in an orchard, while carrying a 2h-foot al:.tlTJinum ladder in a ve:tt.ical position in moving it from one place to another, when th0
ladder came ·in contact With high voltage uninsulated wires of the n· Power Co., which
had a right of way over the ·orchard. · Some time prior thereto another employee had
been injured in much the same 1'!ay, but D had made no change in the conditions.
Points to note: (l) D r elied upon th~ "unbending testn rule and argued that evidence of experts to the effeet that the power line was erected in accordance vJi th ap~
proved practices and at a height greater than that required by the National Electrical Saf ety Code is,· in the absence of evidence to the contrary,_ conclusive as to the
lack of negligence on its part. {2) But here there is evidence to the contrary a s
follows: ( a ) D knew of the prior accident; (b) D knew that ladders had to be used t c
take ~roper care of orcnards and that trees were as high as, or higher than, the .
vJires. (3) D1 s negligence and P 1 s freedom from contributory negligence were jury
qu estions. The jury c ould have found th.'.lt P slipped or stumbled on the wet ground,
thereby causing the l a dder to t ouch the vlirc accidentally.
TORI'S
Standard of Care
Simple Tool Doctrine
193 Va. 506
P, an experienced farm arnjJloyee, 1-vho had every opportunity his employer had to inspect the floor of. an ordina ry wagon, was inj11red when his foot 1~ent through the flee
boards t.rhile he was unloading fertilizer.
Held for employer. "Where th e tool is simple in construction, so that defects
therein can be discover ed without special skill or knov.rledge and without intricate il.
spection, the employee is as v:ell qualified as a nyone els e to detect the defects and
to ju'dge of ~he probable dang er of using tl-}e devic t:: VJhile defective ; and where the
tool is in the possession of tho employ ee, his opportunity is bett e r than that of thF
employer. 11 Hence the r e is no evidenc e of the employer's having failed to use ordinar
care. But the simple tool doctrine do es not apply whe re there a r e technical latent
danger- as where a hamme r· has b8en tempered in such a •my as to make it brittle and
employer, without lvarning empl::Jye ;~ , ;_1.3ks him to strike that hammer with another one
. and employee is injured by fiying steel. 7 S .E. (2d) 883.
TORTS
Standard of Care
191 S.E. 615
Is the driver of ~ n a utomobile n eg lig~ut a s a matt er of law if he operates his car
at night a t such a r at e of speed thilt he c annc t stop uithin the range of its lights?
No. He is justifi8d in assuming that the r e· will he no unlight 8d obstruction in th(
r oad.
TORTS
Standard of Ca r e
192 S.E. 782
If a n engineer of a railroad train sees children i n the vicinity, must he slow doW1
in the same way that a motorist is required t c do '?
Not unless he has reas onable gr ound to su ppos e thc1.t th e: childre n will get in the
way of the train, as tho r a ilroad by s t atut e b-1.s th e exclusive us e of . its tracks.
TORTS
Standard of Car0
200 S.E. 591
Facts: A customer of Def~ndant Bank .f 2ll on st eps cover ed 1rJith worn rubber mats
securely c emented to st c; ps . These mats wor 0 originally 3/1611 thick and we re worn
through in places. Plaintiff docs not knew how he happened to f all.
Question: Should a verdict in Pla intiff' s f :w or be set aside as c ontrary to the
l aw and the evidc nc ,.:: ?
Answe r: Yes. Thor 8 is no evidenc e t o indica te th at Defendant Bank has violated
a ny duty owed t o Plaintiff. Defendnnt Bank i s no t <m ins urer. Nor is there any evi·
dence t o show that t he slight dopressi'.Jns in the rubb er m,'l t s was a proximate cause of
the inj_ury. He nce, it is i.Jnm:it e rial 1·1betber c r ne t Pl a intiff wa s contributorily neglig8nt. So , c onsi.dcring the evidenc e in its most f a vor abl e aspects, it still does
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not support a verdict for Plaintiff, and such a verdict must be set aside and judgmE-. ·
entered for Defendant Bank.
'l'OH.TS
Standard of Care
187 Va. 5
\rJ' tvent to visit her husband, H, who was a patient at the D charitable hospital.
The:re was a freezing rain falling off and on through the day. She left the hospital
at. 9 p.m., and, as she went down the outside steps, she slipped and seriously hurt he:.
self. She was not warned of their slippery condition. No ashes, sand, or sawdust
had been placed thereon. The jury awarded her $9,000, and the trial judge set the ve:
diet aside as contrary to the law and the evidence. What result on writ of error?
Held: Trial judge was correct. A charity owes a duty to invitee to use due care
to keep the premises safe. In this respect a charity is like anyone else. But D did
not violate this duty. It .was under no duty to remove the ice until the storm subsided. To place sand, ashes, or sawdust on it beforehand would be us8less, and it
would be utterly impractical to remove the sriow and ic e as it . fell~ Hence D has violated ~o duty owed W• . Nor was D under a duty to warn i;! that it was slippery outside.
D's agents had no notice ·vl·was ignorant of th:-tt situation. D provided lights and a
handrail, and the stairway vms not its slf defective . D was not an insurer of W's
safety any more than the City would be i f W had accidentally fallen on a slippery
sidewalk during a sleet storm.
TORTS
· In the following cases there was citht::r a viob.tion of a duty to use due ca re as a
matter of law .(negligence per s e ) or a jury could properly find a violation.
TORTS
Standard of Care
200 S.E. 589
A wrecking true~ at night was on Plaintiff's side of tho road at a 50-degree angle
in order to aid a disabled car. A boy with a flashlight was stationed to warn approaching cars. Plaintiff was blinded by lights from an approaching car and.ran into
the wreck~r and was injured.
Questions: (a) What measure of care did owner of wrecker owe? (b) Has he exercise,
that measure of care? (c) Has Plaintiff contributorily negligent in not stopping whc:
his vision was obscured? (d) Was Pl~intiff contributorily negligent per se in operat·
ing his automobile so as not t u be able to stop within tho range of his lights?
Answers: . (a) Not the highest degree of'care, but only reasonable care to avoid injury t o travelers:- (b) Since reasonable people might differ as to whether this was
reasonable car e, it is a jury question. (c) Quoting from 174 S.E. 7~, "Undoubtedly
there are courts of great ability which hold that, when visi on is temporarily destroy
by glaring lights, it is his duty t o stop. But this rule ••••• must be applied in the
light of present day traffic conditions. Many highways carry unbroken str(?aJns of car
Sometimes they flash by almost every seccnd, and cf nec t:ssity their lights obscure
vision. To hold as a matter of law that one must come to a stop when lights interfer
is to say that .he must not travel at night. 11 Hence this was not contributory neg~
gence per se. (d) While th ~re is some authority outside Virginia to this effect,
this has never been the rule: her G. In th e absence CJi' a statute, such a rule is too
broad. V#46-209 only requires <l reasonable speed having rega rd to traffic and other
existing conditions. It is not specific enough to require r:tS a matter of law a speed
so low that one can always stop at night withtn range of h:i.s lights.
TORTS
Standard of Care
197 S.E. 527
Action against driver of school bus to r ecover for in.juries sustained by 13-yearold boy who was shoved by other pupils under slowly moving bus. Driver knew that
· children were in habit of crowding around bus.
Held: (1) He could not escape liability on ground that his services in operating
. school bus constituted an act on behnlf of a govGrmnental agency. (2) Public officers are liable for injuries r 0sultine: from their n0r,ligcnce in performance of duties
which do not involve judgment or discretion in their performanc e, but which ar e purel
ministerial. It was negligence in this cas o t o keep the bus moving under the circumstances.
I
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Standard of Care
2 S.E. (2d) 3JO
The evidence showed that a nine-year-old boy was riding his bicycle on the right
s:i.Je of a highway and that A ran into him, inflicting serious injury. A moved that
the court strike out all.of T's evidenc~ on the ground that it did not show even a
jury case for negligence. The court granted A's request. Was this correct?
Held : No. When a motorist sees a child of tender years upon or near the high1fay,
h0 is under a duty to keep his car under control so that he can stop if need be."
Her1ce the jury might have found A liable, and it was error to take the case from them

TC:2TS

TORTS
Standard of Car e
3 S.E. (2d) 153
Dr. A was an interne in a private hospital operat8d for profit. He negligently
injected a solution of iodihe into the tissue of T instead of into her veins. As a
result T suffered terribly, and her arm became paralyzed and her health gravely impaired. She sued tho hospital and received a $13,000 verdict. Result on appeal?
Held: Judgment affirmed. The hospital held itself out as able to provide compet ent medical servicGs. It paid the interne, and he wa s its servant or employee. T
had no'control over him. All the el ements of thtJ tort of negligence are present.
Not e: Had it been a charitable hospital (even though injured person paid), it
would not be liable for negligence of its empl cyees causing injury to a recipient of
the charity unless the hospital authorities were negligent in tho selection or retention· of the employees. But a charit,c;.blo institution is li::,-.ble as anyone else for
injuries done t o thos G who are not r <:: cipients of the charity.
TORTS
Standard of Care
185 Va. 965
p ordered four tons of coal from D, who sent the coal to P in a large dump truck,
the body of which could be raised 14 feet. There was a septic tank near the coal
shed, of -v1hich D had warning. P had an 11-year-old boy. Vl'n en D went to unload the
coal, he first raised the body of th~ truck the full 14 feet making it top-heavy.
He then maneuvered the truclr. t o get i t in just the right position. In doing so, he
ran a wheel over the septic tank and the 1rlh8el broke through, causing the truck to
· overturn. It was later aisc over Gd f or tb.e first tim;; that P 1 s boy was under the
truck crushed to death. Is ,'J. juJgment f or P as personal r epresentative of the child
f or $10,000 proper?
Held: Yes. It was negligenc e (2.. ) t o movE: th0 t op-heavy trLLck at all, (b) to run
over the septic tank, (c) t o fail to keep· a l ockout for children. An 11-year-olcl
boy is presumed incapabl e of negligence, and this presumption was not rebutt ed. The
mother was not contributorily negligent in not keeping tho boy inside while the coal
v1as being unloaded . Note: If th e mother had been cuntr·ibutorily negligent, she
would have been barred a s a beneficiary, as no one should profit from his own wrong.
TORTS
Standard of Care
187 Va. 444
The owners of the Cape Charle s Flying Service invited the members of the s enior
class of the l ocal high school t o visit t heir field a nd ride in their planes. This
was done f or advertising purposes. D was a pilot in one of the planes and did s ome
stunt flying, ther eby getting P, a 16-year-ol d girl, dizzy, excited, and upset. When
she got out of the plane, she walked intc the propeller, which was "idling" at 500
revolutions per minut e . It was hidden fr om view by the struts, npd its noise only
added t o P's cvnfusion. The jury f ound for P, and its ver dict stat ed that defendant
(singular) should pay P $20,000, in spite of the fact that both the pilot and the
Service, Inc. wer e defendants. The attorney f or F' stated thJ.t P might have been the
daughter of any of the jurors cr of their fri ends. The Court stopped him and instructed the jury t o disregard such an ar gument.
Held: (l) P was not guilty of contributory negli gence . (2 ) D was guilty of negligence in not stopping t te pr opeller ~d in not warning P of the danger~ (3) On
the whol e r ecord the jury clearly m,:;ant defe ndants (plural), and the singular was a
mere obvious clerical error. Hence the verdict is not t ou vague . (4) The instruction of the court t o the jurors t o disregard the infa.rTll'ml.tor ;y i:lrgument cured the improper conduct of the attorney a nd hence is not gr ound f or a new trial.
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'rOlt.I'S
Standard of Care
187 Va.. 619
Due to the negligence of Dl and D2, there was an automobile collision of cars dri1 by each. One car pushed the other against P 1 s house knocking it from its foundatio n
Lefendanta contended the traffic laws were for the protection of people using the
higbwny and hence no duty owed P was violated.
Held.: Both Dl nnd D2 owed P 4L duty not to knock his house down. He was in the
~rbit of the duty, for one who drives negligently can reasonably foresee that people
or propert,y on or near the highway may be injured as a proximate result of such neg-

ligence.
Standard of Care
187 Va. 555
P broke his llllg in a football game. Dr. Vann set it and put on a cast. A fet.v day~
later D complained of unbearable pains. Dr. Vann refused to eY..amine the cast and
left town, leaving no one in charge of P. During this time P 1 s condition became
worse. Sometime later serious infection set in, and P 1 s leg had to be amputated.
The jury found on competent evidence that the infection entered through bruises cause
by the' cast 1 s being too tight :md left on in spite of warnings. P r ecovered a verdic
of $20,000, and P' s f ather for ::~5,000.
Held: The verdict is not contrary to the l ::rw and the evidence. Dr. Vann held himself out as a bone specialist and O'I-TC:d a duty to use duG care. When he ignored danger signs of pain and fev er and l eft paticnt 1-ri t hout providing for other doctor's
care , he violated a duty owed to P, and as a proximate r esult of such violation P
l ost his leg. hence all the elvnents of th e t ort of negli genc e are present.

TORTS

TORTS
Standard of Care
187 Va. 755
This case reaffirmed the principle laid do.-m in 145 Va. 48 9 which held that if a
parent allowed his son to drive his car for the son's use wh en the parent knew the
son was unfit (often drunk) and the son negligently injured P, the parent was liable,
not on the theory of r espondeat superior but on the theory that the parent was negligent himself when he d:i.d such a thing. The same principle tvould apply i f one allowed a person to drive, knowing that that person's driver 's lic ense had been r evoke(
because of r eckless driving. But if the parent gives no permission and the child
drives the car in spite of that f act, th ·.~ parent is not liabl e .
TORTS
Standard of Care
187 Va. 857
If a statute r equires certain precautions for t he benefit of t he general public, h
a. compliancc with the statute nt;cessarily in and of itself the exorcise of due care?
Held: No. It is well settled that this alone is not conclusive proof of the duty.
The common law uuty continues t o .,axist in all case s where the circumstances r ender
the statutory warning inadequate in f act. The latter is only the minimum precaution.
(p. 869) Hence where a railroad maintained semaphor signals which were placed too
high where the railroau crossed a main highway just west of Richmond, it was held immaterial that such 'signals satisfied th e statute if in fact they were inadequate.
TORTS
Standard of Care
188 Va . 458
Deceased, who weighed 200 pounds, became intoxicated and l ay down on D's R.R.
tracks. Two boys silw his peril but wer e unable to dr ag him off the tracks. They
heard a freight train coming and r an up the tracks to meet it in order to flag it
down, but the engineer paid little, i f any, att enti on to thom although, if he had,
he could have stopped in time .
Hel d: A jury verdict for ~~15 , 000 should not be .s cJt "lSide . vlher e railway knows
ther e ar e apt to be trespass er s or bare l ic ens .Je s , the:r c is a duty to exercis e r easor.
able car e to see them in time to avoid killing trwm, ar1u thi s is especially so when
we have the superadded fact of an indt: pendent vlarr..ing . The court distinguished this
ca s e from 186 Va . 195 in that in that cas e it was impossible to discover t he deceaseG
in timo t o pr event the accident, :md there was no super add ell warning in that case
either . On p. 470 the court says, " If the trairunen s e8 cr should see, in the exercise of ordinary car e, a trespasser in peril, it is their duty to avoid injuring him
i f it can be dono consistC:;ntly with saf ety to thems elves and t o passengers."
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194 Va. 842
Tag 11 for use in their
urchards. State and federal statutes require that the labels and other printed m3.t . .,.
ter ;:;.ccompanying what are known as ~~ ec.anomi.c. poisons'• shall contain directions for
us3 ecnd a warning or caution when nec essary to prevent injury to man, vegetation, anc
us ef ul ins ects. In the directions there was a positive prohibition worded as followt
"Do not us e this product on apple-bearing trees later than petal fall." And there
Has a caution t hat the liquid would burn if any carne in contact with flesh or ey•JS .
1N.hile D's vic e-president was present, P sprayed his tree s some two weeks after pet al
fall. The spray killed the leaves and ruined both the crop for that year and the on(
for the next yea r. A jury awarded P $30,000 damag0s, but the trial court s et aside
the verdict and entered judgment for D. What result on appeal?
Held (2 justices dissenting and 2 concurring specially): that the verdict in favor
of P should be reinstated.. The caution was inadequate. No warning of what would ha].
pen if directions were not followed was given. 11 This is not a case of a plaintiff's
having acted in defiance of a warning. Here there -vms no warning (as to effect on
foliage). Where th er e is a duty to warn and the defendant fails to give the requir8r
warning, ther e is no a ssumption of risk. 11 Thore is a difference between directions
and warning. 11 The dir.ections arc requirod to a ssure effective use, the warning to
assure safe use." 11 An insufficie:mt ~ing is in l egal effect ~ warni?g. 11 It is
the purpose of the statutes to protect the general-plibiic who are pract~cally at the
mercy of chemical manufacturers, as t h8 ordinary man cannot be expected to be an expert in such matters.
':.'Ci1.TS

Standard of Care

Sales

- .P purcb.as.ed.. a spraying .material manufactored by D known a s

11

TORTS
Degree of Care Owed Gratuitous Guest
By V#B-646.1 a gr atuitous guest cannot recover fron1 a host unless the host has bee;
guilty of gross negligenc e, which has been defined as negligenc e that " shows an uttej
disregard of prudence amounting to compl et e negl ect" of the safety of the guest. Ap·
pli.cations of this rule follow.
TORTS
Gross Negligenc e
189 S.E. 310
p was D's guest in D's car. D's car was the middle of three cars, all going the
same way across a wide bridge at a r easonable speed. F's car was behind D's car.
F decided to pass D, so F blew his horn and turned to his l eft. When F was almost u
with D, D decided to pass the car in front of him. As a result, F's car struck D's
car and pushed it off the bridge , killing P. In D's car all tho windows were down.
D did not blow his horn; nor did he give a hand signal; nor did he notic e the lights
of F's car. Is D liable for P 1 s death?
Held: There is liability -only if ther e is gross or wanton negligence. While the
violation of one statute or the failure to use ordinary caro as to one factor would
not be gross negligenc e, thr ee or four such viol ations together may amount to gross
negligence. In this case the matter was properly l eft t o t he jury, and a verdict fc
p will not be disturbed.
TORTS
Gross Negligence
191 S.E. 589
Held that a basketball coach who goes to sleep while driving a car home from a
game may be f ound by t he j ur y to have been gr oss ly m:::gligent and henc e liable t o a
member of the t eam who was his guest.
TORI'S
Gr oss Negligenc e
.
2 S.E. (2d) 318
p was riding a s the guest of D who (l ) i 0 nored r epeated cautions of P t o go mor e
sl owly, (2) passed a hi ghway crossing si[{n without checking his speed, (3) drove 55
miles per hour and r an t oo cl,)S0 t o th e beginning of an S curvt: t c make the turn,
around which he could not s ee , (4) on a slipper y r oad with wh).ch he was unfamiliar,
(5) and applied brakes suddenly, causing car t v skid nnd t o be wrecked. (a) If a
jury wer e t o find there was gr vss negligenc e , shc:ul d its verdict be set aside?
(b) If a jury wer e t o find f or D, shoul d its ver dict be s Bt asi de? (c) In tho instant case the court struck out P 1 s evidence . Was this error ?
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I t was error f or the court to strike out P's evidence, as there was evidenc e from
\·rhich the jury might find gross negligence. If the jury did so find, the verdict. i~ ·
''.11 right. If the jury f~.:;und for D, the verdict is all riGht. But it is error t cta.l-:e the case from the jury when reasonable people mieht differ as t o whether or n ::;-';,
I; r..ras f.:Uilty of gr oss negligenc8.
TORTS
Gross Negligs nce
9 S.E. (2u) 452
H0st att empted t o pass three cars ahead of him on an S curve while traveling at a
speed of !.;.5 miles per hour. An approaching car stopped, but Host ran into this car
Hithout even diminishing his speed.
Held: Error to strike Plaintiff's evidence. There was at l east a jury question af
t o whether or not Host was r:-: :rossly negligent.
TORTS
Gross Negligence
179 Va. 7
D went t o sleep while driving a car, and her guest was injured. Jury f ound for tht:.
r,uest. Should trial judge set verdict aside?
Held: No. Any speed is t oo fast to drive a car while asleep. Going t o sleep whil<
driving a car may be found by a judge cr jury to be gr oss negligence.
TORTS
Gross Negligenc e
183 Va. 670
D1 s intestate was driving a truck dor,m a 6-d<Jf~rc.:: e grade and around a 32 -degree
curve. P 1 s intestate was a guest in the truck. The rip,ht wheels of the truck went
off the r oad and onto a soft shoulder. The driver was unable t o regain control of
the truck, and its occupants were killed. 1'vidence as t o speed indicated a speed of
from 20 to 35 miles per hour. 'l'here was a drizzling rain, and some f og. The jury
found for P. Wa s this error?
Held: Yes. For a guest t o recover i t must be shown that the host was guilty of
gr oss negligence--that h e Wr:!.S driving the car in such a manner as t o show 11 an utt er
disregard of prudenc e amounUng t o complet e neGl ect of the saf ety" of his guest.
The evidence in this ca sE: fails t o show such a complet e neglect.
··'"'TORTS
Gross Negligenc e
185 Va . 744
P was D1 s gratuitous guest in his car. X was drivinv a car in the opposite direction. X' s steering gear suddenly broke, and he put on his br::J.kes. This caused X' s
car to swerve directly in front of D's c!lr, and P was injured in th e collision. P
sued D and recovered a verdict upon which jud.p:~e nt was enter ed. D appeal ed. Result·
Case reversed. The evidence shows nc gr oss negligence, or, f Gr that matter, any
negligence on D's part. It was just an unavoi d::tblc accident. Even if D had been
going t oo fast, his excess speed was net the cause of the accident.
TORTS
Gross Negligenc e
186 Va. 261
D drove a car mor e than 13 hours within 24 hours i n viol ation of statute, drove
55 miles per hour when war speed limit was 35 miles per hour, and when it was raining so hard that visibility was poor, and dr ove car 8nto soft shoulder.
Held: While no one of the a bove is ~:ro ss ne~ li ge nc e , the jury could find gr oss
negligence from the combination. (189 S.E. 310 f ollowed).
TORTS
Gross Neglieence
186 Va . 394
n--was driving carefully at a f air r ate of speed ar ound a curve when the rear wheel.
of the car were caught in ruts made by the 'sinking of the streetcar tracks. In trying to get out of the rut he l ost control of the c.J.r, lvhich skidded 30 f eet into a
pole injuring P, a r,r atuitous gue st. The trial court f ound f or P. What r esult on
appeal? Held: Reversed and final judGment enter ed f or D. Ther e was no gross negligence as a matter of l aw.
TORTS
Gross Negligenc e
187 Va. 4h
Guest sued Host f or dalll.::tges ar1.s1.ng f r um injuries in an m1tomobile-truck collision.
The truck was parked entirely acrcss one l ane and ha lfway ac r oss the next or passing
lane of a f our-lane highway. It was dark. Ther e wer e no lights on the truck, and
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flares had been placed on the highway. Host demurred to the evidence, and GL1est
;:oined in the demurrer. Discuss and decide.
ln the case of a demurrer to the ·evidence, the court must overrule the d emurrer t c
th2 evidence and find for the demurree guest i f a jury might so find. This r educ es
t.:-lu issue to the question whether a driver \'rho on a dark ntght fails to see an unlight ed obstruction of the kind described in time to avoid a collision might be founc
cuilty of gross negligence. Ordinarily a person has a right to assume that there
·Hill be no u.nlighted obstructions in a highway. The most a jury could possibly find
in· this case would be ordinary negligenc e. Host's conduct as a matter of law falls
sho)'t of shmving an utter disregard of prudenc e amounting to complete neglect of the
saf ety of his guest. Hence Host's demurrer to the evidence should be sustained.
~10

TCRTS
Gross Negligence
191 Va. 886
D was driving P, his married daughter, back from a shopping trip. There was a
light snow falling. D had. no chains on his tir es. D was driving south on a threelane high\·; ay. There 1-fere snow plows in front of him, and he turned into his extreme
l eft 1ane, while driving 30 miles an hour, to pass the snoH plows. He was then approaching the crest of a hill on a curve. X' s car ca.me over the crest, whereupon D
attempted to turn to his right, but h:i,s car skidded and crashed into X's car, which
had come to a stop on X1 s right shoulder of the ro.e.d. P, who was sitting in the
front seat beside her father and had not objected to the way in which her father
drove, was s eri ously injured. The jury awarded P a $10,000 verdict. Should it be
set asid e?
Hel d: No. D was guilty of gr oss negligence as a matter of law. P was not guilty
of contributory n.:;gligenc e . It is one thing t o warn a driver of a danger unknown to
him and quit e another t o give directions when the dang er is already imminent. The
first may prevent an accident; the s econd may t end t o creat e an additional hazard.
p di d not know her father was planning t o enter his l eft l ane , and after h6 had done
so, it was t oo l at e t o r emo nstrat e. nThe guest should not undertake t o drive and may
trust the driver until it becomes plain that such trust is misplaced.n The sudden
emergency doctrine is not applicable, a s D's acti-:ms caused the emer gency.
TORTS
Gross Negligence
193 Va . 604
It i s not gr oss negligenc 0 t 0 i n2.dver tently put one 1 s f oot on the accelerator instead of the brake when a tire blov;s cut.'
TORTS
Gr atuitous Guest?
194 Va . 541
p and D were school t eachers. D owned a car and off ered P a ride to school. When
p f ound that D was ~lli ng t o t ake her r egularly, she started t o pay her $1.20 per
week every Friday, l-fhich was t £w samo as bus f ar e would have been. D did not ask
f or the money but accepted it over a two-year per i od. "[r.Jhat degree of care do es D
owe p when P is riding under tho abov.; m·r:mgement?
Held: D owes P a duty of cr dinary car e and tvill be liable f or ordinary negligenc e .
The r egul ar payment of $1.20 p::!r week , acquiesc ed ·i.n by D over a l ong period cf fime ,
indicates an understanding that compensation is t o bo pai d . It is more than a mer e
social amenity. P is as a matter of l .:J.w not nD. guest with,)ut payment" as contemplated by V#B-646.1.
TORTS
Viol ation of St atut e
Viol ation of a stat ut e passed f or thE: gener al pr ot ection c.f the public is f ailure
t o use due care as a matter of l aw, . a nd, if such viol ation was a proximat e ·cause of
plaintiff's injury and if pl aintiff wa s a member of the class f or whose prot ection
the .·statute was passed, he has ~ prima f acio cas e . Illustrative cases f ollow:
TORTS
Violation of St atute
186 Va . 444
D remodeled a house , which consisted of twc stories a nd an attic, into a t enement
hous e with two families on each of the two st ories a nd one family in the attic.
Ther e was only one stairway t o the attic, although a city ordinance r equired two.
The r oom in the attic which l ed t o the stairway caught 0n fire, a nd P's family was
\
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t r apped and two of his 1.ittle children burned to death. P sought damag es under the
death by wrongful act statute. Defenses wer e (l)House was in existence before ·the
or dinanc e was pass ed and ordinanc e was not r etroactiv e, (2 )Contributory negligence a:~.r_
as sumpt i on of risk of Pin living in the attic,(J)Life of child is of no pecuniary
value, sinc e- it .. is- a sourc e of ex:p~se rathe r than income.
Hel d : (l)Whi l e house was built bJfore th e ordinance, its conversion into a t enf'lm ~:::rrt
t ook plac e after the ordinanc e was passed a nd in violation ther eof linless t her e wer o
two sta irways. (2)Wher e statute is pass ed fo.r prot ection of a certain class, ev en consent of a member of that class will not bar an action. The ordinanc e placed the duty
on t he landlord for th e prot ection of the tenant. (3 )The jury has almost an absolute
discretion up to $25,000 in determining the damages in death by Hrongful act, and
pecunia ry considerations are not the only matters on which their verdict may be bas e:
(4)Impossibility of getting mat erials for second stairway did not excus e D fr.om complying with . ordinance.
TORTS Violation of Statut e
Sugg ested by 187 Va .309.
D was driving a milk tru'ck at ten miles an hour in the middle of the street inst ead
of wholly on his right.A three-year-old child suddenly ran from D's right directly i n
the path of the truck. Instead of putting ()n his brakes, he turned sharply to the
left. The child was struck and killed. W11at three objections ar e there to the foll~w
ing instruction? "The co.urt instructs ·the jury that under the law the driver of a
motor vehicle shall drive his car upon th e ri ght half of the highway, and, if D did
not so drive his truck, then he was negligent in not s o doing, and th ey should find
a verdict for the plaintif f."
Held: (l)Th e deceased was not a member of the clas s f or whos e b enefit the statut e was
pass ed --i. e .,people on t he l eft s ide of t he highway;£ 2 )the court did not instruct
the jury that it was a l s o necessar y that D1 s viol ation of the statut e be a proximat e
caus e of the injury;( J )the court f ailed t o instruct t he jury on the sudden emergency
doctr~ne . Since this was ~~ finding instruction, it must be complet e and accurat e .
Revers ed and r emanded.
187 Va .23L
TORTS
Violation of St atut e
D entered an arte ria l highway when his visibi lit y was qui te limited because of a
pecket of fo g. As he enter ed, he s aw P's ca r appr oaching . D stopped his car when he
was s orne three f eet into t he hi ghway, but i t was t oo l at e to avoid collision . P contends(l)that D was under a duty to stop, look and list en, and(2)that D was guilty of
negligence pe r se in that he violat ed V#46-256, whi ch prohibits any vehicle from
stopping in such manner as . to impede traf f ic except as t he r esult of an accident or
mechanical breakdoHn.
·
Held: (l)Tber e is no hard a nd f ast rule that one must conti nually stop,look a nd
listen. Under the facts above stat ed it was a jury que stio n whet her or not an ordinary prudent man would have ent or ec,i t he arterial hi ghvmy without first listening.
(2)Nor is tho second cont entio n well made . Every statut e mus t be given a r easonable
construction. Stopping when traffic conditi ons demand i t is a part of traveling just
as much as i s motion. Surel y D owed no dut y to keep going when a collision was imminent if he did so . By stopping, he did not impede t r affic withi n the meaning of
the statute-.
Vi olat ion of St atuto
TORTS
189 s .E.339
P was driving eas t · on a paved highway. He had a c l ear view of a n inters ecti -):lg r oad
for 75 .feet up the road, and aJ.so had the rig11t of way over D who was approaching on
the i nter secting road at P' s l eft. The cars collided. P test i fi ed t hat he did not
s.e e D'-s car until th e moment of the co l hsion. Is a j udgment fo r p pro per ?
Held: No. He i s barred by his contribut or y negl i genc e . Statute giving man on the
right th e r ight of way It does not l egalize blind drivi ng . 11
TORTS
Functi on of Judge and Jur y
179 Va .JO
P was ridi ng in D' s bus , D bei ng a common carri er of passenger s . P ei t her had one
arm out of the wi ndow or r Gst i ng i n the open window when due to th e concurrent neg -
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.igence of D and E the bus was sideswiped and P's arm was crushed. P recovered an
verdict and judgment was entered thereon. What result on 1,1ri t of error to t b
S:1pr eme Court of Appeals?
Ther e is a conflict of authority-as to whether or not holding one's hand out of a
bus >vindow is contributory negligence as a matter of law, or whether it is a jury
question. But resting one's arm in a wil1dow so that a collision might caus e it to bl
jarred out of a window would at best raise only a jury question, and, as verdict was
for P, the jury has decided the question in P's f avor. $8,000 damages is not excessive . Not e: D has burden of proving contribUtory negligence so that if evidence is
equally balanced as to whether or not P was contributorily negligent, judgment shoulc
be for P.
:

1

~; 8 , 000

TORTS
Function of Judge and Jury
179 Va. 693
p bought a bottle of Coca-Cola at a stand. · He drank some of it and became very
sick. He lost 30 pounds befor e recovering his health. There was affirmative evidence that the bottle contained a vile-smelling for ei gn substanc e which burned his
mouth.and stomach. Jury f ound for Pin n suit against bottling company.
Held: If P can show that bottle had not been tampered with since it l eft the bottling company, the finding of the fort;!ign substance creates· a prima facie case of
negligenc e. Evidenc e that bottling company was careful merely makes a case f or the
jury. Judgment affirmed.
TORTS
Function e;f Judge and Jury
Procedure
194 Va. 332
· p was s eriously injur ed t o at l east the extent of $10,000. The evidenc e as to D's
neglig enc e was in conflict. The jury was not c ertain whether or not D wa s t o blame
f or the accident. So the jury evidently decided t l, pu.t part of the burden on each
and rendered a verdict f or $5,000 upon which verdict judgment was entered. Both P
and n· appealed. Wh~t r esult?
ijeld: Two wrongs do not make a right. If the jury believed the preponderance of
·e vider1c e was in favor of P, they shculd have given him adequat e drunages. If not,
they should have given him nothing . The judgment should be reversed and the case r e·
manded f or new trial on all issues (and not sol 0ly on the issu e of amount of damages,
·~S

Proof of Neglig~nce
-~bl~c ~tilit~e s .
.
184 S.E. ~77
car passenger su~ng f or lnJurlos sustalned ln derallmerffi made out pr~a
facie Qase on proof that he wa s a passenger and that a der ailment occurred, sinc e th:
type of accident is r ar e unless defendant was negligent, and if in fact there wa s no
negligence, defendant can ordilli~rily prove that such was the case . · But when defendant shows that accident was due t o latent defect in axl e not asc ertainable by any
practical method of inspection, plaintiff's prima faci e cas e disappears, and a verdi~t in his favor cannot be sustained .
~~ et

TORTS
Proof of Negligenc e
186 s. E. 289
1. Fact that automobile l eayes public driveway and injures pedestrian on sidewalk
cr~at es a presumption of negligenc e and casts on Def endant burden of showing that
there was no negligenc e . Same rule applies where Plaintiff is injured standing on
hi~ own land at some 13 f eet from paved portion of highway.
2. Under such circumstanc es ther e is no r eason t o instruct jury on the l aw of con·
tributary negligenc e .
TORTS
Proof of Negligence
189 S.E. 1(:4
X dr ove a truck f or D. On0 of the tires was puncturecl.. He t ook off the tire and
rim, fixed the puncture, roassembled the t ire and rim, r olled same t o Y1 s gar age and
asked p t o inflat e the tire . While P was doing this, th e rim came apart and viol ent..
ly struck P, inflicting serious injury. Expert evidence showed that the accident
might have been caused by any one of six causes, s ome of which wer e, and s ome of
which were not, within the control of defendant, D; but ther e was no evidenc e indicating just which one of these caus es was the r eal one.

10111

'Revised August, 1953

Held: Wher e evidence shows that any one of several t hings may havE:) caused the in ·
for some of which defendant is responsible , and for some of which he is not
n:;sponsible, and leaves it unc ertain as to what was the real cause, then pl ai ntiff
has failed to establish his case, and he had the burden of proof. Doctrine of r es
ips a loquitur do es not apply, since P had control in part over the instrumentalities
causing the accident.
.~iury,

TOHTS
Proof of Negligenc e
6 S.E. (2d) 661
P had rh eumatism. Dr. X told her she would have to have all t eeth r emoved, so Dr.
D, a dentist, r emoved the offending t eeth. However, he l eft some 8 or 9 roots in
P's mouth. Dr. S made a plate for P, but, becaus e of the roots (which could only be
s een in a n X-ray picture), the plate only caus ed pain. · 1-fu en Dr. S took an X-ray pi cture, he discovered the roots, and this nec essitat ed a second operation. P sued Dr.
D and r ecover ed a verdict for $300 on proving the above f acts. Is the verdict valid?
Held: No. The doctrine of r es ipsa l oquitur is inapplicabl e. More than roots of
t eeth still in th e gums must be shown. It was not shown that it was customary for
dentists to t ake X-rays aft er extractions; nor was it shown that dentists could t Bll
whether roots were still in the gums by an examination of the extracted teeth.
TORT'S
Proof of Negli gence
182 Va. 138
P ordered a case of 7-Up from D, and it was delivered. Later P put some bottles oi
7-Up in an electric cooler along with some beer. Three hours later a customer asked
for a bottle of beer, and P opened the cooler t o get it. There was a violent explosion of a bottle of 7-Up causing the loss of one of P's eyes. P sued D. Result ?
Held: No liability. Ther e was gr eat er pressure on the bottle when outside the
co ol er. Henc e the explosion was probably not du e t o any def ect in the bottle . In
fact, there is no sat isf actory expl anat i on. It might have been due t o P 1 s hitting
the beor bottle against the 7-Up bottle . At any r at e, the doctrine of r es ipsa l oqui
tur is inapplicabl e unle ss def endant ha s exclusive control over the instrument aliti e~
causing the accident. It is not applicable wher e the caus e of the accident might
equally be D's neglig enc e or some f actc.r f or which D is not r esponsible . (Two judgeE·
dissented.)
TORTS
Proof of Negligence
184 Va. 94
' Defendant maintained a switch box on a pole about ten feet f rom t he ground for the
purpose of throwing switches for its streetcars . As plaintiff went by the box, it
burned out, and a bolt of el ectricity went through her body injuring her. Evidenc e
indicated that the defendant had exercis ed every pr ecaution and t hat no such accident
had ever occurred before. Plaintiff r elied on the doctrine of r es ipsa loquitur. IE
def endant liable?
Held: Since Plaintiff ' s only evidenc e of negligenc e is based on the doctrine of
r es ipsa loquitur and sinc e defendant's evid enc e complet ely r ebuts any possible presumption of negligenc e a rising out of that doctrine, judgme nt must be for the defend·
ant in spite of a jury' s verdict for the plaintiff .
TORTS
Proof of Negligenc e
. 186 Va. 746
The Danville Corrrrnunity Hospital was organized as a corporation for profit. Its
stockholder s a r e entitl ed to fr ee hospit alization within st ated limits . It always
enters a charge for servic es r endered and collects if it can . It has not paid any
cash dividends for year s , although many of its stockholders have r ec eived free hospit al car e . Linda was born ther e . On th e day aft er her birth it was notic ed that
she had a deep burn on her l eg . No one would admit that he or she had the slight est
idea of the caus e of the bur n . Complications s et in, and Linda Hill be a little lame
for the r est of her lif e . She su r:ld the hospital four years l at er. It defended on
tW:o grounds: (1) it was a charit:3.bl e or ganization and liabl e only for neglig enc e in
the selection of its l.,J mployees , and (2) ther e 1.vJ. S not pr oof of aeg lig enc e . What
judgment?
Held: Judgment for Linda f or ~~5,000 affirmed . A corporation organiz ed for prof it
do es not become a charitable or ganization mGrely becaus e it fails to make money. Thi
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i s a res i psa loquitur cas e . Def endant had full control over Linda and her surr ou:-1< . ·
icgs. Babie s ar e not ordinarily burned unless one or mor e of the att endants ar e nog·1igent . Linda could not be expect ed t o t estify what h appened. Hence the burden of
going f orward with the evidence (not t he burden of proof)" was cast on def endant, '.-The
t:r offer i ng no p~oo f a s t o the caus e of the injury failed to meet Linda 's case.
Que:r y : Hovl l ong did Linda have in which t o bring suit? The statute wou.ld not st ar
t u run until she vJas 21, but in no case shall the period be ov er 20 years.
TORTS
Proof of Negligence
189 Va. 89
P dr ank part of a bottle of Pepsi-C ol a when she notic ed the r emains of a partia llydecomposed mous e in the bottle . She rushed t o her doctor and then t o her l awyer.
She suff er ed a sever e and l ong-continued digestive upset. A loca l druggist preserved
t he carca ss of the mous e in a s olution of fo rmaldehyde f or the eventua l benefit of
t he j ury. P sued the D Bottling Co . in a t ort action. Tho Court instructed th e jury
"that they may inf er negligenc e from the f act that for ei gn substanc e wa s found in the
bot t le and t he law doe s not require the plaintiff to show the pa rticular dereliction.
Hel d: Revers ed and r emanded for t wo reasons: (1) The i nstruction should have
stat ed that if the jury believe from the evidenc e t hat the for ei gn substanc e was in
the bottle at t he time D parted with poss es sion of it, etc. As given, D was deprived
of t he def ense that t he-mouse may have gotten into the bottle either while it was in
t he possession of t he loc al groc er or while it w~ s in the po s s es sion of the plaintiff
(2) The instruction should hav e told the j ury th ~t the inf er enc e wa s a r ebuttable
one , a nd that if they believed from t he e ridenc e that D had us ed due ca r e , or, if
t hey believ ed t he evidenc e to be in equilibrium on t his matter, they should find for
t he def endant, since ( even if thi s i s :,~ res ipsa l oquitur case ) the burden of proVing
negligenc e is on t he per son who alleges i t .
TORTS
Proof of Negligenc e
189 Va. 140
D wil s 20 year s old and had jus t purchased a two-seat ed cubtraining plane with dual
control s . tle was duly lic ·3nsed and asked a two- year-ol d boy, P, t o go up with him.
The pl ane eventually crashed, and D and P wer e bot h ki l l ed. Ther e was s ome evidenc e
of mo t or troubl e but only conj ectur e as t o wh~t ca us ed that trouble . It could just
as easily hav e been due to r.tn acc i dent as to negligenc e. P's r epresentative sued D' s
r epr esent at i ve .
Held : For D1 s p~ r s o m.l repr t:sent ative . ' Doct ri ne of r es i psa l oquitur is not applicabl e, f or it i s cormnon knowledge that airpl anes Gft cn crash without f ault of t he
pilot . Negligenc e cann::Jt be pr oved by speculation and surmi s e a l one .
Not e : (1) Ther e i s nothing in the case to show wh0 t her cr not P' s par ents gave
their consent f or their son t o eo ridi ng i n an airpl am . (2) Ther e is nothing t o
i ndicat e whet her or ne;t gr oss negligence i s r oquir ed i n hust-r uest airplane ca s es as
it is in host-guest automobile c ::tses .
TORTS
Proof of Neglie:ence
189 Va . 948
p lived i n D' s t ourist hor1.e . While .P was absent , f i re broke out in P 1 s r oom. The
fi r e may have been due· t o D1 s negligonc e wi th r efer enc e t o the gas and light fixtur es
or it may hi'J.VO been due t o s~me other cause ov er whi ch D had no control. Is D liable
t o p f or the l os s of per s onal pr operty?
Hel d : No. One doe s not make out a cas e by showing t hat a f ire might have been due
to the defendant' s negligence . "Wher e the evidenc e shows that any one of the sever a l
things may have caused t he i nj ur y, fo r some of which the defendant is re sponsibl e,
and fo r some of which he i s not r esponsible:!, and l eaves i t unc ertain as to what was
th e r eal cause , t hen the plainti.i 'f has failed to establ i sh his cas e ."
TO RTS
Proof of Negligenc e
190 Va . 521
A heavi ly-loaded trail er was l eft ,,rith D for t he pur po se of unloading. The forward
support of the trailer slipped f orward and upward, ca.using i t to crash on the c oncr et f·
driveway and damagi ng the t r ai l er to th~ extent of $1SOOo No one knew exactly why
t his happened . I t might have been due to ca reless moving on t he part of D, or to a
structural defoct in the t r ail er, or t o pur (:; accid0nt. The trial court held for t he
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plaintiff, relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Has this error?
Held: Error. 1Nhat caused the accident is pure speculation. The res i psa loquitu:;
doctrine is not applicable where the accident might be due to
number of caus es, fo:c
some of which defendant is responsible and for some of which he is not, but is limit,_
t o t he c a se in which,.....in___the ordinary course of events, the a ccide nt_:_could- not have happtmed ..except on the theoryo"f-n:eg-l~-1=>-laiz:.:tiU--has--f<r!reci -to prove any negligenc e a nd hence has failed to make out a prima facie case.

a

TOHTS
Proof of Neglige nce
190 Va. 613
D o-.vned a drug store which was entered by a swinging double doo r. When P was l eaving the store, she pushed the door on tbe right open and went out . In some unexplained wa y a . fing er on her right hand wa s caught b etween the two doors a s tl1ey shut
quickly, and her fing er wa s 'S'GV'ered. There was only 1/ 1611 opening between the two
doors vJhen they were closed, and there was evidence that there should have been %".
Ther e wa s no evidence that the springs or that the r e straining fluids were not in
proper condition. Such doors a re in common use throughout the country and a ccidents
v ery rar e . The trial court struck P' s evidence. Wa s this error?
Held: No error. P has failed t o show a violation of duty. This was clearly an
unexplained freak accident. The fact that ther e was only a l/16a opening was not a
proximate caus e of the injury. Testimony that the doors clos ed quickly is t oo vagu e
t o be of proba tive value , as it moans cne thing to c. ne pe rscn and a nother t o s ome om~
else.
TORTS
Proof of Negligence
Sudden Emer ge ncy
190 Va. 979
While walking on the sidewalk at the corner of 3rd. and Gr ace Streets in Richmond,
plaintiff was' injured by a city transit bus which ran up onto the s_idewalk and hit
her. Afte r shovJing the above f acts, plaintiff rested her c ause . Defendant bus company then showed that aft er the accident it wa s discovered that the solder had broken
and loosened a cap over the end of the a ir hose connect ed with the brake. Experts
t estified tha t this coulrl not hav e been J:iscovered by a r easonable examina tion and
that such a breakage wa s, if not tlnhear d of, a t l .;;ast v ery r nr e . The driver t estifi ed tha t when he went to a pply his brake to l et a custom er off at the safety zone ·
near the corner, t he brake di d not \-rork, and. thc;.t to a void piling into the ba ck of
cars waiting for the street light to change , he had t o Sl•Ting the bus out into the
inters ection, where it hit a nother car ahd. r a n up onto the sidewa lk. There wa s evidence to the effect that the bus wa s go ir1g only 10 m.p.h. at th e time , that when t he
dr i v er discov er ed the failur e of his bra kes, he wa s 87 feet from plaintiff, a nd that
had he a pplied his hand brake , he couli..l h,::tve stopped in hO f eet or l ess. Instructions wer e given the jury t o t he effect tha t plaintiff had r ais ed the inferenc e of
negligence which \voul J entitle the jury t o find f or her in the a bsenc e of evidenc e
satisfactorily showing fr oedom from negligence, but on the vJhole case the jury must
believ e the accident wa s due t o negligenc e in cr der so t o find . The c ourt a lso instructed the jury tha t they could find defendant lia ble if they f ound that the drivel
wa s negligent in f a iling t o apply his hmd brnke aft er finding out hi~ air brakeswoul d not work . Are the inst ructions proper?
Hel d: Yo·s . I~Jher e pla intiff show8d that a bus s ol ely under defendant's control r an
up on t h e sidewalk wher e busses ordin..:trily do not go , she 1o1as entitled t o r ely on
th e doctrin e vf r es i psa -loquitur. 'l'he jury couLl find th -::tt t he cap b ecame l oose a s
a r esult of the a ccident r ather than befor e t he a ccident. Expert t e stimony indic at e~
how urilike ly such n prior f ailur e of the brake would be . Whilo the court does not
appr ov e of the und~ rlint::u wur ds used in th e ins tructiun, it c annot agr ee tha t, when
co nsider ed in the light of the c.:ntir e instruction, the l.Ju r ds plac ed upon def enda nt
the burden of sh uwing l ack of neglige nc e r ather t han just go ing f orward with the evidence. Furthermor e , the jury c c1 uld f:ind, as t hoy did, that defenda nt was not protect
ed by the sudden emer gency doc trine when he fail ed t o a ppl y his hand brake . The bus
was going only about 10 m.p.h., and t ht::re wg_s o.mplC; opportunity f or any r easonabl e
man t o u se the br :.:tko .
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Proof of Negligence
191 Va. 635
The tracks of the D Ry. Co. run through the town of M (population 500) and cross a
r:ruch-traveled highway at right angles. The view up and down the tracks is obscured
by a bank and underbrush until one reaches the railway's right of way. Then there ii
e:.n unobstructed vi ew for 1800 feet on each side of the crossing, at which points
curves interfere with visibility. The highway runs downhill until it reaches the
railway's right of way, and then there is a slight elevation as it crosses the trach
There is an automatic warning signal which operates when a train is within 2500 fe et
of the crossing. There is no town ordinance regulating the speed of trains or other
duties of the railvmy. P was 67 years of age and in average health. Just a s he was
about to cross the tracks in his car, the automatic signals started. A pass enger
train was approaching at the rate of 80 miles an hour but was not then visible . P
kept on going, but his car stalled on the tracks and P was killed when the train 4emolished the car. What are the rights of P's personal repres entative, if any?
Held: H~ has no rights. There is no proof as to why P's car stalled. It may not
have been tne fault of .the railroad company. Negligence is not to be presumed when
there'are hypotheses just as plausible as that of negligenc e . But even if the D Ry .
Co. was negligent, it took the train 20 seconds to cover the 2500 feet, and if P did
not "abandon ship" within that time, i;.he sole proximate cause pf his death was his
foolhardiness in staying in the car in spite of appr oaching disaster which he could
have easily avoided. (His ten-year-old grandson got out in plenty of ~ime when he
saw the train coming a r ound the curve 1800 feet away.)
·
'l'O?.'I'S

TORTS
Proof of Negli genc e
194 Va . 597
P was a paying passeng er riding t o work .i n D's car. She alleged and proved that
while she was sitting in the back seat of the car r elaxed, D suddenly applied the
brakes as hard as he could, that she vlas thrown .forward and injured. The trial cour1
sustained a motion to strike out P' s evidence. Was this error?
Held: Action of trial cotirt was right. Negligence is not c.1 rdinarily presumed fron
the happening of an accident. D was not bound t o introduc e any evidence unless P's
evidence prov8d a prima faci ,, cas e . From anythint~ that appears in the evidenc e, D
might have had good r eason t o slc:lrn c·n the brakes . (It was also said that weaving in
and out of traffic was not neglig(mc e per s e -- t rw.t 1:Jould depend on the circumstances.)
'l'ORTS
Proof of Negligence
..
194 Va. 615
P was a non-paying guest·in D's car when it struck a concrete post on the right
side of a culvert. The survivors of the accident could not give many details of its
cause, but ther e was evidenc e to indicat e that D was driving tvith due care prior to
the time he hit the post, that the car did not skid, and that D turned to the right
just before hitting the post~ D stat ed that he:! could not r emember what caus ed him tc
turn to the right -- whether it was some obj ect or vJhether something els e distracted
him. The verdict and judgment were for P.
Held: P has failed to make out a jury c ::tse of gross nE.gligence . Revers ed and
final judgment for D. What actually caused tho accid8 nt is unknown and speculative .
P had th e burden of proving gros s negligenc e . His ovid ne e does not show that D
acted with "a heedl ess and r eckless disregar d uf ·the rights of another which should
shock fair-minJ.ed men."
TORTS
Proof of Negligence
10. S.E. (2d) 887
D t estified that he did· not r emember how he happon8d to drive his car into P's car
but supposed h~ must have f aint ed . Discuss.
Point l. If D had no ~ eason t o suppose he was about t o faint, and did faint sudden
ly, then it was not his act, and it was an unavoi dable acc i dent. Point 2. But i f he
can't r ecall the circumstances because of th e shock of the accid ent (a common occurrence) and the accident may have been due t o drowsiness or inatt ention, he cannot escape liability by merely saying he does not r emember what happened. Poiot 3. And th
burden of proving tha.t he fainted is upon him who alleges it.

I
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TORT0
Proof of Negligence
Pleading and Practice
181 Va. 471
In Virginia, whether it is gross negligence for a defendant to fall asl eep while
driving an automobile, thereby rendering him liable to his gues t , is a jury question .
P alleged in his notice of motion that D failed to keep a proper lookout whil e driving his car. He did not allege that P went to sleep at the wheel. Is evidence of
this latter fact admissible?
He l d : Yes . Contrary to the rule at common law the decl aration in a ne gli genc e
cQs e is no longer demurrable pe cause it does not s et out the f acts that constitute
l10'gligenc e . I f D wishes these, he should ask for them in a bill of particulars.
Proof that B was asleep is not a variance from the alle gation that he fail ed to keep
a proper l ookout. It is rather proof of that fact.
TORTS
Proof of Ne gligence
183 Va. 379
D was driving at ni ght with P, a gues t. The car was f ound demolished against a
tr ee near the highway, and D and P were both dead. Tho ro ad was a stra ight four-l ane
highway. P's personal repres entative sued D's pers ona l r epr es ent ative . There were
no witnesses. Result?
R8 ld for D. There is no evidence of gross ne gligence . The mere fact of the accident is no evidence of_' ne gliganco where the accident ·c ould have happened as a r esult
of blinding lights, som<:1thi ng in the machine br eaking, or sudden illness of driver.
Wher e the facts can bo explained as a r es ult of. nogli gonc c or on some other r easonable hypothesis, ther e is no pr esumption of negligence .
TORTS
Proof of Negligence
19 2 Va. 150
P was killed while in tho act of removing n. live wire from E, who was attempting to
r emove it from thu str eet. Does P's per sonal r opr os ontativo make out a prima facie
case of negligence agai nst tho D Electric Co. by showing the above f acts?
He ld: Yes. "It is well sottlod ••••• th3.t under the doctrine of r es .ips a loquitur
proof that an injury h as r esulted from co nt.:~ct wi th a highly charged wir e which i s
under tho exclus ive oper at ion and control of t h0 def endant and is out of its proper
pl ace , r ais es a prima f ac i o presumption that the dofendunt was ne gligent ••••• and
throws upon it the burdE.:n of ov0rcomine; sueh pr es umption. 11
I s pl ainti ff barr ed by hi s contributory nc::gli gonco? He ld: Jury qu estion. One
may, in a comnendable e ffort to save human life , t ako chances that he could not
otherwise take without being guilty of mtgligenc 0 , but even then one cannot r ashly
or r ec kless ly disregard a ll consideration for his own p0r sonal safety. In the instunt case it was cla imed that the D Electric Co. wa s negli ge nt i n that the wir es
which wor e stretched from pole to pol o some 35 fee t fr om the gr ound wor e not insul at ed. What effect, if any, should be ci ven to evidenc e that it was not t h~ practic0 or custom of (J l octri-:: companies t o ins ulat e s uch wir es ? Hold: While us age and
custom do not ju stify ne gli ge nc e , ovid on co of such us o.ge and custom i s conclusive
evidence of due care unl ess it is shovm by competent evidenc e that the usage does not
aff ord as high prot'e ction o.s vwuld r esult fr om nny other known and practical methods
of tho bus iness . · Since no such ovid en co was introduced , P d i d not prove that failure
t o insulate the wir es was negli gent c onduct .
TORTS
·Proof of Nor:;ligence
Sa l es
192 Va . 192
P purcha::;ed s ix bot tles of Coc'1-Col a , which she pla ced in a pa steboard carton furnished by the D Mnnufuctur er of the product to tho s t or E: keoper from whom P purchas ed.
While s he was walking in tho s treet, tlrr e e of the bottles fe ll out when part of the
carton broke , and P was ser i ously injur od by the f lying gl ass . Thor o was no proof
of l a ck of proper i nspection by D, or even whothor the carton was damaged befor e or
after it was de liver ed t o t he st or e .
Held : For D, as thor e i s no pr oo f of neg li genc e on its part.
Note: Tho Court s a id t h0r e wa s l iabi lity f or ne gli ge nce oven without privity when
the r mnote se ller or manufacturer w::1.s dealin g i n f oods nr in n.rticl es inher ently dancror us . "But beginning with MacPhor S('ll v . Buick Mot or Co . the r e cent co.s os have enl ar ged t ho liability of a ma nuf a cturer to o. r er~1o t o vondoo t o i nc lude articles~ not
i nher ently danger ous wher1 pr opo rly construct ed rtnd put t o thuir i ntended use, which
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~ I.' defectively constructed may reasonab ly be anticipated to cause injury to tho se
pr·-:> perly using them.
"In the cas e before us it is not n e cess ary that we decide whether the former or thu
rr,ocle rn rule should pr ovailr' as ther e was a failur e to prove negligen ce.

Concurr ent Causes
188 Va. 803
M Stre et runs north and south and is intersected by S Street, which runs oast o.nd
wost. In viol ation of a city ordinance, H parked his Buick on tho southwest corner
in· such a way th.~'l.t it f a ced south on M Stroet but proj e cted some 4 fo ot into S Stre et
Duo to the negligence of A, who was driving a truck south on M Street, and to the
ner,li gonc o of B, who wa s driving a Ford we s t on S Street, the truck hit the r ear 0net
of the Ford, knocking it southwest in clockwis e motion o.nd crushing P between the
Ford ~nd tho Buick. P was a littl e girl about nine years of age , o.nd she was at that
momont stand ing in b ack of tho Buick avmitin(~ a chance to cross M Street when traffic
conditions should permit. The jury thought that A was 50% to blo.me, B 40/o, and H lo;'lo
Tho judgEJ told tho jury tho damages could not be apportioned in that manner, whor e upon t~e jury f ound f or P against A, B, and H. Tho court s et the verdict aside as t o
H, over the ob,jection of A and B.
Held: H was negli gent ns a matt er of l aw in parking his car in violation of ordinance . A jury could have found that StlOh parkin,; forc ed P t o wait in a danger ous
placo for an opportunity to cross M Stroot. The parkin g was not o. supers edin g caus e
but a concurrent one. Some s ort of tr affic accident could have been foreseen by H as
a r esult of his improper parking, n.nd i'G is inrmat eria.l he could not expect the very
one that t ook pla ce . It wo.s error t o s et o.s id e· the jury's verdict against H, a:s th,~ r
was at l east a jury question. 11 Thor e is no y ardstick by which every case ( of l egal
caus ation) may bo measur ed nnd fitt ed ir.t o its proper plo.c e . In oa.ch cas e the pr oblc.
is t o be s olved upon mixed cons idorat i :Jns of l ogi c , cammon s ens e , justice , policy and
pr ec ed.:::nt. 11 ( p. 816)
'r:JRTS

TORTS
J oint ancl. Se ver a l Tort-f o<:Lsors
Su t;gosted by 187 Va. 530
Duo t o tho ordinary nvgligcnco of T, u third party, and of Host, Guest was injured
in an aut omobile collision. ·wh a t £', r e tho ri ghts of tho pa rti es?
Sinc e tho negli genc e of Host is not i mputed t o Guest, T is liable to Guest. But
does ho have a right of contribution under the st atuto which a llows contribution bet~en j oint tort-f ea.s ors where it is a t ort of mero negli ge nc e not involving moral
turpitude ? l'Jo o T ha.s · no such right. In s eekin g c ontribution ho is subrogated to
Guest's ri ghts against Host, and as Host was n ot guilty of gr oss ne gligence , Guest
has no ri ght s t o be subrogat ed to.
TORTS -- Joint and Sever al Tort-foas ors -- Ccveno.nt Not t o Su o
191 Va. 306
P, a l ocomotive fir or:m.n f'or theN Ry. Co ., was injur ed when tho l o comotive in which
he was riding co_llided r,tt <J. crossing with a tr act or driven by D. In consider ation of
$3500 p gave tho r a ilwc.y C·::lmpany a s i gned c 0venant that he would not c ommenc e any action a~a. inst it f or drunage s arising out cf the collision . The;:; covenant expressly r es erved ·the ri ght in P t o institute D. l at er acti on a gains t D and in addition c ont ni ned
thes e words, "It is expressly uP-dvrstoocl thfl t this instrument is mer e ly a covenant
not t o s ue and not a r e l eas e ." P l at E:r instituted suit aga ins t D, allegin g tha t the
collision was the proximate r esult of D's ne gli Genc e in driving ont o the cross ing in
fr ont of the t r a i n . D fil ed a special pl oo in bar r ecitin g the above covenant and
tho r ul G that r e l eas e of one j oint t ort-f eas or is a. r e l eas e 0f all in s pit e of any
r es ervs.ti on of ri ghts against the oth \J r s . In r ep licati on P contended that this was
no t a r e l eas e but me r e l y 9. covenant net t o su e and that ther e was n othing t o show
that D and the r a ilway w0r e j oint t ~ rt-f easo r s anyway.
Hl3 l d : Judgment f or D. By the gr eat wei~-;ht of aut hority e l sewher e a covenant not
t o su e , as distinguished fr or:! a. :re l 0t'1so , docs not oper at e t o d i schar ge the covenant or's claim a gainst othor j ~) int t ort-f eas or s . But Vir gini a ho.s ado pted tho strict
c ommon l aw viow that r..:ny s ettl <>ment n.nd r e linqui shment of ri [!;hts £tgainot ono t ortf eas -.r oper ates as n.n a.c c or J. and sa.tisf'o.ction ani extingu is he s t ;1c ri ght t o sue other
t or t -f oas ors r ot;o.rdl os s of tho f or m ,if t ht:: r elinquishment. P' s cont ention that ther e
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i s no showing th t: parti e s we r e j oint tort-fe'lsors is an swer D.bl -1 in two ways. [<' irst)
i··.n.vin g s1.; ttl ed with the railwa y company, he i s es toppe d to deny th n.t hEJ held o. cla i m
.-:.o. [~(", ins t it. Mor e ove r, sinc e P ha d but a singl e indivisibl o cn.use of o.ction f or dt~n 
.-.. f~(;s f or his pe r son n.l injuries, in de t erminin g whe the r h e h as r e cived s a tisfa c ti on
t !wr (:~ for, it · is irrnnn.t 0ria.l whethe r thos e gu ilty of the wr ongdoing wer C'; t echnica lly
joint tort-fen.sors.
·
"I'OHTS

Proximate Cause

X n egli ge ntly r a n into Y's ca r, and Y's car ca me to

·. 190 S.E. 82
n stop on tho sido of tho ro a d

;:;~..Yld

Y got out. Z n egli gent ly ran i nt o X ' s car, which had stopped, struck it a glllncin g blow, ~nd befor e getting .his co..r undor control had run int o Y injuring him. Y
sue d X for all t"ho damages. Result?
"V'Ihe r o thor o inte rve n e s the inde p end ent act of a third pn.rty b e twc <m th<.; n eg li genc o
of the d e fendant and the resulting injury which is its imme d i at e c a us e , rto r e cove ry
can b e sustainod. 11 So X is lia ble in this c ase only for th0 injury t o Y's cn.r.

TORTS •
ProxiD1Jlt e. Cause
191 S .E. 651
Landlord n 0g l octed t o furnish metnl fir o oscnpos r.1 s r oquir od by ordinance. Fir e
os cape could. hov o boen o.t o i thor e nd of hall or in middl e of building . Tpe r e wer e
woodon stairways at each end of ha ll. ' Docoased wa s burn0d t o deo.th b e cau se of ina bility to got into and thr ough the hall. The woocle n ste ps a t e ither end of the ho.ll
wer e not burned . Is l a ndl or d lia ble ?
No , as proximate cn.use o f death was ina.b ility to r eo.ch ha ll, and dec.th wou-ld ha·,re
r es ulted e ven if ther e had b e e n a . met rJ. l fir e esco.pe n.t e"ncl of hall.
192 s .E. 772
Proximat e Cause
TORTS
P w0.s. standing on ei. gr ade cr ossing l r;o kin g a t a n a pproQching train, the enginee r
of whi.ch .f;d:ilo d t o give statut or y s.i gnn. l s . Suddenly P dec i ded t o cr oss in front of
it i n stead of t o wait, but poo r P did not quit e make it, D.lld h e r pers onal r e pr esentative is now suing the Southern Ry . Co . ~·Vhat r esult?
He ld: V-//:56-41 6 , which pro,rides th o.t if Railr o ad f £dls t o gi v e s t atut ory signals
P ' s c ontributory n egli ge nc e. i s n ot c, b ~~r b ut merely g~)OS in miti gation of dama ges, is
not n.pplicabl e whor e sole pr oximnt o c·.tus e o f inj ury i s negli r;encc of Plaintiff. Under such circumsta nc es tho giving of tho s i gno.. l c ould Give such party no i _n f orma ti on
h o . d i d not a lready possess, 'J.nd fa.ilur e to give si r.;nals c ouLl not b e said t o b 0 a
c •; ntrib uting caus e ;)f the -'l ccid ont.
·
194 S . E. 69 2
Thor e
wor o stru etli ghts. P wn.s blind ed by tho li ghts of an a pproaching c o.r and r o.n into
D's car. P wa s s e ri ously i n jure d . Is D lia bl o ? 1-Jc. ,. D.s vi0 l a ti on o f sta tute, whil e
nogli genc e per s G, W (.tS not n pr oxim~t o c auz o o f the a cci,lon t.
TORTS

Pr oximate Ca use

D, in v i o l a tio n of s t u.tute , p a rked his c a r withuut a. t a il li i_'; ht aft e r dark.

197 S .E. 4 68
Pr oximate Caus e
TOR TS
S owned n. new Pierco- Arr aw c nr, which h~:J l d 24 .gn: l a ns o f 1;o. s •· He sto pp0d a t the
StB.nclard Filling Sb.ti on o.nd h u·-1 it fill r:~cl up. It went ab out a milo when it sputt e r ed nnd sto pped in fr ont · of the Alnc-;rican Fillin g: StAti on . Tho a.tt endn.nt ther e said
t he gas pr ob ab ly h f. ..< vmt c r :l.n it. He obtn.inod 11 tir e -t o s t in [~ p'ln , tha t h o l d s ome s ix
gall ons, nnd a tub <3 c:.n l s t a rt ed t o •lr ain •! Ut t h rJ gas o l ine . S was v ery angry a nd r e queste d the o.tterid a.nt t o t .-:tlcc~ . him t o th e St undar d St a ti on s ,J h o c nulcl prote st ::tbo ut
getting watE;r . Thls wa s drmo a s a f avor r e luct antly co ns ontorl t o by owner of the Amor
i cD.ll St a ti on, who SQi d thnt he c ould not hanrll e a ll t hE:- businoss by liims olf. Ev e ryon v
f o r go t ab out the dr o.ining ope r ations , n.n~l th e pun r nn e ver a.n l th e gas start ed to run
cl own the gutt or. Someon e was h uorJ t ·) so.y , "I wond e r i f th 'l.t i~'> gas0 lin c or wat e r,"
o.nd he n.ppliod the light ell mat ch t est . The Pi erc e - Arr ow was burned . I s the St a ndard
li n.blo? Is th Ame rican l iable ?
Ho ld: Applyin g the f r1 r es i ght test , nn.turo.l s <;qu onco t os t, t?.nd substo.ntial f a ctor
t es t o f tho R th'lt tho o.ct o f tho Stand.er d wo.s t e- o r ewJt e . Thor o wer e t oo many inte rv oninfs circumstances . A l s~) , h e wa s barr od , by his c ontribut or :r n egli gence , fr om
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l'e :::,ove ry from the American Oil Company. Note that if r e asonabl e people might diff c :c· .
qu.:.; s tion of proximate caus e is for jury.
1'0R'!'S

Proximat e Cause

1 S.E. ( 2d ) 261

On8 who se e s a train approaching when thBr e is y et time to stop, and is injur ed irl
a t t <Jmnting; to cross the track .ahead of i.t, cannot r EJ cove r from r n.ilroa.d on ground o f

:'a:i.lur <::- ·so sound whistl ~) , since there would be no causal conn e ctj_on b etwe en such
failur e :\nd the accident. But if failure to give statutory signo.l contribute s in a ny
wo.y to crossing collision, injured person may r er~ ove r from rflilrond despite gross
n e t~ li gcnc e , which may a s a result of st atut e :l.n Vir ginia miti gat e the amount of r ocovery but _canno;t . preve nt it. (And 11 may " moa.ns 11 must 11 - - 185 Vo. . 908)
TORTS
Proximate Cause
3 S.E. (2d ) 169
A bus driver, in violation of sto.tut e , stoppr;;d his bus on paV'Jcl. surface of a thr oolar10 highwn.y"' withou} giving any signal. X, with his guest, P, was a pprdaching in a
car. X was not watching and several seconds lntor ran· into tho bus . Ct'J1 P r e cover
from the Bus Co.?
Held: No, becaus e the sole proximate caus e of the accid e nt was thG officicnt intor
v e ning act of X in not keeping a lookout. Benc e th e ne g li genc e of the Bus Co. was no
a proximate caus e of __.tho accident; nor' is this e vc.-r: '·'· c.a s e of concurrent neglige nc e .
TORTS
Proximats Cnus c
3 S.E • . (2d) 397
The violation of a statut" , while lfne b li ~;ence pe r se, 11 will not support a r e cove ry
f or damages unl e ss such vi o le.tion p:-oximnt" ly contributPd to th;:; injury. Vihere bus ,
in violation of stntut e , had stoppe d partially on hi t:~hw:w to discharge passenger · and
was proc eedin g to move f orward when ov3rtuking truck side swipe d lms and collided with
a.n onc omin g automobil e , causing d eath of mot orist, the stopp ing of th e bus partly on
th e highway in violat i on J f st n.tuto was 11 r emot e c ::1us c ," a nd negligence of ·truck drive r, who c ould have obs e r ved bus when it wn.s 400 f ee t ah e ad of truck but fail e d to do
so, wa s sole proximate caus e of collision. ·whcro a ~ 0 c cnd tort-feas or becom0s n.w are,
or by ex or-cis e of ordinary car e should be · a~ar t: , :- f the - .~ xj_st e nc e of a potential dange r created by n egligfJnc e of n.n ori ginal t ort-f e o.s or a nd th e r e afte r by ·nn inde p endent
act of n eglice nce brings ab out .nn accident, tho e c ndition cr ea.teq by tho original
tort-feasor b e c omes me r e ly a circumstance o f the accident ansi is n ot o. proximate caus :
the r eo f, and .the intervr:m in g indepond E:nt tl.EJgli geno e of the second t ort-feas or b e come s
th e s o l o proximate c n.us c ;.::f the accident. Generally, tho ju1·y and not th o· cQurt has
th o ri ght t o det e rmine ·. vhat is the pr oximate c o.us o ')f an aut omobile ~ccid q nt, but,
whe n the facts nr e n ot d isputed a nd a re susc e ptiblo r; f but em u inf er e nce ,· :the que sti on b e c omes on e o f l n.w f or the c ourt.
TORTS
Proximat u Co. us '4 S .E. ( 2d ) 78 6
Pede strians we r e. stand ing on th ~.;; ri Ght s i d o of the r oad a t night and wer e struck by
a truck a pproaching , fr om the r e ar, t he drive r of which C')Uld have sven them 350 f eet
o.h oad e. nd c otlld ho.ve avoid ed strikin~: thom by a slight turn t o the l eft.
He l d : Violati on of sta tute r e quiri ng pede stri Qns t o kee p t o l e ft wa s n ot a proximate c nus e .,f a ccident. Als o that last cl ear chanco ch ctrine applios.
TORTS
Pr oximate Ca us e
Civil Conspir ncy
179 Va. 335
p brought an a ction of tre spass on the cas e against D and E~ all egin g tho.t 'th 0y
conspir ed t o ex pel hir!' fr om the Union t o which th ey o. ll b e l on ged and t o pr ev ent him
f"r oni havin g a fair h e-c.ring on the ch('.r ge that h e wa s assisting c ompeting uni ons. P
admitted the truth of this l a st stateme nt c..t the hearing .
He l d : No c aus e of a ction s t ate.cl.. In o civil C(mspirocy darnnr.es must b e all eged
and proved . It must a ls o b e a ll Gir,c d s.nd proved th at the c (·• nspir n.cy was the J?roximate
c aus e of tho damage . In the inst n"Gt C flS O th e c.dmissi ons of P c ould very we ll h a vo
b ee n t he pr oximat e c ausu of t ho d.oma c;o , r ath er th:m the O(' nspiracy. Not e : Ip criminal c onspir a cy n o drunage n e ed b e pr oved .
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TORTS
Proximate Cause
186 Va. 669
X drove a truck for Y an~ was a competent driver. He inadvertently allowed his
dr iver's license to expire. Y knew this fact but allowed him to drive anyway. X
stopped by his sister's house, and her children came running out and started to clim~
on the truck. She ordered them to go around in the back yard and stay there. One oi
t hem, a ged 6, snelik:ed back, climbed i nto the truck, and hid hims e lf. When X sta rted
s:way, tho boy be came panic-stricken and jumped from the truck and was killed. Is Y
lia.blo?
Held: No. X's not having a driver's permit was not a proximate caus e of the child's
injury, so it is not necessary to consider any other points.
TORTS ;
Proximate Caus e
187 Va. 222, 227
Dr. D negligently ran into P. Th~ force of the car drove a portion of P's metal
garter and portions of his clothes into his leg. Dr. D s ewed up P's wounds, l eaving
parts of his garter and clothes ther e in. P gave Dr. D a release for a ll damages arisi ng out of the collision. Sometime l at er gangrene s et in, and P was permanently injured.' He sued Dr. D for ne gligently treating the wounds. Dr. D r e li ed on the r e ·
l ease. What judgment?
Hold: ·The s econd tort was independ ent of tho first. A r e l eas e of Dr. D in his
capacity as chauffeur does not r ol eas e. him from ~ tort committed in his ca pacity as
a doctor. One cannot r easonably f or esee th at if he injures a man hi s dqctor is going
to be so gros s ly n egli gent as to s ow f or e i b~ substances i nto his wounds. Hence the
first wrongful act is not the proxL~at e cauJe of the s econd one . Cf. A.L.I. Torts,
Se ction 457, wher e the ori ginD.l wrongdoe r is made lir.tble f or t he risks of medica l att ention whether render ed in a proper or n<1 gligent manner.
TORTS
Pr o~imat e Ca us e
187 Va. 384
The D Ry. Co . l eft one of its coal cars s o that it pr oj ected ha lfway a cross a hi ghway. Although the night w~s dark and f oggy, thG coa l c ar wa s not lighted. P was
trave ling about 20 miles ~n hour wi t h hi s eye Qn the whit e line in the center of the
ro ad. The c oal car obstruct ed the l eft ha lf of the r oad as P ~pproabhcd on his right.
The white line stopped abruptly when it came t o the r ailway cros s ing, and P r an into
the c oal car and wns injur ed. The court instructed the jury that if they b e lieved by
a pre ponder ance of the evidence that tho c oa l car was on P's l oft side of the highway
tltey should find f or D. Was this instruction proper?
Hel d : No . The statute r equiring peo ple t o drive on tho ri ght w::> s not pass ed f or
the prote ction of r ailroads while st orin g their unli ghted cars on public hi ghways at
night. The jury might have f ound that P's be ing on the· wr ong side was inadvertent
and a condition or circumstance of the collisi on r athe r than a proxirr~te caus e ther eof. At any r at e it was err or not t o submit this i scu e t o the jury.
TORTS
Proximat e Cause
194 Va.• 692
According t o D's evidenc e , he was drivinb north in the l0ft northbound traffic lane
when the car in fr ont of him suddenly st opped , wher eupon D Lad t o s t op suddenly without giving s ignals. and P, who was f ollowing on n mot or sco ot er, ran into D and was
hurt. Acc ording to P's version, D. was i n the ri ght northbound t r affic l ano , turned
suddenly and without s i gna l into tho l eft l ano , and as sudd enly stopped wi thout giving any s~gna l, although P admitted that he saw D's car mu.ke this turn and slowed
down f or that r eas on. .The court i nstructed the j ury that i f D f a iled t o give ade quate signa ls, t hen he was liable t o P unl es s F w11s cont ri butorily ne gli gent. D als o
asked f or an instruction which was c ontrary t c his evidence a ltho u ~h supported by P' £
evidence .
He ld: (1) The instruction given was orroneous, becaus e it r e quired D t o give a si gnal even if i t wer e not pos s ible f or him t o do s o 9ocnu s e of the sudden .s to p of the
car i n fr ont of him. (2) Unl ess D' s turni ng int o the l s ft t raffic l ane wa s a proximate c aus e of P' s injury, it i s i.nunat eris. l whether or nr-:.t p.t;t gave si gna l s at that
t i me. (3) D i s entitled t ~ any ·proper ins truction he wishe$ th11t i s ba sed upon relevant .. eviden-ce even though he himse lf contends t he f acts wer e differ-ent.
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?OR fS
Foreseeability of Result
104 Va. 39
P leased a house to D for one year. D abandoned the premises leaving the door un locked. Thre e weeks later it was burned by some tramp. P sued D. What judgment?
He ld: For D. Loaving the door unlocked was not a malicious act. "If the wrong
·md the r osulting damage are not known by c·ommon experience to be natur a lly and usu·. '- :
ly in sequence, and the damage does not, according to the ordinary course of events,
f' ollow from the wrong, then the wrong and the damage are not sufficiently conjoined
••••• as cause and effect t 'o support q.n action." The wrongful act of tho tramp wo.s n.r
efficient intervening cause as a matt'tlr of law. Cf. Hines v. Garr ett, 131 Va. 125,
whore defendant railway was held liable for a criminal assault made on a female passenger who was negligently carried past. her destination and let of~r near a city durnp
about dusk when to the knowledge of the officers of the railway tramps made their
headquarters th ere. Such an attack or efficient interve ning cause could have been
foreseen, and. in such a cO:se there is no break in tho causal connection~
TORTS
Foreseeability of Result
186 Va. 74
P, rtged 75, wa s in the D Hospital for nn eye operation. He had boon warned not to
att empt to go to the bathroom bu,t to rin g for n. nurs e , who would send for an orderly.
He rang and rang and rang. After waiting for s ome thirty minutes he attempted to go
hims e lf, as the pain ru1d embarrassment' v;er o unbearable . He f e ll and broke his hip.
De f e ns e : Proximate caus e of accident was his own 11ct in going himself..
.
Held for P. Such an 11tt e:mpt on P 's part c ould have been forese en. The cause of P 1
going himself was f a ilur e o f hospital nurs e to pay any attention to his bell. Unde r
such circumsta nces ther e is no e ffici ont intervening c a use r e lieving D. Compare: Ir
184 Va. 994 an intoxicat ed pass en ger was nc;: g li ge ntly put off a bu)f) in a dangerous
place and run over by a "third -po.rty. Ee ld: No break in caus a l connection. In
111 Va. 32 a pass e nge r was n<J gligently d irect ed to wr ong train. .A.ft er it started,
he jumped off injuring himself. It was h e ld that his ovm n egligent act in jumping
off was sole proxima t e caus e of injury. But in this case passenger voluntarily
jumped , while in hospital case P wa s f orc ed by his pain to do a n act D should have
anticipated. R#(r43 of Torts, "An intervening act of a humrm being or animal which
is a normal respons e t o the stimulus o f a situation cr e at ed ~y the actor's neglige nt
c onduct is not a superseding caus e o f harm to another ••••• "
' TORTS
For(;3see a bility o f Re sult
187' Va. 222
Dr. Ono pulled P's t oo th but negligently l o ft a r oot in her gums. He r e fused t o d e
anything f urther by way of tr eatme nt <:. nd paid P $225 f or u r e l ease. P the n went to
Dr. Two who pulled an ad j ac ent t ooth and s owed s ome a bs orb ent cott on into the cavity
mad e by the r0movo.l o f thu t ~Jo th. She su ed Dr. · Two , wh0 relied on the rel eas e she
had gi ven Dr. One .
Ho ld: For P. The s e cond wrong by Dr. '1\vo was not Cl:'. us od by the first wrong of Dr.
One. Ho c ould not r eas ona bly foresoo o.ny such g r () SS n egli gence by another doctor.
Eve n thou gh the injury t o P' s gums mo r ~;ed int•J on o injury, she is still entit'led t o
a chan ce t o prove the runount of ea ch t\nd t o r o cov <? :r fr om Dr. 'rvro f or h,is sec ond i ·njury t o he r. The or d inary rul e that if X injures Y a nd Y goes t o a doctor who tr eats
him unskillfully X is liable f or the ln.tte r injuri e s a ls o , ho.s n o application he r e ,
b e caus e (1) Dr. Two was n ot continuing tho r ~mo vo. l of tho r oot but performing a distinct oper ati on a..11d (2 ) tho sewin g of tho cr) tt ,J n into the c avity was s o extraordina r :y
as not t o be r oaso n o.bly a nticipat ed .
TORTS
For e s e eability of Resu lt
193 Va.. 543
p was a p ass onger on D's bus. Tho bu s st opped t o l ot her o ff w~th th o rear of tho
bu s on ther tro.c.ks of a r a ilroad line opor e.t ed so l e ly by th e M Co . for s.e rving th e
needs o f its c oal mine . P a light ed and waited a mome nt t o s ee who.~ the operator of
tho bus was go ing t o do . Some ca r s on th e railr oad we r e b oin g backed out and struck
the bu s , causin g it t o b e shoved upon P. Both th o bus drive r and th,bs o in char ge of
th o tr a in should ho.vo s ee n each ot i1c r. D cont ends tha t its n er; ligenc e in s t opping
the bus on th o tr a cks was a r omot o cause of tho accid e nt and tho.t M'a ne g li g~nce was
t he s ol o pr oximat e caus e cf P's injury.
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Held: A jury could find that D could reasonably have foreseen th e intervening
caus e , and in such a case the .causal connection is not broken.

I

TC)li.TS

Assumption of Risk

Agency

193 S.E. 524

r was
tile t ruck driver's helper. He told truck driver th e brakes were bad, and truck drive ·
pronii sed to i'ix them that night. .Eext day P. was inJured as a result of defective
br a kes, o. s . the truck driver had not fixed brakes. The ovme r of truck employed only
3 mon. Is he liabl e to P?
Hold: Ye $ , for ( a) common le·,v applio~; (b) knowledge of truck drive r was employe r' ;
knowl e dge; (c) truck driver .was a vice-principal and not a f 0 llow servant; (d) P did
not a ssume risk when he continued work as a result of promise that brakes would b e
fixed. $20i000 r e covery sustaine d.
·
A truck driver was in charge of a truck and under duty to keep it in r epair.

TOR.TS
As sumption of Risk
12 S.E. (2d) 821
P, a station agont for the Southern Ry. Co., met his d oath whe n h e f e ll off a
bridge• while cho eking · numbers on ·freight cars that wen.: in interstate commercE.:. The
Ry. Co. had violat e d no st a tl.J.t c , and the dange rs of the work we r e obvious and fully
known toP. What are P's rights?
They are governe d by th o F ed e ral Employe rs Li a bility Act, 45 u.s.c.A. #&1 and 54.
P su ed for $25,000. He ld: No r e cove ry. Und E:J r this act a ssumption of risk is a defens e unl e ss tho Ry . Co. h as viol::l t od a statuto e nact e d for tho safety of employe e s
and such violation is _a proxima t e caus e of the injury, or the r a ilway compa ny has
in some other wa.y b oen n eg lig:.e nt. I n a lJ. other ca.s os ( a nd this is one of them), the
a ssumption of risk is still a d e f en se in nn a ction brought und e r this a ct. Not e : If
Workme n's Comp e ns a tion La.w had a pplied, t hen assumption of risk would have b een no d e·
f enso. ·
TORTS

Contribut ory Negligence
198 S.E. 441
Is the foll owin g instruction proper in n n eg li genc e ca s e wher e defe ndant r e.lies
upon plaintiff's c ontribut ory n eg lig e nc e '~ "The court instructs the jury that i f the
defendants rely upon the c ontribut ory negligenc e of tho pla intiff as a d e f ens e in
this c a s e , the n tho burden is up on s a id d e f end a nts t o pr ovo such contributory negligence by a pr e ponderanc e of tho evide nce ." ·
-A. . Tho above should be suppleme nted by adding the r e t o "unless such contribut ory
negli ge nc e is disclos e d by plaintiff's evidenc e or cnn be fairly inferre d from the
circumstanc e s." In this particular c a s e , since neithe r pla i ntiff's e videnc e nor the
circumstance s showed th at plaintiff was guilty of c ontribut ory n eg lige nc e , the instructi on a s originally given wa s h armle ss .
Note: F or c ontributory n e gli ge nce t o b e n bnr it must ho.vo b een a substanti al fact or in causing the accident . He nc G em instructio n tha t no rocov e ry should b e allowod
if plaintiff's n egli genc e " in any d ogr ee " c ontribut e d t r) the a ccid ent is err oneo us
as overemphasizing ~rivialitios.
Q.

TORTS
Contribut ory Ne gli g0nc e
1 S.E . (2 d ) 255
Is c ontribut ory n e gligence o f doco o.sod a bar -i f h o is kill ed whil e cr oss ing a railr oad track in a. city that ho.s no ordin anc e r e quiring any sort of s i gnal t o b e g iven ?
Yes. V#56-414 a ppli es only t o c asa s in which n si gnal i s r e quir ed by statute or
ordinanc e . In a ll oth er c o.s os C'"lnnne>n l aw principle s a pply.
TORTS
·Contri-but ory Ncg li [~u nc o
12 S.E. (2d) 826
D e nt e red a highway fr om ·'.l pri v at 0 r oad . He st opp0d. and l r)Q k od o.nd then e nt er ed
the hi ghway, whor e h o was s truck by I' wh0 vvos tr a ve ling at nn exce ssive r a t e of
speed • . P contends h e had tho ri ~~ht o f wny . Dis cuss .
By V#46-2~8 the d riv8r of any ve hicl o tr ave l ing at an unl awfu l speed f orfe its any
right o f wrxy which h u mi ght otherwi se ha ve .
TORTS
Q. 12.

Contribut ory N8 gli go nc e
Bo.r Exam Do c., 1943
A is a d.romo.n on a Norfo l k a.n,d Weste rn tr a in runnin g fr om Roanoke., Va. t o
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Hager s town, Md. The en gineer :('an by a red light which could have been observed by
t .w:J fi reman and the engineer for., a distance of a mile.
By virtue of this ne gligence
a bend - on collision resulted with another train, and the fireman lost his life. His
wid ow duly qualified as administratrix and instituted a suit under the Federal Employ
crs Liability Act for $50,000. Under the rules of the Company the fireman was charge<
with joint responsibility with the engineer in the proper observance of signa ls. At
tho tria l the defend ant company offered to prove the rules, to which couns e l for the
pl a intiff objected. (1) How should the court rul E;) , and, (2) assuming that the s.uit
wo.s brought in the Oircuit Court o.f Warren County, Virg~nia, wh'lt would be the limit
of tho plaintiff's recovery?
·
A. Under tho Federal Employers Liability Act (which governs employees of railv·).ys
engaged in interstate commerc e ), contributory ne gligence of the injured party is not
a bar to un action, but may be shown in mitigation of damages. · Henc e the company
should be allowed to prove the rules, as they ar e relevant on the question of contrib·
utory ne gli gence. The limit under the State Act is $25,000,. bl.lt Stat e Act applies
only if injury occurr ed whil e engaged in intrastnte corrrrnorce. Ther e is no hard and
f ast llmi t ·under the Foc1eral Act, the ordinary rules as to damages applying.
TORTS
Contributory Neg ligence
184 Va. 94
p r eached the D Filling Station at i2 :30 a.m. and asked the attendant to fill his
gas tank. P got out of his car to go to the r est room. He asked no one wher e it
was, open ed a door, f e lt a r ound for a li ght; and f e ll int o the greas e p:lt and was
s eriously injur ed.
He ld: P is barr ed by his contributory negli gence . He ho.d no implied invitation to
grope around tho pr emises in the dark.
TORTS
Contributory Ne gli gence
V#5 6-416
· 185 Va. 908
p was injured in a grade crossing railway accident at a public crossing. The D Rai .
way Co. had not given the signals required by st atute. V#56~416 gives the injured
party under these circumst ances a cause of action in spite of his own contributory
negli gence (unless that is sol e proximat e caus e of the a ccident) and concludes "but
the f a ilure of the tr ave lzr to ex:ercis e (due ) car e may be considered in mitiga.t·ion of
damages."
-Held: May means mus t in the above cas e t a king into cons1idoration the purpos e and
history of the st atut e . Hence a written instruction t e lling the jury that it may
take P' s negli gence into considenttion to mitigate the damages is r ev er s ible error,
even if court has told th e jury or a lly that it must do so. Th~t written instructions
go to the jury and would carry more we i ght than the court's or al st at ement.
TOR TS
Contributory Ne gli ge nce
186 Va. 106
A municipal ordinance r equired trains switched across Ma. in St. to come to a stop
and for a fl a bffian to si gnal traffic befor e tr a in proceeded. The D Co. failed to have
a. fl agmru! ther e . P was injur ed when tra in struck hi s truck, a lthough tra in was in
cle ar view. If he had been looking , ho could ha.vG s ee n the tr ain more easily than
ho could have seen a flagman who would ha ve point ed out the obvious. ·
He ld: P i s' barr ed by his contribut ory n og li go nc e a s a. matter of l11w. Note: In
t his c as e t he do ctrine of compar ative neg li genc e (wher e r a ilroad f ails to give statutory signa l s , negligence. of pla intiff is n ot a bar but go0s in mitigatio n of damage s .
V-#56-416) was not r e li ed on in tria l c ourt. Henc e it cnnnot be ur god f or the first
time in the Supr emo Court of App.oa ls. 'rho court i ndicat ed, howevor, that the s ol e
proximat e -c aus e of the acc i dent was P's drivin g in fr ont of the train, in which evont
p could r e cover nothing . Not e: "Noithor go ngs or go.t 0s r e li eve a travel er from the
exerci se of or dipary car e o.nd ca uti on •. I n 160 Va . 633 , it was he l d that even thou gh
a fl ag;rnan. on th(; cros s i ng s i gno. l ed t ho t r :wdu r t o cr os s , the tro.vo l er wa s not r e lieved of t he duty of l ooking ."
TORTS
Contribut ory Ncg li go nc o
Muni cip r:t l Co r por ations
189 Va . 576
Pl aintiff knew of a. depr es s i on i n a s i dewal k i n Ri chmond but t hrou gh inad vert ence -·
0r f or getfulness he st ep ped in it, slipped , . and br oke his L g . Is he guilty of
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c ontributory n e gligence as a matt er of law?
!-Ie ld: Ye s. He OY'f0S the city the duty to us e his s 0ns es and not to walk into def oc ~
that ho is familiar with and could easily avoid by the exercis e of ordinary care .
Otht~r case:
P knew some boards on a board sid ewalk we re loose. She stepped on a
bo8rd without first ascertaining whether or not it was s e cur e , and it fl ew up and hit
rwr.- in th:c; face. He ld: P's action is barred by her contributory n eg lige nce, ll O Va.
296 .
TORTS
Contributoi'Y Negligence
Railway Crossing .Cas e
191 Va. 212
Decoasod was kill ed when the garbage truck he was driving collid ed with e. train.
The a ccid0nt occurr e d at a crossin g used by the City of Pet e rsbur g , with the a pprova l
of tho railroad company, for access to its city dump. When not b e ing us e d by city
trucks, the ·crossing was barr ed to pr event public us o . On th e occasion of the a ccid e nt d e ceas ed should h a ve s e en the train coming . His a dministr ator, howev0r, cont ends th,a t tho ~ a ilroad did not give statutory signals, and tho.t und e r the Vir ginia
statutrJ, dEJc oas e d' s ne gligence is not a bar but only oper a t es to miti gat G the dama ge s
He ld': The statute (V-#5 6 -416) is applicable to failur f3 to gi v o the si gnals r e quir e d
by ·l ow "on approaching a gr ade crossing of r, public .highway 11 ::md has no application
t o a non-public crossing us e d only by the city ii:lmployeos. Thus the contributory n egli gence of deceas e d i s a bar to any action.
.
TORTS
Contributory Neg ligenc e
193 Va. 579
S 's truck had mechanic .,1 troubl e and wo.s for ced to s t op on tho highway. No fl a res
we re put out, 9.lthough fhl.r os a r e r .oquir cd by law. Te n minut es l a t e r P approache d i n
a truck and did n ot r ea liz e ~J.t onc e that S ' s truG:k h ad como to a stop. Whe n he was
about 30 yards fr om the truck, h8 r en. liz od t h e true s t at e of affairs. Howeve r, wh0n
he we nt to . put on his bra kG, his foot slippod, hittin g th e acc 0 l e r ator and causing
P's truck to plow int o S 's truck. Estch sued th e other, a nd the jury r eturned a verdict in f a vor of P. S a ppeal ed, cl a imin[ th ~t tho verdict should have been in his
f a vor.
He ld: Each is b o.rr 1:1 d by his c ontribut ory n eg li ge nce. S's n eg ligenc 0 wa s of a continuin g natur e ri ght up t o th e mom0nt of tho co llision. If fl a r es had b ee n place d
as r e quir e d by statut e , it is pr ob abl,') tha t P wonld ha v o c ompr eh ende d the situation
soon e r. Whil e h e was und oubt ed ly ina tt entive , .?' s nogli g·.:mc o cannot b e r egard ed us
the superseding caus e o f tho accident.
TORTS
Contribut or y Negli gon c 0
194 Va . 572
P wa s D's inv it oe a t its studio whero ~he h <.1.d go ne to t ak e part . in a f as hion show.
Shu was dir ected by W, an empl oy ee of D, t o p <t s s i n sing l e fil e th r ou gh o.n e ntrance
a t tho loft of th o r oar of th e s t age., tl-t0 fl o•J r o f whicl~ , as c ons truct e d, h a d two
l ev e l s , the l owe r of which had n dr op o£' from four t n s:·.x inches . This drop was
l o cated just a st op or two f r '1m the cn t .:-nnc c . T -1.0 f l oo r s <; f ea ch l ev e l wer e b oth
mado of hi ghly po li3he d oak . The r e wuo b ri ght :t. i0hts .'lbove cmd no s i gns or othE:r
indicati on o f th e cha n e;o in l ev E: l .. ') thor tha n tho urop its o lf. P inadve rt ently
ste ppe d ove r th e d r o p·, l os t h o:r ·on.l ance , and f e ll. ·:'1:-H;; t ri o. l court struck out P' s
e vidence on the g r ound tha t sho wa.s cont ribut ori ly ncg.J.l c;ent as a matte r of l aw.
He ld: Rov or sed and r ema nd ed . It was nt l eas t a jury ~ u e stion ns t o whe the r or
n ot s h e was o c ntribut orily n t;g li g;.; nt . A jury c oul d fin d '..hat tho s ame type of fl oo r
and the r ofl e <Jtion of th o bri gh t light c t oge the r, with no 'Pnr n i n~; of any kind , ab so 1 ved hor fr o.m ony n e[~ li go no u (m h ur part.
TOR TS
Co nt~ibutory Nog ligcnce
194 Va. 6 70
He ld: . A biowclis t who i s r iding 0n t he s h0u l d or of a r o ad , l;u--ns int o the r oad
in fr ont of a ~ ar, a nd f a il s t o f~ ivu th0 s i gnal fo r n l e ft tur n 1\S r e quir ed by st a tut e is ba rr ed £"r om r .::. cov e ring; ag;n. ins t J. mot c·ri s t who s truck h h1 imme diate ly the r e after, b ecaus e . h e i s guilty of c ont ribut or y nog li L~en c o n.s Lc ma~~ o r o f l aw.
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TORTS
Violat ion of Statute
Contributory Negligence
12 S.E. (2d ) 833
In violation of a city ordinance X made a U-turn in the midd l e of a block. His ca.t
stalled on the street car track, and a few minutes lat er a street car came along and
r :m into it, injuring X and the car. What ar e X's ri ghts ?
l!eld: He has no ri ghts. While thi s violation of the ordinan ~e was not mat eria l,
s .i.n ce n was not n: proximate caus e of the accident, he was n egligent in not getting
out and pushing his car off the track. · He had just as much chance to do thi s ~s the
str eet car had a chance to stop, and .one cannot shut his .eyes to danger in blind r e li u.nce upon the una ided car e of another without assuming the consequences of the omis ·
sion of such car e . (Hudgins, J. dis sent ing)
TORTS
Hot e :
TORTS

Vio~ation of Statute -- Contributory Negligence
By V'ff 46-247 a pedestrian may l egally wa lk on e ither s hould er of a hi ghway.

Last Clear Chance

186 S.E. 13

1. De f endant is liabl e und er l ast cl ear chance doctrine both wher e he actually s ee s

Pl a int1ff's peril and fails to exercl.s0 ordinary care to a v ert injury, and a l s o wher e
De fend ant, be ing under duty to kee p proper lookout for Plaintiff, by exercis e of ordi ·
nary car e should have see n Pl a intiff's. peril in timo to avoid injury by use of ordinary ca r e ( at l east wh en Pla i ntiff is he lpl ess). 2. Fact that chauffeur was a ct in g
gr atuitously i s irmnat er ial with r es pe ct to own er's liab ility.
TORTS
Last Clear Chance
189 S . E. 169
P was standing in the midd l e of the s tr eot t a lking to a fri end. D negligently r an
into P, who had his ba ck t o D. Is P barr ed by his contributory neg ligenc e ?
As D in the exercis e of due dili g~mc o hn.d a last cler:tr chanc e to avoid the accident, contribut ory negli ge n ce of P i s not a b nr.
Cf. · Hfld P been wa lking t oward the path of the ca r, then b ot h would have been guilty of continuing nGg ligcm co th '1.t contribut ed to the occident to the vory time of the
· a ccident, and m s contributory nogli gonce would then be a bar.
Las t Clear Chance
189 S .E. 342
TORTS
'fwo cars appr oa ched an i nte rs ecti on, eac h having ~ plain view of tho other. Ne itho~
driver wo.s keeping an o.doguo.t o l ookout, o.nd as a. r esult the r e wa s a co llision. Discu-ss fr om the s t andpoint ·or the "last cl ear chance do ctrine . 11
"The doctrine of the l a st cleL"\r chance cannot be succ es sf ully invoked . That n.venuo
of esco.po is not 2:_ ~-w a.y r oad. 11 1Jiiher e en ch has a l as t cl ea.r chanc e , each is 10 qu a ll ~
to blame in not t akin g advantage of thD.t fact.
TORTS
Last Cloar Chance
194 S .E. 665
(a) Upon whom is tho burden of pr oof of whEJ ther or mlt def endant had a last clear
.
chance t o avoid .t he accident?
Headnote 5 r eads ' in part, "Pla i nti f f cann ot r ec over under th'l l a st clear chance
doct rine on mer e per advent ure , and h:.\ S the burden of showing u.ff irmati ve ly by a pt"e pondera.nc o of the ev{d ence that def endant had a l ast cl ear chance to avoid the injury
by us ing ordinary c ar e ." ·
(b) A boy was walking we st erly un th o l eft edge of a r oadway f or west-bound trnffic. Ho r an di ago nally i nto tho r oadway di r ectly in fr ont of a west-b ound auto on
hearing the h rn ther eof. · Driver had l ess than a s e cond t o s ave b oy aft e~ his peril
b.e-ca.me known and could do nothing but sworve t o the ri ght, which he di d , striking the
boy. I s l ast cle ar chance do ctr ine o.pplic F.tblo ?
No . The l a st clear chanc e do ctrinu pr o sup~l s o s t i me f or eff e ctive action and is
inapplicable t o sudden emer genci es aff 0r d ing n o time t •J av'l i d the accident.
TORTS
Last Cl aar Chanc e
8 S.E. (2d ) 301
Plaintiff's int estnt o Wf'. s r olling his bicycl e up a hill em t he ri ght hand s~d e of
the r oad when he was struck by De f endant , who fnil i:ld t :> ko o p a pr opor l ookout.. What
ar e the ri ghts of the - par ti os ? The so l u pr oxima.t G ca use 0f th o accid ent wa ~ D~ f e nd
ant ' s f ai lure t o koep o. pr oper l ockvut , ns he ther eby pr e clud ed hims e lf fr om t a.k;ing
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advantage of the last clear chance to avoid the injury. Hence it is unn e ces sary t ,
d e cid e. whethe r a bicyclist, upon dismounting, should walk on the l e ft as a pedestrJ_::m . It makes no d iffere nce whethe r d eceased was n eglige nt or not negligent, a s t he;
last cle a r chance doctrine h e r e allows a recove ry, ove n though Plaintiff's inte st at •.
vms negligent.
TORTS
Last Clear Chance
178 Va. 207
P was walkin g a cross a brightly light ed street a t night in the middle of the block
a nd without looking out for traffic. D did not s ee h e r ~nd r an his taxica b into h e r
with gr ev.t force while trave ling 40 miles per hour, thG spe ed limit being 25 mil es
per hour. P was seriously injur ed , and the jury awarded he r $15, 000. I s th8 v ordi c
contrary to law?
He ld~
A good verdict. D, if he had b een keeping a prope r lookout, would have ha d
a last clear chance to avoid the accident. He is not .:m ti tl ed to run into he r me r e ly b e cause she was n egli ge nt. In Vir ginin. if defend n.nt did ha v e , or, in th e exercise of a proper lookout, should havo h ad; a las t clear chance to .avoid th e a ccid e nt,•then he cannot rely on P's contributing n 0gli go nce .
TORTS
Last Cle ar Cha nc e
180 Va. 1
P was a gratuitous gu est in D' s ca r, which was full of womon and children. R was
proceeding e ast on Vn.lley St. , which was a n a rt eri a l h i ghwo_y. D was proc eeding
south on Court St., which inte r se ct ed Valley St. at ri ght nn g l e s. vVhen D r each ed
Vall ey St., h o stopp ed his c a r a nd th Em stnrt ed it age.in. R's car a nd D's c a r collided , and P wa s seriously injur ed. P was sitting in the b o_ck soat of D's car nnd
saw R's car approaching some - 150 feet away . Neither D nor R was traveling a t a n
excess ive rat o of speed, :1nd n e ithe r smv th e o the r until th0 moment of tho cra sh.
What ar e the ri ghts of the parties?
P can r e cover fr om D only if D h as b e e n gr oss ly n egli gent . Ho ld: Driving a c ar
a cross an art e ri a l highwa y without kee ping a l ookout when th e co_r is full o f women
a nd children is gross n eg lige nc e . R clc~imo d he had tho r ight of wa y and henc e was
n ot liable . He ld: First, D must h avo ent e r ed V ~ ll cy St. b e f or e R r oached the inters e ction, o_nd the one who first e nter s the int e r section h as tho ri ght o f way ; s e cond, e v en if R did · h av e th e ri ght of way, that _does not '3-bs o lvo him from his duty t o
ke e p o_ prop er l ookout.
, Not e : Tho fact thnt eac h p a rty h o.d .a >last cl oar cLo.nc e t o a void the acc ident pr e clud es tho applic at i o n of th n.t principle , n. s · it rlo os nr)t li e in tho mouth of e ither
t o blame the othe r for the samo thing th at he hims e l f 1s guilty of.

182 Va. 746
Last Cl ear Chance
TORTS
pe ceased wo_s wo_ lking down tho r o c.rl on hi s ri ght l eo_d i ng a !~0 r so . D r an into the
h orse with his co.r, ct:Jusing tht3 hors e t o st ri ke dc:;coased . It l s a violation of
statute t o wa lk on th e hi ghway with ono '1 s b a ck t o traffic. Is D liable ?
Hal d : Yos. He h o_d o_ l o.st cl0ar chanc e t o a void injurin t; do ce osed , o_nd his fo_ilur€
t o avai l himself the r eo f wa s tho col e proximate cau se 0 f the a c c .ldont. D's contributory ne gligenco as a matter of l aw wus a romot e c n.use nndhe nco not a bar.
'l'ORTS
Last Cl aar Cha nco
184 Va. 984
G' s truck broko d own o.t 11 p.m. Th o <'. river the r e of mado n o e ffort to get it off
~he highway.
Ho d id n ot light flar es o_;; r e quir ed by statuto . His t a il lights did
not conform t o statutory r oquir r,;mont s . ?i v e hour s l nt cr H' s truck r an int o G' s
truck. Tho driver of H's ·truck was not k ~ e pin g: a pr op0 r l ook out. What a r e the
ri ghts of the parti e s?
He ld: Both pa rti es a r e bo_rr e d . G' s nogii e;onco Wl . S g,r oss and c ontinued t o the
time o f the accident. G had five h ours in whi. ch t o pr ev ent tho o_ccidont, H only a
f GW seoOiids.
G's truck WO.S 0. tr o.p , rmd G ou ght not t o b e a llowed t o coll e ct damages
fr om o ne who wn.s injured by hi s tr a;:> . G i nvit ed ';_h v d is as t e r and should b oar his
own l oss. · The l u st clonr chance d o ct rine J o os n" I; n pp ly wh or e ' the n egli genc e o f eac'
e ffici ent ly contribut e s t r) the accirl. c;nt t o thu v e ry mome nt t he r eof . To ho l d otherwi:
wou ld pr actica.lly do awa y wit h tho l rw 0f contrif •utory und c on curri ng negli ge nc e .
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TORTS
Last Clear Chance
187 Va. S!J
P owned a farm through which ran the tracks of the DRy. Co. P's hovs c and barn
we re on one side of the tracks and his pasture on the other. He was killed while
driving his car across his private crassing. The only eye witnesses were thf; en g;:i nee r and fireman, who both testified they saw him near the track and gave a warning
·, vhistlo. The jury found for P on the last clear chance doctrine.
Held: The trial court properly set aside the verdict. There was no proof the D
Ry . Co. had a last clear chance to avoid the accident. The employoes could assume
that P would not l eave a safe place for one of danger •. It was impossible to stop
tho tr-ain; whereas, P could have stopped. The sole proximate cause of P's de ath was
his own continuing ne.gligence in crossing in front of a train in full view and in
bro,J.d daylight.
187 .va. 820
Last Clear Chance
TORTS
p was crossing a street after dark between the wpite lines in that portion of the
street marked for the use of pedestrians. When sho was thro e-fourths of the way
acros·s, she saw X' s car one-half block 8.Wo.y a pproaching at a. moderate rate of spe ed.
She quicken0d hor steps to get across first. X did not s ee her "becaus e of the
glar e " of a street light until he was .practicf'.lly on her, when he turned the ca.r
s harply and applied his brakes. P was struck by tho right fender of the car, which
caught her by only a few inches and s eriously injured P. X died shortly there aft e r,
and P sued D, who was X's personal r e pr oscnt o.tive . Tho jury found that P was barred
by her contributory negligenc e , and the court r efused to give an instruction on the
last clear chance doctrine . What result on app 0a l?
He ld (3 judge s diss enting): Affirmed. When P misjudged the speed and distance
of the approac hing car and quick.onod hor steps to pas s in front of it, she was guilty of negligence in walking in front of an a ppror.. ching danger. X could not ·be expe cted to for es ee that any pede strian v;ould be fool enough to cla im the right of
way over an a.utornobil e , 0von n.t an intersection whore pede strians theor etically have
the ri ght of way. He r negligence continued t o tho very moment of the impact, and
X never had time for eff ective action t o pr ev ent the injury. Hence this is not a
last clear cha.nco cas o .
Dissenting judges argue tha.t P ha.d ri ght of way and mot orists must r e cogniz e such
a ri ght. P could assume X would keep a proper l ookout and slow down, v0er, or even
stop, if ne cessary. ThE') dissenting judgas thought that the "glar e "· of a street
light increas ed visibility and that the real caus e of the a ccid ent was X' s failur e
to keep a proper l ookout, and that o. jury might have found, if properly instruct ed,
that he did have , or should hn:ve had, a last clear chance to avoid striking P • .

TORTS
Last Clear Cho.nce
189 Va. 712
0 was driving his car on o. dreary December morn just o.fter daybreak. His windshl.alci was for the most part cover ed with fro st, which h e had negli gently failed to
r-emove . P was walking on tho ri ght s ide of tho street on the hard surfo.ce ther eof
with her back t o D' s a ppr oa ching car. The paved portion of the str eet was only 15
feet wide, and a truck wo s appr oachin g in the oppos ite dir e cti on. D did not sea P
'Cm:td.l it was too l ateto avoid s triking her. Is D liabl e t o P under the last cle o.r
~ doctrine?
!ffild: No. Up to tho v ery moment o f ·tho collision P could have avoid ed the acciby stepping off the pavod portion of the highwo.y. The last cl e ~r chance doc .- ·
is not a one -way street. · She w~~s not in a st ate of he lpl ess ness. Hence she
!_s - orred by her . contributor y ne; gligenco in (l) walking on tho wr ong side of the
· ~~ta~d ( 2) not keeping a bolcout. for tro.ffic c oming up fr om behind; es pecially
whe she s aw that tho·. t:t;"uck appr oach2ng hor was nbout t o block the other half of
'the·-s
et. Three judges c oncurr ed specially. They 'lgr eod with tho r es ult in this
cas-a. b e caus e D did n ot know in timv t o avoid the accid ont thn.t P was unaware o~
h er . danger •
Last Clear Chanc o
194 Va. 47
·De>QeD.sed was one of f our men who wer o pushing a s t a ll ed co.r a l ong the hi ghway in
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tree dark. Be was on the left of the car toward the middle of the highway. D wa s
driving his car at a negligent rate of speed, and h e did not see deceased in time
to avoid striking hirri. Ther e was a conflict in the evid ence as to whether or not
the stalled car had its lights on and whether or n&t it was over the center of the
road. The trial court gave several instructions .on the last clear chance doctrine .
7'l>'\S this proper?
·
He l d : No. The sole ques-tion is whether deceased was guilty of contributory ne gli gence or not. I.f he was pushing a· car without l ights .and over t he center of the
r~ ad, his continuing to act in that· manner was a proximat e cause of the a ccident.
If ho was pushing a car with lights and on his, pa rt of the hi ghway, he. was not guilty of contributory nogli gence. 11 Tho doctrine of l ast cl ear chano.e is to be applied
with caution, and 8. plaintiff is not entitled to recover und er it on mer e. per adven ture . 11 Here there wa s no time for effe ctive s.ction afte r de ceased's per .il wa s discover ed or should h ave been discovered. Henc 0 no instructions should have been
given on the l ast cl ear chance doctrine .
Note: In l94 Va. 116 the . same principle was applied. In that cas e a drunken man
suddenly appeared on a crowded highway. De f ond •:mt was unabl e to avoid striking him
within the s e cond he had at his dispos a l • . It was D. lso stated that the law of ncgligm:ic e as to intoxicat ud persons· is _the s nme us tha t t:lpplico.bl o to the sober.
Last Clear Chance
194 va. 374
TORTS
P was driving his car north on W Str oot which meets at ri ght angl es, · but do es not
cross, H Street ., which l att er str eet runs east and wes t. P was attempting to make
a l eft turn, but his steering gear brdke , and his ca r went straight ahead. He
stopped in such a . position th at t ho r oar of his ca.r projected over tho north half
of H Street. P got out of his car t o size up the situation, and his wife a ls o got
out. The wifo ca ll ed t o ? , who was thon standing to the west 9f his disabl ed auto ,
tha.t ·a car was approaching fr om the. otls t but that she thou ght it was go ing to stop.
Shu th on lo oked t o sue wher e her pet dog had gone . Tho upproaching car did not
stop, ran into P's car with gr oat f orce , and hurl ed it ag'linst P with such viol enc e
that P was killed. P' s wife is suing f or his wrongful de ath. She is the s ol e statutory benefici ary.
Held: ( l) Whether P was. contributorily negli gent i n r e lying on his wife 's statement that the car was going t o stop, and t her eby f ailing t o stop back out of harm's
way, was a jury ques tion. (2) Tho wife is not barr ed as benefici ary on the theory
that she was guilty of net~ li g(m c e . Hor husband was not und er h1.;r control, and she
owed no duty t o keep an eye on tho appr o'l ching cc.r t o ~ee if her first hunch was
the right one . (3) Tho court orr od in givin g on instructi on on tho l as t clear
chanc o . If P was n egligent, his negli c;onc e continued t o the moment of the impact,
and he is burr od. D could not soo P (who was behind the s t a ll ed car) in time t o
avoid injuring him; nor was P at that time in a he l p l ess c ondition. Note : If an
action had been br ou ght f or dam11 ge done t o tho c ar, it. s eems that tho last cle ar
chance doctrine would apply, for D, i n th o exorcise of duo caro ,· should have s een
tho holploss car which P had not yot hn.d time to r emove from t ho hi ghway . ( 4) This
is not a case of harmless err or, · f or undo r the court's i nst ructi ons on the l ast
clear chancEl doctrine the jury wore t old t o find f or the pla intiff e··\en }:;hough P
\
.
wero negli[~0nt.
' I

TOR'l'S
Imputerl Nogli g0nc e
189 ti_.E. 339
X borrowed .a truck which, with the holp of P, he bad loaded with crate~ of chickem
X then asked P to accompany him to he l p unlo ad same at des tinat i on. Du~ ~~ the combined ne gli ge nce of X and D, P wa s injured when X' s truc k and D' s car c ~llided , each
having a clear vi ew of the other. Can P r e cover from D? Can owner of -~ck recover
from D? Yes . X's nu E,li genc o i s not imputed toP, s i nce P nad no contro1 over tho
driving of tho truc k . Negli ge nc e of driver is not imput ed t o ovmer of th~ck wher e
driver is not und er owner's control. In this c ase th er e i s a bailor-bai~Je r e lationship r ather than an cmploy •~r-cmp loy ce r 0l at ionship.
,;
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Imputed Negligence
Joint Enterprise
200 S .E. E.144
Persons are not engaged in joint enterprise so as to impute negligence of one to
t !1e other unl ess each has some right to manage und ertaking and a community of intere
in object of undertaking exists. · The fact that on e sister might defer to the wishes
of anothe r as a matter of courtesy rat_~e! than of duty is not enough to establish a
joint enter prise~ That qc cupants of a.ut6inob"il~ ta~ turns .in_.driving does not of it
sc: lf make the enterprise "joint" so as to make driver's negligence :imputablo· to-· -t he
other occupants. If r elationship of parties is doubtfu~, tho question of whether it
is one of joint enterpris e is for the jury. (Accord: 11 S.E. (2d) at p. 646)
TGHTS

TORTS
Imputed Negligence
181 Va. 800
P was a nine-year-old girl who crossed a city str eet in front of her hous e in the
middl e of the block on th_e way to school in violet ion of a municipa l ordinanc e . Her
mother, M, know that she habitually did this but never tried to correct her. She
was struck by a car driven by D, who failed to keep an adequate lookout, and perma nently injured. M, who was a widow, pa id out $2,000 for bospital and doctor bills.
What ·are the ri ghts of t ho pl'l.rtios?
He ld: . The mother has no ri ghts, us sho is b arr ed by hs r negligence ~n not correcting her daughter's actions. Tho no g~igence of the par ent is not imputed to the chil<
A nine-year-old girl is pr es umptive ly inc 11pablo of being guilty of neg ligence , and,
unless this presumpt.io.n oan be r ebutted , she is entitled to damage s for pain and suffering and potential loss of aarning power oi'ter be coming of age .
TORTS
Imputed Neg ligence
187 Va. 759
F and S wero f ather and 16-year-ol d son. F was driving, · and S was sitting beside
him. Suddenly F r emember ed that ho hn.d forgotton tiJ buy any chicken fe ed, so he madL
a U-turn acr os s a much-trave l ed hi~Shwo.y, giving no :;;igno.l in spite of the fact that
D's c-ar was approaching r apidly. F's ·c::tr WFlS struck by D's car, which was overload e<
and traveling at an exc essive r 8.te c i' spo.;;d . D did not apply brakes or diminish
speed. F' and S wC::Jr e both injured . S sued D ond r e cover ed a ver d ict reas onable in
amount, which the tri a l judge s ot as ide. V'that r osult on appeal'?
He ld: Verdict r e instat od . He r o both F and D wero guilty of negligenc e c ontribute!
to the accident. This make s D liable for all the damages t o s. F's negligenc e is
not i mputed to s. Note that in cas es c f this sort D is not entitled to sue F f or
statutory c ontribution, f or, if he were t o sue , D would st11nd in S 1 s shoes, and S,
who is an unemancipated minor, cannot sue his f at her fer a personal t ort. Of c ours e
F c annot hold D for his injuries be cause of his own c ontribut ory ne gligen~e which
c ontinued to tho very mom0nt of the impact.
TORTS
Imput ed Negligenc e
189 Va. 459
p was rid ing in X's car in the fr ont seat as X' s guest. X drove across the tr acks
of the D Railway Company withc;ut l oo king, fl.nd P wn.s kiJlecl i n a collision with a
tra in trave ling 30 miles an hour and wh ich gave statutory sj_ gnals. The train was appr-o aching from P' s ri ght, and P d i d not warn X of the dange r u ntil the -t;rain was - pral
tically on top of the car. The jury awa r ded P ' s persona l r epr esent at ive $2500 to be
paid by X and $2500 to be paid by the D H.ailway . What r esu lt on writ of error'?
Held: Reversed. If P' s r e pr ese nt r~tive is entitl ed to $5 , 000 , the verdict should
be fo r him for $5 , 000 as aga inst X and thEJ D Railway Company ( assuming that X wa.q
guilty of gro ss n eg li e~e nc e ). But the evi de nco s hows t hat the D Rn.ilwuy Co . is not
li ab l e at a ll, as it has viol at ed no ·.luty owod P. It was a l s o he l d that while X was
guilty of gross neg li g:tmce , P was guilt;r of contributory ne gli gence as a. ma.t.t er of
la.w in not war n ing X of th0 o.pproachinb train . He coul d sGo it Ootter than X could
see it, o.nd he was und or ':l duty to look oncl war n the: driver. While the negli genc e
of X is not imputed to P, the pr:1.ss0n ger m.1st exercis e r eas onabl u car e for his own
safety .
TORTS
Imputed Ne gli genc0
193 Va. 330
M was D' s moth<:: r. M owned ~ car, and V was t aking her for a pleasur e ride in it
on a country r oad 17 f e ot wi de . P' s tractor with a hay b a l or in tow was o.pproaching.
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The baler was 9'8 11 wide and was protruding over the center of the road. D pas sed L
tractor but ran into the hay baler, doing $1,000 worth of damage to it .• The c ar w.·. ~
damag ed to the extent of $170. Assuming that the last clear chance doctrine is not
r~ pplicable (neither side relied upon it in the trial court), what are th e ri ghts o£·
tho parties 7
Held: M is not liable , r e gardles~ o;f the n e gligence of D, as D wa s a bailee of tl:
car and ~h0 negligence of a bailee is not imputed to the bailor. It is a jury question as to whether P and D were n e gligent. Instruments of husbandry may be moved
along the road even if they will take mor e tha n half the road but nm~t b e k ept to
the ir right as far as practicable, and due qare must b e taken for the protection of
us ers of the highway. See V/146-326. If the jury find that P wa s neglig.e nt, then M
is entitled to a judgment against him for $170, regardl e ss of D's negligence or l ack
of it. If tho ,jury fj.nd P was in the exercise of due care a nd D was negligent, the r1
M cannot r e cover from P, but P is entitled to a judgment ag ainst D.
TORTS
Impute d Negligence
Joint Enterprise
193 Va. 840
H ahd W wer e husband and wife . He alone h ad income . He bought s e ver a l cars over
the years in his own name , and, b ocaus u his wife wished to say she owned a car, h e
bought the car in qu e stion and had tho title put in his wife 's name. She operat ed
this car ·as she did the othe rs, and so did he . He bor e all the e xpenses of the ope r
tion of th0 c •J.r. While they were . on a. ple a sure trip to a mountain cabin they owned
a nd whil e h e wa s driving, W wo.s injured 'ns .o. r es ult ·of H' s n ogl igcmco a nd the n eg ligence of D, who was driving another car. Is H '· s n n g li genco imputed to W?
Held: No. This is not a joint enterpris e , as W .did not .have the right to dir e ct
Md control H in the oper ation o f the ce.r. They do not sta nd in the position of
principal and agent. H, in furnishin g recr eation to th e family, is merely fulfilli n
a marital duty, nnd in so do ing , he is acting for hims e lf nnd not as his wife's
agent. He is the baileo of his wif e 's c a r, and the n cgli ge nco . of a bailee is not
imputed to the bailor. "It is not unusu a l for a husb and to buy a car for th o use
of his wife, title to which is sometimes r eg iste r ed in the husband's name and s ometime s in the wif e 's n ame. 1J'Jh e n a husband is drivin t; an automobile so acquired and
registe r e d, the prusumpti on is tha t he is in absolute c ontr o l, e v e n though his wife
is in tho car with him, and in tho abs enc e of evid onc o to the c ontrary, h o is solelJ
responsible for its operation." . A $12,000 verdict in f avor of W, which the trial
· --court- -hacL .s.e_t _o,sJc!o 'fl.S c ontrary to law, wa s r e instat ed .
··-· -.
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TORTS
Wr ongful De nth
. I9oS.-E-. --a:t·-J;>..----6.5l __ __ _
In a _d~o::j:;h by wrongful aot cas e Ins tructi on G wo.s give n as f o ll ows: "The -court in
struct:rthe-_:·j~t:-i:n;--ti~ing. tho damqge s (which are n ot to exc eed $ 25,000)
it ~ay consider: 1. Th0. pocuni'y.gJ:o&a . :.su,sta:incd.. b~ - t~e w~fe and child of Dea.v? rs,
fix~ng such sum as would b o e.51ua
o t h o pr o b~bl e oa rm.ug s o :t -ttre--deceaaed.._. tab.ng
i to c nsid e rati on his a e iritolli once o.nd h onlth,_ during what would ··have-=-::b een his lifetime if he had n ot b ee n kill ori . 2. In ascortr:tining the probability o f life
of tho 'deceased, tho jury ho.v e the r ight to determine samo with r efer enc e t o r eccrgni~ed scientific t able s r e l a ting · t o the expecte.ti c n o f hum!Ul life .
3. By adding
the r eto compensation for the l os s c f t h o care, .a tt cmti op ond s oci e t y J o s+=:l:l¥=-hi,s wU
o.nd chilcJ.., 4. By t~ddl; g such furth ur suin n.s th e y may deem f o.ir arid just by wo.y of
s o lace and comf ort t o his wif e and child , f;or the sorrow, ...Rll .ti' ~ r i~ ;; aFld ~c.> nt a.Lan
..{;.'"Uish occasioned t o wife by his de ath." Obj octed t o bo cau s e it a ll ovrs a r e c ove ry f o
all tlfa t Deav e rs would h a ve eo.rn od during his lifetime , witho ut t aking i nt o co ns i der
ti on the f act that it is t o b o presently ::laid and n ot t o b e paid in instalments fr om
time t o time , and without t.aking i nt (, c onsi dor :::.ti on t h a t Deavers, ha d he live d , woul
haye oxpewl ed o. porti on of' his ear niP.gs f or his own us e .
He l d: Obj e cti ons overrule d . Tho jury in M y such act i on may award s uch damages
as t o it may s oom f a ir and j ust, · n ot exceed in g $25 ,000. H0 haw h old r e c e ntly in
c onstruing tho statut o in an ac ti rm f or wr ongful de ath tha t t he amount of r ec overy
is l oft e ntir e ly to the d i s cr e..t ion of" the jury, as l rmg as i t d oc s n ot exc eed $ 25,00(
W.e h av e s ustained for s o many y ear s th rul e tho.t i s app li v l t o the instruction h er e
excepted to -that wo pref e r t o o.dhor o to it and f o llow our own pr e ced~nts as e videncer
by tho many Vir g inia C8_se s in which this instructi on h a s b e.:: n o.ppr (we d .

-.

ltJJJ~
hev·:L::Jed. August l)~ (i,,
'!'CRTS l:vrongful Death
Bar Exam, Dec., 1943.
Q. z, while driving his automobile in the city of Richmond,Va., ran over and killec'
~Q A duly qualified as administrator of Y's estate. He instituted an action under tht
.e.<rt h by wrongful act statute. Y left a widow, a son, and a father. At the time of
his deat.h Y had no assets. There was a duly docketed judgment against Y in favor of H
f or the sum of ~2,000; Y owed C ~1 1 000 on an open account. The undertaker's bill for
f uneral expenses was :~1,000. The widow, the son, the father, N, c, and the undertaker
:c.ll claimed the money. Who is entitled to the $4,000?
A~ Be sure to learn the important things about the Virginia Death by Wrort_ft.l Act
Statute, often referred to as "Lord. Campbell's Act11 (V#8-633 et seq.). Here they are:
Under the common law personal actions die with the person, but under the Virginia
Death by Wrongful Act Statute, a new cause of action is given the personal representative of the deceased party for the benefit of the statutory beneficiaries, who are
divided into classes as follows: Class 1. The surviving wife, husband, children and
grandchildren of the deceased. Class 2. Parents, brothers, and sisters of the deceased. The jury are given the discretionary power to specify the amount or portion
to be received by each of the beneficiaries, provided, however, that nothing is to
be given to anyone in class 2 if there is any member in class 1. If there are no
members of either class 1 or class 2, the amount recovered is assets in the hands of
the personal representative to be disposed of according to law. If a person dies leaving a widowed mother and a widow or widower but no children or grandchildren, the
widowed mother is in class 1. Note that the statutory beneficiaries are given the
property by force of the statute and don't claim the property as distributees of the
estate of the deceased party. Hence the creditors of the deceased have no rights. The
widow and the son are in class 1 and are entitled to the ~~4,000 in such portions as
the court or jury may deem best. If there is no one in class 1 or class 2, then the
sum recovered is part of the estate. The maximum statuto~ amount that can be awarded
is since July 1,1958 $30,000. It is immaterial whether the tort-feasor or the injured
party dies first. Since July 1,1958 the action must be brought within two years from
death of deceased. Note further that if deceased would have had no cause of action
because of his contributory negligence or other reason, then the personal representative has no cause of action.

TORTS Wrongful Death
181 Va.911.
p was a loader in D's coal mine. While he was waiting for the cutting machine to
cut out coal to load, he decided to do some personal exploring. He entered an unventilated portion of the mine which was not being used at the time and in which gas had
collected. The gas exploded, and P was killed. His dep8ndent was denied workmen's
compensation, as the accident did not occur during and arise out of the employment.
His administratrix then sued under the death by ~~ongful act statute. Is such an
action barred by the workmen's compensation decision?
Helds No. Even i f P were a licensee or a treepassGr, he had some rights none of
which were meant to be covered by workmen's (~omp enaation lai~S. In the instant case
it was he~ that D had not violated any duty it owned a licensee, and hence P could
not recover. (Brol·~ing, J. dissenting.)
TORTS Wrongful Death
185 Va.561.
x worked as a driller in D's mine in 19)5. He breathed in large quantities of rock
dust. D was negligent in not warning X of the danger and in not furnishing proper
equipment. X died from silicosis in 191:2, t-wo years after discovering he had this
disease. X's personal representative rued D. ~~at result?
Held: For D. X's cause of action arose in 1935, whether or not he knew it.The then
statute of limitations ran in 1936, and X's death does not revive the action. "The
cause of action contemplated by ou -r· statute ls not the dF.lath itself but the tort
which produces the death, and thl;; is the same cause of action for decedent's injuries, and, as such, subject t o its infirmit.;.es as an acti onable cause." The court
holds that our Death by ~vrongfi1 .L .Act Statute :l.s not a new cause of act ion but the
action that would have belongec". to deceased i f he hadn't died. But whe ther it ifl
regarded as a survival of the ·.·i ght of action ·.'f decedent, as a revival of the right,

1034

Re vis e d August , 1953

~s a substituted right, or as a new ri ght, th e cause o f acti on i s the s ame , t h a t i ,·
the wr on gful injury to t h e d eceden t , the wr on g whi ch e ntitl ed him to maintain an a n ·
ti on if d eath had not ensued.

'TORTS
Animals
182 S .E. 235
De f endant k e pt bea:ts in a wir e en c lo s ur e . Plain ti f f l ean ed up aga in s t th e wi r e an
wns clawed by a b ear which had not the r etofor e s hown a ny s igns of vici ous n e s s .
Pl a intiff sued for the injury on_ the the ory that one k . t anima l s
at we r e f"' r ae
na~ r ae a t h is-paril.
;
He ld: Whil e th i s principl e ha s influ enc ed numerou s d e ci s i ons , it is not s ound.
Many cit i e s have zoos. The y s erve a us e ful purpos e , a nd thor o i s n o good r eas on why
the owne rs of such animal s sho u ld b e subje ct to absolut e li ability. I n the i ns t ant
c ase De f end·ant' s n e gli gence (if any) and Pl a intiff's contrib utory n egli ge nc e should
h a v e b een l e ft to the jury and tr e at ed a s a ny othe r n eglige nc e c as e . NQt e : Qutsj d0
Vir ~ ini a and Wes t Vir ginia the gen e r a l rul e is a s p er Pla inti f f' s conte ntion.

------- - - - -- TORTS•
An ima ls
Sugge sted by 19 5 S. E. 4 96
Pla intiff's l a nd is not e nclos ed by a l awful f e nc e . DErfendant owned c a ttl e and
turkeys which went on Pl a intiff's l and. Is De fe nd ant liab l e for th e · d amuge d one ?
Nqt liable for t hfl. damage don e b;y c a ttl e , horses , mul e s shec p,_ go§.t §.., or hogs un l...O"~
Q.intiff's _ l a nd wc.s enclos ,Jd by a l awfu Uv_rlC8 .iyjj-·8 - 8 74 ), or Defenda nt d ~ov e
thQ... anima ls onto the l a nd. Bu t iher e a r e no s tatut e s with r e f er e nce to poultry.
Hence the Eng lish common l aw rul e a ppli e s t hat t he owner is m Hi e r a.-El-tri;y-tG-f-en ce
t §_ln. Howeve r, e. court of e quity will not d ignify occasional t r es pas ses of turke ys by a r e straining orde r wh e r e d amage is trifli ng e.nd r emedy a t l aw ade quate .
Not e : The c ounty s u pe rvisor s may by f o llowin g s t a tut e s adopt " a n o f en ce l aw," in
which case th e bo undary line it se l f be comes a l awfu l f e n c8 .

191 Va . 601
TOR TS
Animo. ls
In s ome unexpl ain ed way D' s covl ( which wa s one of a h e r d ) wande r ed onto a hi ghway
at ni ght. P r a n into th e cow and suffer ed se v or f; no r sone.l i n juries . Has h e a c n.use
of action on the facts stat ed a bove ?
He ld: No. The doct rin e of r e s ips a l oq uitur i s not a pp l i ca b l e , be ca us e D did not
h av e exclus ive control ov e r th.o i ns trument a liti e s causi ng the o.cc id ent. P f a il ed to
prove a ny negligenc e . So th or o c a n b e n o · r ocovory i n s pite o f our s t atut e , V#B - 886 ,
"It sha ll b e unlawful for tho owne r or manage r o f a ny h or s e , mul e , c a ttl e , ho g , s hoe;
or goa t to permit any s uch a nima l •••.• t o r un at l a r go b e y ond tho limits of h i s own
l and s ••••• " This l an gu age i mpli e s · know l ed ge , cons e nt, or a willingness on the p n.rt
of the owne r, a nd d oe s not cove r a sit u rttion whe r e t ho owne r h as us ed or d i nar y c a r e
kee p his ~took confined to hi s pr emis e s •. P ho.s the burde n of provin g D's n egli genc e
TORTS
Nui sa.nc e
1 S . E. ( 2d) 305
A l a r ge c a nning corp or a t i on , in sp i t e of the ex e r ci s e of duo c a r e , d i schar ged v e;go·
t able r e f u se into creeks tha t e nt e r Che s a peake Bo.y . Pl a i nti f f owned pro per t y n e a.r by
The stenc h i n tho s unnne r timo b<:::co.me unb our a blo . Ha s Pl aintiff a caus a of a cti on f ol
do.ma gos?
Hold: Ye s . Def end unt is gu i lty of ma i n t a i n i n g a pri·rn.t e nuisanc e . He mus t use hi l
own l and so o.s n ot to in,j ur o . othc) r s . Stat ute of lii'!'J.i t ~~ ti o ns d i d n ot run f r om time o j
e r e cting ·t h e f a ctory, but fr om t ir.lo of tho in j ur y . Not .; , howe v e r , t h at i f a city gei
· the po rmiss i on of t he l egisl::l.t ur e to d i scha r ge r r:J.w s ovmle i nto tho t i da l wat e r s , no
othe r u s er of tida l w-:tte r s c o.n ob j o ct ns l on e a. s na v i gat i on i s not int e rfe r-ed with ,
s inc e t h e St a.t o , as owne r in tho exe r cis E! o f i t s jus pub:icum , may d o oid e a s t o t h e
be st u se of its pr o pe r ty . 158 Va . 52 1.
18 7 V'FJ. . 4 22, 431
Nuisanc e
D er ectod a buildin g t h ,, t ~; ncroac h cd on Pi ne St r eo t s o~,; e i ght een inchos . P filed
a bill in e qu i ty askin ~ f or o. JOO.nd o.t or y i njunct i on di r e ct i n g D t o r emov o the e ncr oach
m ~ nt .
P did n ot o ll ego any pe cu l i a r d8.mage t o himse l f TI 'J~ ; s uff e r ed by oth e r membe r s
of tho pub lic .

1035

Revis ed August, 1953

He ld: For D. While the encroachment. is a public nuisance, an individual cannot
ma intaiJ) · a bill to enjoin such nuisance unless he can show he has suffered, or nt:tll
suf f e r . t.!\!;)refrom, special and peculiar injury to himself, a.s distinguished from !t!jury to th~ public in general. Moreover, such special injury must be direct o.nd no t
putoly consequential, and must be different in kind and not merely in degree, from
~hat ~ ustained by the community at l arge • .
193 S.E. 491
Tr e spassing Adults
TORTS
A railroad company is bound.to keep a reasonabl e lookout for tr e spassers (8 Dig.
where there is reason to suppos e that their pre s e nce
422) and licens e es on its tracks
.
~s like ly,

.

TOR'f8
Tr e spassing Adults
189 Va. 341
As a r e sult of poor visibility, P mistook a private railroad crossing ' for a public
one and started across the tracks. There was a locked gate on the other side, which
had b een e rect ed to ke ep the public from using the crossing. lJllhon P discover ed his
.mistal.to , he att empt ed to back out, but th~i r e ar whyels got off the narrow road, nnd
the·. C'lr s~a ll ed on tho tracks. A pass e nger tr a in d emolished it some 15 minutos l n.t er
'ij,e ld: P was a trespass e r, or at b es t a bf.l.r e licensee. .The railroad company ha s
not violated ,any duty owed such a person • . Jud gment for p r e'vcrs ed •
:,;.···

.....

TORTS·~· Tr e spassi~ g· Adult s
190 Va. 605
· P,'~ and R we r e enga ged in unloading lumbe r from a b ox car. They wore all omployod
by'.the X Corporation, which do o. l t in hardwood products. It b e came necessary to shift
some cars, including the on G in whicii. P, Q and H we r e working • . They were told to dis
continu e the ir work whil e o. N & W Ry. Co. locomotive shift e d the cars. In violation
of instructions and unknown to the r a ilr oad crew, P stayed in the car while it wo.s
be ing. switched. It was shunt ed into (.t nother c a r with considerable force, o.nd P was
killed insta ntly when the open door in which he was sta nding sudde nly clos ed when the
car . r a n int o the othe r car. P' s pers bnal r e pres e ntative r e cove r ed a ,judgment, which
the trial c ourt s et asid u . \¥hat r e sult on appeal?
·
He id; For the def endant. P was a tr e spo.ss e r. The defendant . owed no duty to s e arc .
· the cars for trespassers be for e switching them. It owe s him the n e gati vo duty n ot to
. ihjur.c ··him wa ntonly or wilfully aft e r h:wing di-s-cov e r ed ~s pre s enc e or after having
·rioti·c e o_fr _wh'llt would caus o o. pers on, in 'the 0:xercis e of ordina ry car o , to be alerted
.t o the -O.ange·r • .. Afte r such notice they must exorcise ordinary care t o a void injurin g
a · pt:Jrs on; ove n thou gh he b e a tre spas se r.

TORTS · ' · Tr e spassing Childre n
7 S.E. (2d) 119
D ? wried a t oo l hous e in a vicinity whe r e childr en of t ende r years were accustomed
· to_~lay,· as he knew.
He ha bitually l oft tho doo r open in spito of the fact tho.t dyn~Cil, aynamite c a ps, alc oh o l, and acid we r e st or ed th e r e i n .
P, a lad of e i ght
ye ~ · o f'. a ge , saw a box on the fl oor which cont a 'ined r..~ri ght mot a llic objects.
P was
an-:uns a lfi~Ht b oy, s o he gave all the childr en in the n eighborhood s ome.
He was als o
an. . i.nqui~~ l ad, s o he picked one of th e s e obj e cts with a pin, and l ost his hand
s o inst~ti. P sued D. Re sult?
Hold f or P without me ntioning the uttr-activo nuis a nc e do ctrine . Gr oa.t care is r e \.uir ed wher e one ha s s uch dan ge r ous instrumont alitivs as oxplo s i ve s or e lectricity
u~o.P ~s premis es, and the · fact th at tho injured pe r s~m was .'3. t e chnica l trespass e r
. will nat excus e l and own e r. A gre at e r degr eo of c a r e is owed an infa nt than un ad ~lt •
..Cas-e wher e child br oke int o l o cked stor e hous e and t ook dynamite cn.ps clistin:guish ed .
TORTS
·Trc s po.ssin g Childr e n
182 Va . 30
A t.e.n--yeB.r-o l d._ -child was struck by a stroEID'llinod ga s c>line rail bus while he was on
. a tr estle ove r a ravine . If t he mot orman had b oon keepin g an ad e quat e l oo kout, he
would h a ve se.e n·· the boy in time to st op. The b oy cou l d hav0 s a vod hims e lf by jump. ing . Is · a $5,000 vor d ict sustttina blc ?
.He ld: Ye s. E'<re n if the child had b con a tr e spas s er u po n a limit ed a r e a, thor o wa s
. a :d~y on\th o part of . de f endant t o koop a l ookout and try t o avo i d striking child ,
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us i ng Whatever instrumentalities it t hen had availabl e . (Note that if brakes had
br:Jen de f e ctive but an adequate lookout had been maintained , ther e would have been no
Hability.)
TORTS
Trespassing Children
Legal Causation
183 Va. 1
In violation of ordinance D enclosed a lot in Norfolk with a barb ed wire f once. P
a five -yoar-old girl, while a t e chnical trespasser, climbed upon the f ence to see bci
t or a hors e that was running loose inside the f e nce. SJ::te f e ll, and the barbed wire
11
tor o an ugly sca r in her f a ce. 11 She r e cove r ed a judgment for $500. Should it be
s et as i de ?
Hold: Ye s. Barbed wir e f ence s are not inherently dangerous or attra ctive to. chi ldren, as ar e dynamite caps. The trespass of tho child and her fall were the sole
proximf;l.t o c auses of the accident, for which p wa s not to blame . Whil e the question
of proximat e caus e is for. the jury wher e reasonable people mi ght differ, her e ther e
is no r eason for differ ence, and the verdict must bo set asid o .
TORTS'
Tr es passing Children
187 Va . 76 7
D owned a quarry from which l ar ge quantiti8s of rock had been removed. Water had
run in and se eped in. A third party had built a r aft, a nd many boys came to pl ay
ther e , all to D's knowledge . Ther e was a heavy r ain, and the waters of t he qu a·rr y
wer e so mu<ldi 0d that one playing ther e in could not t ell sha llow wat er fr om dee p wat e1
by mer e ly l ooking. P, a nine -yerll"-o_~~ - _l:>.~y_, -.v:as-.-d:rowneder-~ His - person fl_ ] -~9..P.f~...~~nt ~ti V l
sued D. Result?
- ·-·---..--··
---·-·· ··· ·
He ld: For D. Vir-ghrin. does not r e cogniz o the attr active nuisanc e doctrine exc ept
in c ases of explos ive , gasolino--;-EilEJ ctricity--cas os in which the danger _is lat cmt unc
not commonly kn own. Her o the dange r was no wis e diffe r Emt fr om that lurking i n n o.tu·
r al lakes , creeks, and rivers. Every nine-year-old boy knows of the danger of drown·
ing, or, if he doos not, the duty of war n in g is on the pa r ent. No sign and no ordinary f'enco would keep a r edbl ooded b oy nwo.y from t ho dan ger. Ther e is no r eason why
the owner of a natural l ake should escape liability whil e tho oY..'ller of an artifi cial
lnke should bo hold. Hone a D has . vio l atod no duty, and tri al court c orrectly sus~
t aino<l D' s demurr er.
TORTS
Licensees -Invitee s
179 Va . 139 , 1:47, 148
· K was in:jured whon she tripped over o. eabl e in im amus ement park. Is the f ollowing
instruction corre ct? 11 The court instruct s the jury that if they be lieve from a pr e ponderanc e of the evidenco that the l ocation , oonstructi (m, and maintenance of tho
cables over which K f e ll creat ed a dan11~e rous conditi on · at a place where patron s had .
a ri ght to go , then it was the duty of the dof ondants t o warn the patr ons of such c or.
dition, unle ss K knew, or in tho exercis e of r easonable car e on her part, should hav(
known or discover od su ch c ondition .
Hold: Rever s ible err or, as it places t oo gr eat a duty on K, who is in her ri ghts
in assuming that h-er s a f ety has b u0n pr ovi ded f or unl ess she can plainly see the c on·
trary. 'I'ho word 11 di s cover" imputes r, duty t o us e ex-cr o.or dinary care--to bring t o
1
light things which may be hidden or l at ent. K' s only duty wns t o ;seo " or " obs erve"
. thoso things which wer e obvi ous.
· TORTS
tic ons eus - Invitoes
18? Va . 365
D ran the Sto.to Fo. ir o.t which thor o wer e o.ut;) r a c es. He negligently a llowed some
o],d na ils t o r emain on tho r a ce tr a ck. T wns in chur go of ·t ho r aces as an ind ependeht contractor. E wns giving his co.r n tri a l spin . It picked up a nail which punctu.r od a tire , and tho c ar r un int o tho crowd , killing P . His per sonal r epr es ontativ€
sued D and E. Tho jury found -.for P as against D, but it a ls o f ound f o'r E. D claims
that whor e tho s ervant i s f ound not guilty, the muster must a l so be f ound n ot guilty.
Hol d: 'l'hi s principl e i s not npp licabl 0 wher o one r elies upon the negligenc<;J of thE1
principa l tS in tho above c ase . Not e o. ls o that th o princi pal ca nnot es cape liab ility
f or the condition nf the pr omiflos s0 f!:lr ns business visit or s ar e concerned by turni~g thlllm over t o tm indep~ndent . 9 QD.t~tor-, -as the pd .ncipal owes a non-d~ l egabl e
duty t o us e due car.G W- keop 'them r oo.s 0n1.1b ly safe .

---- -·-~-

------·------J--- -·- - · -··-
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TORTS
Licens ees - Invitees
182 Va. 713
A mother and her 3-year-old child were guests at D's hote l. Upon arrival in theiJ ·
room , the mother went to the bathroom to get a wash cloth. The child climbed into
trlC window, the screen of Which WaS unfast ened, leaned against it, fell out, and WD.f.:
k:ill ed . The judge sustaineda demurre r.
He ld: Error. The hote l oweq a. duty to the child to have its screens fasten ed.
The mother could reasonably suppose the screen was fast ened. She was l.ulled into a.
f nls o sense of s ~ cur.ity. At least thes ~ r a is ed jury que stions.
TORTS
Licensees - Invitees
182 Va . 876
P, a paying . gu est at a hotel, sat in a rocking chair from whi ch one of the rocker s
was missing, rocked back, and turned over. · She was s ever e ly hurt and r ec over ed a
verdict of $6,500.
Hold: Questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury. She
owed no duty to inspect chair unles s danger was obvious. The missing rocker was on
the side away from her as she approached the chair. The hote l-ke ep roJr owed a duty to
provide a saf e chair~ She was invited to sit in an unsafe chair • . Verdict proper.
TORTS
Licens ees - In vi t oes
186 Va. 1022
P bought a ticket to D's show. P annoyed others by coughing and spitting on tho
floor. A, D's manager,suggested toP that h e come outside for some air. P struck
A, and A and his as sistants e j ect ed him from the theatr e with conside r abl e forc e . P
hung around outside and picketed the show. When· A went out sometime l ater, P ca ll ed
him a vile name , and A hit him so h ard hr:) had to go to tho hospita l. It was not po s
sible to show how much of P's injury was due to the first assault and how much t o th
second. Discuss principles involved.
Dis liable (1) if A did not r evoke P's licens e befor e eje cting him, (2) even if A
did r evoke the licens e , if A us ed excess i ve fo rce in e j ecting him, (3) if A was acti
for D when he struck P durin g the s ec ond a lt erc ation . If he struck P becaus e P was
t ollin g people not to enter the show , then A's t ort was committod in the scope of hi.
emp l oyment.
·
D is not li ab l e f or · th8 first assault if A r evoked P's lic ens e and us ed no more
force than was r easonab ly necessary to e j oct him. D is not liable for the s e cond ns·
sault if P brought it on himself by ca lling A a. vile name and A struck P primarily
becaus e of person al animosity. In the latt er evont D would not be liable even for
the f ir st assault, f or, if a pers on brings an injury on hims e lf a.nd cannot show how
much of the injury he caused hims e lf and how much was cau sed by someone e ls e , he can
r ecover nothing. This is like the c as e where plaintiff and defendant both polluted
a. stream and plaintiff cou ld not show how much he was damaged by def endant' s pollution and how much by his own. 185 Va. 758, 771.
Of course A would be p e r son~lly ~ liabl o for the s econd a.s sault, as words alone do
.not justify a batt ery. ·.)l.nd~if A's fir s t a.sso.ult was not privileged , he would be lia
ble for a.ll the d~~· done P. But in tho instant c as 0 P did not · su e A, so A's liability wn.s~-JUcticia.lly considered.

--

TORTS'
Lic ensetJs - Invit o0s
' 189 Va. 229
P's husband was a pat i ent at tho D Hospita l. Prior to 1941 ther e had been an en·"tra.nCe used by all at the end of th e hospi tn.l when :J P ' s husband occupied a r oom, and
there was a s idewa l k l e nding fr om the str eet t o this entr ance . P h ad known of this
qondition . In 194 1 tho outs i de door knob was r omaved, and the 'door was us ed only fm
M..-.emergency oxit. A cha i n was str etched a cr oss tho sid ewo. lk, but P had nG""Ve t been
not i f i ed of' thes e ohanges. P went t o visit her husband at night and tripped over th•
chain in th e dar k. The jury r eturned a vt: r dict in f avor r:if P, which was set as i de b:
the trial judge.
Held: Verdict r eins t at ed . Tho jury c ould find t hat P was an invitee , that su ch, ar
ac.cid ent c ould have been for e s een, and that P was not contributorily negligent.
\

TORTS
License es - Invitees
193 Va. 400
p , a mn.ture woman, r ode on D's mer ry- go-r ound with htJ r fi ve -yoar-old niece, Ther<:l
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wa s a· sign reading, nRIDE AT YOUR OWN RISK. DO NOT STAND ON HORSES , CHANGE HORSES
OR GET. ON OR OFF WHILE RIDE IS IN MOTION." This rule was violated for several mb ·
utes by some small boys, one of whom bumped against P, who1 in turn fell off the
merry-go-round. The violations wer e in · plain view of those in charge, but th ey t oe•.
no steps to enforce the ~ule.
Held: A verdict by the jury in favor of P should not be set aside. P was a busi·
n os s visitor or in vi t ee to whom D owed a duty · of du e care. D. c annot evade this dut;y
by posting signs, He owed a duty toP to enforce the s afe ty rul es. She is not guil
ty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Sfte was standing on a platform,
moving round and round at some speed; holding a child s eat ed on a hors e going up anc
down. She was not in a positionto maintain n. perfect or norma l equilibrium. Under
thes e circumstances a jury' could find she was not guilty of contributory negli gence.
TORTS
Lessor and Lessee
185 Va . 333
L l eased an old hous e to T for $7 per month. It was obvious a f ew years later th:·
the porch needed r e pairs, and L promised to make them. He neglige ntly failed to rna~
them, • and T' s wif o f e ll through tlle porch and was injured when it gave way. Is L l ~;
able for the personal injury?
He ld: Not in Virginia. In thtJ .: abs enc e of fraud or concealment a. l andlord is not
iiabl o for personal injuri es caus ed by defective promis es, ~s the tenant takes thom
us they ar e . (Not e that rule is diff er ent whor e ther e c.r e common passageways . in
control of landlord.) If L promis 8d to r e pa ir Qnd did not. damages ur e limit ed to
cost of repairs and do not include pers ona l injuries. Ther a is no moro reas on to
hold a landlord for pers ona l injurL.1s than a carpenter or contractor who has br oken
his contract. There should not be t ort liability f or a mer e br each of contract. ~1
the instant case even if it should be conc eded thor o was tort li ability • plaintiff
was bnrr od by her contributory negligence.
19 0 Va . 207 ·
TORTS
Lesso r and Lesse e
Be for e L r ent od an apl).rtment to T, he ho.d had X install a cab inet, we ighing some
pounds, over the kitchen sink. T fill ed th e cabinet with dishes. The cabinet f ell
on T, injuring her. Sho sued L. What judgment?
Held: A l andlord is not liable for def ects in t he l eas ed property unl es s he frau t
l ently conceals them. Hero L had no notice of any def ect. He is not an insurer of
'J!.' s safety. Tho t enant takes tho pr emises as he finds th em subj ect t o the fraudul er
conc ealment rule .
Note : The court distinguished this c ase from 144 Vu. 473, whor e the l andlord ent er ed up on tho l e~ s od prope rty aft er t ho tenancy start ed and l e ft posthol es ·uncover,
It rained hard, and the t enant's small child fEJll in one that wa.s partially fill ed
with water. It wa s ther e he ld that tho r c:J l ation of ln.ndlord and tenant had nothing
to do with the law of th e crts o . If tho l rmd l ord unt ur s t o make r epairs after the
t enant has takcm posses s i an , he must us e r easo nabl e co.r o in making them, just as mu·
as anyone ols e . ·

TORTS
Lessor and Less ee
Business Visitor of Tenant
19 2 Va. 540
T, a tenant, lived upsta irs in a brick building owned by D. D had made two steps
from the ;:;.tro ot sidewet lk t o r e ach the outsid o door l oading to an inside stairway,
which served T and no onE- EJ l so . Thes EJ st"Elps h-?.d be en na iled t o the brick wall but
soon br oke away and wer o then un ~tt ~c he d t o anything. T had moved them a bout fr om
timo t o time . P visit ed T or. businvss . As hu was l eaving, the steps tilted forwar 1
and he was injured. He s ued D. Vfuat juugm ont?
He ld: For D. A business visitor cJ f a t vnant stands .in the shoos of the t enant S •
far as u suit a ga inst tho l rtndlord i s con cerned . Her e the entrance was unde r tho
so l e c ontrol 0f th0 t enant. Thor e wo.s no agr eement 0n the part of the landlord t o
repair, and, he owod ll'J duty t o T or P.
1'oRTS

Misrepr es EJnt at ic;n
Scienter
200 S.E . 624
In Vir ginia if a defu ndant ma kes 11 mat eri n. l fals t st at ement r easonably bel iev·
ing it t o be true , is he liab l e in ,_ t ort Flcti on at l aw for de ceit ?

Q.
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A. Yes . The fraud in such a case is called constructive fraud. 11 In a long line of
cases , we have consistently held that when one represents as true that which is not
true, and another relies thereon to his damage, the latter may recover for the false
representation whether it was knowingly or innocently made. 11 If innocently made, t t e
fraud is constructive. There is no reason why the rule at law should be different
from the rule in equity. Hence scienter is not an element of the tort of deceit in
Virginia.
TOHTS Misrepresentation
Scienter
11 S.E.(2d) at p.625.
In most American jurisdictions the intent to deceive is an indispensable element in
an action of deceit. In Virginia, however, we have consistently adhered to the
minority view that the intent or good faith of a representer is not an issue and is
not controlling. "The intent of the party making the repres entation is wholly immaterial. The point is whether the other party has been misled. It is sufficient that
the statement is actually untrue, so as to mislead the party to wllom it is made.
The party making it need not know of its fal.sity, nor have any intent to deceive;
nor does his mere belief in its truth make any difference. A party making a statement
as true: for the purpose of influencing the conduct of the other party, is bound to
l£now that it is true. 11
TORTJ
Misrepresentation
181 Va.824
A, the general manager of the D Insurance Co., told P that he had submitted an
application for a ~25,000 loan to the proper representatives of the Company and that
p would know within a few daJS whether or not the loan would be granted. A then Wlent
on a vacation. P did not hear for sometime, and then investigated only to find out
that A had falsely told him that the application had been submitted. P then procured
funds elsewhere. As a result of the delay P lost ;:n,ooo rentals and had to pay higher
prices for labor and materials due to war conditions. Is the D Insurance Company
liable?
Held: Yes. All the elements of the tort of deceit are present, and the principal
is responsible for the fraud of its agent committed in the scope of his authority.
TORTS Misrepresentation
182. Va.567.
In this case the Supreme Court of Appeals unfortunately revives a principle that
has been almost wholly discredited. Said the Court, quotine 1rfith approval from Coole:y
on Torts: "Where ordinary care and prudence are sufficient for full protection, it i s
the duty of the party to make use of them. Therefore, if false representations are
made regarding matters of fact, and the means of knowledge are at hand and equally
available to both parties, and the party, instead of resorting to them, sees fit to
trust himself in the hands of one whose interest it is to mislead him, the law, in
general, will leave him where he has been placed by his own imprudent confidence."
In other words, it is legal for dishonest persons to prey on the naive, the foolish,
the inexperienced, and tlie trusting, in spite of the general rule that contributory
negligence is no defense to an intentional tort, and the sound principle that no one
should profit by his own Hrong.
Note: Fiduciaries are not protected by the rule laid down above by the Court; the
party for whom one is fiduciary need not use diligence to detect the fraud.
TORTS
Misrepresentation
190 Va.247
p wished to sell a brick house to D. She told her it was substantially built, easy
to heat, in good repair in every way, and that there was nothing to worry about. Jusi
move in and enjoy i.t. D inspected the house before agreeing to buy it. After moving
in, she found that t he sillies were stopped up, that the oil burner needed a new generator, and that there was a bad crack in the wa11. D moved out and refused to pay the
balance of the contr3.ct price. P s old the house to X at ~P4, 000 less than the price
that D had promised t o pay, and sued D f or that amount. ll>]hat judgment?
Held for P. The statements made were matters of opinion commonly regarded as puffing or dealer's talk. There was no misrepresentation as to a material fact. It is
common knowledge that sinks get stopped up and oiJ. burners need repairs after a few
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of use. As for the crack in the wall, it was perfectly obvious, and, since she
inspected the house before agreeing to buy it and the parties were dealing at arms
l ength, she is not entitled to avoid the contract for that reason.

y~ars

TORTS Misrepresentation
190 Va.788
D sold P an agency which he had conducted for some 2.5 years and under which he had
the exclusive right to sell the products of nine different manufacturers in the Richmond territory. The contracts between D and the manufacturers were on an annual basis and could be terminated by either party's giving 30 days' notice. Such contracts
were ordinarily renewed as long as the agent sold his quota of goods. D told P when
P bought the agency that, D, was tttn good standingtt ld th all ni ne manufacturers. If
this statement was false, would P have a cause of action?
Held: Yes. D's statement is an opinion of what he thinks the manufacturers' opinions are of him. Whi~e a statement of opinion rather than of fact is not ordinarily
material and hence not actionable, there are cases in which opinion is material.
This is such a case, for the chief value of the agency was its good will--the likelihood that the manufacturers would keep giving their business to the agency, and a
false statement as to that likelihood would be most material.
TORTS Misrepresentation Property
191 Va.505
G was an unlettered farmer. He thought that T, an attorney-at-law, owned a 30-acre
tract of land. T enjoyed a good reputation and had been Commonwealth's attorney. 't
sold the land to G for $1,500 and gave him a special warr anty deed for same. As a
matter of fact, D owned the land; T did not even have color of title and must have ~ ~
known. T later became insane, and G wishes hi.s $1,500 back. Is he entitle to it?
Heldt Yes. This is not a suit on the special warranty but one for fraud. T has so L~
0 a ngold brick." He impliedly represented that the land was his to sell. The deed
is sufficient corroboration to satisfy V#8-286. While more than five years had run
from the time of the fraudulent transaction, that period had not run since the discovery of the fraud, and the action is not barred by the statute of l i mitations.
TORTS Defamation
3 S.E.(2d) 385.
The News Leader, the defendant, published a statement that Mrs. Plaintiff of 2317
Floyd Avenue was arrested, charged with the opera·tiion of a clearl ng house game. The
Mrs. Plaintiff actually arrested was one living at another address. The reporter was
negligent in not noticing this fact, although the name was an unusual one.
Heldr This ie libel per se. But there was no a.ctual malice. Hence there can be
no punitive damages. General damages, however, are implied from the constructive
malice which the law implies from the publicati on. ~1t it is error to instruct the
jury that substantial con~ensatory damage can be recovered, as this overemphasizes
the idea. One would not say that slight compen3atory damages could be recovered, as
that would underemphasize the idea. Note: Three judges dissented on the ground that
.s ubstantial meant "not merely nominal."
V#8-6J2 provides that in actions for defamation against newspapers and periodicals
the defendant may introduce in mi.tigation of punitive or general damages their good
faith, an apology, freedom from negligence, lack of actual malice--but not in diminution of actual damage. However, such evidence is admissible only to the extent
that it is included in the grounds of defense, which must be filed in writing at
least ten days before trial.
TORTS Defamation
7 S .E. (2d) 133.
The D Newspaper in good fai th published a story about a lawsuit against the City of
Newport News growing out of the killing of one woman by another in the Newport News
jail. The story stated that Mrs. Futrell, mother ann administratrix of deceased was
the party plaintiff. As a matter of fact Niss Futrell was unmarried and had never
had a child. She charged that the a.rt:l.ole was defamatory in that it charged her with
fornication. The paper published a cor rection and an apology. Verdict for plaintiff
for $500. What result on writ of error?
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Held : (three judges dissentin g) that the verdict was unjus t and should be ~et a "
side . No reader could think that any insult was int ended. The innuendo cannot enl o.r ge the meaning of the words 11Mrs." and 11mother" to me an anything immora l or insultin g. The court has the inherent power to set aside the verdict "in ord er to cor
r ~ ct any manifest departure from right and justice."
Ground of dissent: "I can conceive of nothing . bett er calculated to give troubl e
than an erroneous statement to the effect that an unmarried woman of good character
hb.d e. daughter, therefore illegitimate , who died in jail."
TORTS
Defamation
182 Va. 512
P bought goods from Don credit and paid for · them. Later P's brother-in-law, with
out any authority, bought goods on credit fr~m D and wrongfully charged them to P,
who r efus ed to pay for them. D thon wrote P 1 s employer that P owed him $16 which wa.:
l ong pas t due. T sued for (1) libe l and (2) under .th e statute of insulting words.
He did not a lle ge any sp ecial drumages but attempted to prove that he had beon shifto(
from an 83¢ an hour job to a 67¢ an hour job.
Held: (1) Th~t no evidence of spe cial damages is admissible unless alleged in tho
notice of motion so de f endant will be on notic e that such · damages aro claimed. (2)
That the l etter is not actionabl0 per s e , but only if · there was somespecial damage .
Here the court cited 5 types of oases in which ther e could be a recovery for s~ok2~
defamatory words, and concluded that tho instant oaso crunu in none of them. The
court fail ed to notic e that the words in this case were written. At common ln.w ger·. ·.
era!'drunages are presumed fr om writt en defamation. (3) The l etter was .not privil ef!:·-l•
as it was not s ent t o someone with n cormnon interest. (4) The l etter was not def:"Jl•ll
t ory. Lots of people owe bills th at are long past due. P wn.s not a merchant, an:i
credit was not ne cessnry. Cred it ors hn.vo to write· dunning letters, and to hold t L1 t
such l etters are defamatory or insulting wo.uld work a great hardship.
Defamati on
185 Va. 516
TORTS
p was a white man with a dark complexion. He nsked D's f ountain boy for a CocaCola in a glass • . The boy r ep lied, 'twr:)- <.bn 't s erve Negr oe s Coca-Colas, and we don't
l et them drink out of glass es." Later the boy nnd D apologized for the mistake . P
sued D under t ho Vir ginia statute of insulting wo rds. The court instructed the jury
that if a r easonable man would think that no insult was intended, thoy should find
f~r D, and they did.
Held: Revers ed ~~d r emanded. Insults can be insults whether intend ed cr not. In
t ent is important only on is sue;:; a of mali co. or punitive damages. It is only where th.
words ar El runbigurJus or capable of mor 0 than one meaning that there is a jury questiOl
as t o how they were meant. Under ~ ur statut0 words are not t o be construed acoordint
to the secret intent i on of the user but acc~.) rdin g t o their tl sun.l meaning o.nd common
acceptation.
De fo.mati r;m
193 Va. 529
TORTS
P was an insur anc e ad juster f •.)r sevor al insuranc e companies. D was a car dealer
who s ol d and r epaired aut omobil es. X wa s a purchas er of a oar fr om D on the ~ondi
tional sales pl an ~ V was vico-pr esident of the B Bank, which fin anc es car pur~has e s
o.nd insists on insur ance f or its protection. X was in a wreck. P, in attempting to
adjust mattEJrs, asked D, E, und F f or es timates of costs of r epa irs. Although D.was
the l ow bidder, the work was given t o E. This infuriated D, and he said in the p~s·
once of V und of X, "I am not g·o ing t o do any mor o busines s with the B Bank as l ohg
a.s they us e t hat damn drunk, P, t o handle thttir ad justments. Ho is taking ·money tr m
other garages in exchange f or giving them his insurance companies' r epair work. n.~
is a drunken s on c,f a bitch. I run go ing t o drive him out of business." V t old P'4
superiors what D had s ai d , nnd s ome of them then r efu sed t o a llow P t o handle their
adjusting work. P was given a verdict f ~1 r $ 15,000 which included damages · r es ulting
fr om V's r epetition.
Held: Vl:lrdiot wo.s a pr oper one . A jury c0uld find th er e was an abuse of a privil eged occ as i on. The gener e. l rule that one who is guilty of libe l is liable f or repe•
titions, but one guilty of slander is not li able , is subj ect t o an excepti on when it
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was int ended and contemplat ed that the s land er be. r e pe ated. .
the s lander that P was to be dr i ven out of bus ine ss.

It was by r e petition c .

TORTS
Dofamati6n
Privilege
186 S .E. 42
X, an agent for the D Insura nc e Company, wa s charged by his superior with doing
under cover work, i.e., writing anonymous l etters to the officers of the Company crit
i cising his superior and the way he managed the business. This charge wa s made in
the pr esence of other agents at a meeting and after an honest investi gation and comparison of handwritings. X sued for slander, denying that he had written tho a nonymous l etters • .
He ld: That the occasion was privileged; that in order that ther e could be a r ocov
ory, ma lice would have to be shown; that the e vidence fail ed to show any expr e ss ma l
ice ; and that the burden of pr oving malice was on the pla intiff, X.
TORTS
Defamation
Pri vile go
198 S .E. 461
Plaintiff was in charge of the meo.t department of Def endant chain stor e . One Dillon, an inspector, said to Pl a intiff, "You ar e checked out. You got us for $100
1ast wee k." Dillon's cousin than got Plaintiff's job. Dillon told numerous persons
aft erwards why Pla intiff was fir Hd. At the t rial Def endant pleaded the general i s su
and put nine witness es on the st and, who char ged Pla intiff with the commis sion of
some 14 different crime s. Verdict for Plaintiff for $ 10, 000 . Was this error?
No orror. While charge was privile ged, the r e was an abus e of the privilege in exces s ive publication and .in ca lling tho nine witnesses when De f endant did not evon
ple ad the truth of tho char ge as a defens e . Whil e damages wer e hi gh, Pla intiff's
char acter was blasted, and ho was unabl G to get othor employment. Ho had an ex ce llcs
reputation up to that time and had just been marri ed.
TORTS
Doi'e.mation
Privilege
182 Va. 200, 205
P wa s ~mployo d by D to edit a trade publication and a gr ood not to edit any competi
publication within five years. In violati on of his promis e , P r esigned and started
competing publication. D sought an injunction, nnd during the progr ess of the suit
fals ely and maliciously s t at ed that P was short in his accounts, had robb ed his customer s t and would "sting" o.nyone who advertis ed in his public ations. P sued D for
defamati on. Result?
-Hold: For P. Sinc e the above statements wer e not pertinent or r e l evant to tho ir
junction s uit, the y wor e not privileged. The Vir ginia court is committed to the doc
trine that abs olute privilege protects an individual a ga inst liability f or defamator
words spoken in th e course of a judicia l proceeding when such words are .pertinent a~
relevant t o tho subj eot of inquiry, irrespective of malic e- or falsity • . It is immat€
ri al whether the words ar e in writi"ng in n pleading or made orally by counse.l or wit
nesses. Note : But if P's integrity had been e ven r emote ly in issue , then the stat E
mont would have. be en abs olut e ly privileged no matt er how f a l se or malici ous, a lthoug
of cours e , if knowin gly fals e , tho party ma king tho f als e stat ement whil e under oath
mi ght b e guilty of perjury_.
·
186 s .E. 45
TORTS
M~ lici o us Pros ecution
1. In a maliciou s pr ose cution suit, wher e f acts o.r e not in d ispute , the questi on
of probable ca use is f or the court, i. o ., a questi on of l aw.
2. In the ins t ant cas e Pl a intiff charged that De f end ant maliciously pros e cut ed a
c as e on a not e . De f endant · c lo.iins that there is no ·,caus e of action for malicious pro
ecution of a civil c as e in Vir ginia whor e th or o has been no arrest, s eizur e· of pr ope
ty, or special injury. On this point the. court sb. i d , "It i s not conceded (by t he
oourt) that an acti on will lie f or the ma.lici du ~ pros ecution of a civil suit in thi s
jurisdiction in a ca s o similar t o that pres ented her e . The qu esti on has never been
b r:3 f or e this court f or decision. Courts of ot}?.er s t at es differ on the subj eot. It i .
sufficient her e ·to r est our de cision on other gr ounds. 11 Thes e other gr ounds were
that there was no pr oof of want of probable 9e.us e and no pr oof of malic e .
I

I
I

I

i
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TORTS
Malicious Prosecution
191 S.E. 678
Retail grocer gave wholesaler, who sold for cash only, a bad check which was not
made good within five days. Vifholesaler instituted crimina l prosecution, and retail E
was acquitted. Retailer then sued wholesaler for malicious prosecut1on.
Held: Since after 5 days there is a legal presumption of fraud, wholesaler had pr
ah l e cause~ also, that in an action for malicious prosecution guilt o.f Plaintiff of
acts charg•:Jd by Defendant may be shown, notwithstanding Plaintiff has been a.cquittod
TORTS
Ma licious Prosecution
185 Va·. 497
P bought 5 gallons of gasoline on credit from D. Later P gave D a check for $ 22
dr awn by X in favor of Y. The payee should have be en P, but by mistake it was Y. I
indorsed the check in his own name only, and D gave him money for the difference . 1'
dre.woe bank refused to honor the check because not indorsed by Y. D swore out a ·.var
rant against P for . obtaining money by fals e pretens es . When tho case cra.me for tria l
it was mutually agreed with consent of the court that P was to get a . check for $22
from X payable toP's order, that he would indorse it and givo it to D, and that tho
criminal case was to be dismissed. P did as agreed and then brought this action
against D for malicious prosecution. Assuming D ·a cted ma liciously and without probable cause, what r es ult?
He ld: Verdict for P for $2,000 mus't be set aside. Where a criminal case is compromised (permitted by V#l9-12 with consent of court in all misdemeonor c ases givin g
ris e to civil actions) the settlement thereof by way of' compromis e bars an action .f c
malicious pros e cution.
TORTS
Malicious Prosecuti on
187 Va. 485
H bought e. sofa on the cond iti onal sales plun fr om D for $93, of which $3~ was pa i
in cash, balance to be paid at the r at e of $10 per month. H made no furthe r payment
although he wa.s billed monthly. Finaliy a l etter s ent to H was returned unopened by
H's wifEl , with the notation "Mov0d to Oregon." On inves tigation D discovered that t ·
sofa had been sold by H t o X and re1noved in the nighttime , contrary t o the terms of
the conditional sales c ontr!lct. By V#l8-178 this is larceny. D also received word
that H's wife and H (who had not gono t o Oregon) were about t o go t o North Cnrolina.
D procured a criminal warrant f or H's ar rest. H was ~cquitt e d, becaus e it appeared
that H's wife made the sal e . H then sued D f or malicious prosecution and recovered :
verqict for $1,000, which the trial court refus ed t o set aside. What result on appo
Held: Case .revers ed and fina l judgment for D, who had probable cause as a matter
of law. Also ther e wo.s no evidence. of malice. Hence two essentials of tho t ort of
malicious prosecution were lacking.
TORTS
Malicious Prosecution
189 Va. 624
p of Virginia gave D of .Kentucky a bad check for $90 . D asked a lawyer what to do
about it, and h,e was adviS ed to swear out a wctrrA.nt in Kentucky and then to se ek extradition unless P- settled pr omptly. D did as advised, came to Virginia, and showed
X, an off ic er, the Ken-fucky warrant. X arrested P and called up T, a trial justice,
who t old X that he had no extraditi on warrants at his homo Md just to hold P in ja.i
until the n~xt morning. While the criminal proceedings were still pending 1 P sued D
for malicious prosecution, false ar·rest, und abuse of oriminai pr ocess. It appears
that D t old .X ..thnt all he wanted was his monoy, and , if ho got that. X need take no
further st.eps·. The trial court dismiss ed P' s case against D.
Held: (1) The trial court acted properly ns t o the malicious prose cution count, b·
c..ause -ther e had not yet been n. f avor abl e .t enninnti·Jn, D act ed on advice of· counsel•
and·there was no evi dence of malice o (2) Tht:l.t, even assuming thnt P was falsely impris-oned by X that Sunday night, D was not a party t o that act and hence is not guil"'
of fals e impris onment. (3) But ca s tJ r eversed , as ther e is at l east e. jury questi on :
t o whet he r or not D was gu ilty of abus e of criminal pr oces& . It could be f ound unde1
the e vidence th at Dinstitutod extradition pr oceed ings not f or the purpose of bringir
P t o justice but as a means of c0lle cting a privat e dobt. If so, this would be an
abuse of criminal pr oces s and acti onabl e . In such a cas 0, P1 s guilt is immaterial,
and the fact that D noted on advice of couns ul is not a bnr but may be shown only in
mi~gation of damages.

..
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Malicious Prosecution
Pleading and Practice
19 0 Va. 701
D had been P's client, and P as his attorney had properly enter ed on D's pr emis 8s.
Neve rthe l e ss, D swor e out a warrant charging P with a criminal trespass; P a ppear 0d
a nd was released on his own r e cognizance. Be for e trial D had the cas e dismi ssed pur·
suant to the t erms of V#l9-l2, which permits certain types of minor crimina l c as os tc.
be dismiss ed within the discretion of the justice and upon payment of the c osts by
the defendant, if amends are made and accepted by the parti es involved. As a matter
of fact P h ad mad e no amends; nor had P paid the costs of the criminal pros e cution.
P· sued Don two counts: (1) for malicious prosecution and (2) for insulting words,
and r e cover ed a $2,000 judgment on a general finding of guilty. It was cont end ed
that the words wer e not insulting.
He ld: The statement that P had made a criminal tr espass on D's property for which
he had made amends is insulting a~d a pt to l e ad to a br ea ch of the pea ce and is the r ~
fore actionabl Q. It was ~lso . cont e nd e d that the proc eedin gs wor o judicia l in natur a
and absolutely privil eged. He ld: This cont ontion is we ll made . The jus tice is ex0r
cisin g a judici a l discretion. The f act that he did not r e ce ive costs from the def end
ant ih tho criminal cas e dia not go to . his jurisdicti on, but wns jus t a mistake on
the part of one having jurisdiction. So the cas e w0s r overs od and r emand ed on the
count for malicious prosecution only'· as th o court could not t oll from a gonero.l verdict and judgment how much of s ame was for the s e cond count.
'J.'OR~.' S

TORTS
Malicious Pros e cut i on
193 Va . 381
A ill egally practic ed l aw and, on forma l compl a int by D, was i nd icted for a mis deme anor. The indictment wa s d ismis s ed be caus f; the s b c,tuto of limitations had run.
A suod D for ma licious prosecution. Result?
He ld: For D. "It is we ll s ettl ud that on 0 who wa s in f a ct guilty of t he off ens e
charged a ga inst him co.nnot ma inta i n an ncti on for ma li c ious pros e cution. The bas is
of the action is injury t o o.n innocent pers on. Proof of the actua l guilt of the person accused is o. complet e def ens e , even though the pr0s ocuti on may have been dismis sE>
or the def endant acquitted. The ~ cti o n f or ma licious pr os ecution does not li e in
f avor of a. guilty pers on." (Mor eover, dismissal of a crimina l ca s e f or a pur e ly
t echnical r eas on is not ge nerally r egard ed as a f o.vor abl c t erminati on, which is one
of the e l ements of a c aus e of action f or ma.licious pr os e cuti on.)
'.PORTS
Workmen 1 s · Compons nti on
18 0 Va. 345
P l ost the s ight of one eye when he was 'l child . Ho l ost t ho s i ght of the other
eye while attempting t o put a drunke n gu e st of his empl oyer t o bed , on which o cca sion
the gue st kicked him in tho eye . P sued the gue st nnd r e cover ed a judgment f or
$2,000, but the gu e st had n o pr operty. P then dema nded workmen's compensation . f or
t ot a l disability. Is he entitled t o anything , a ssuming his employer t o come und er
the l aw?
He ld: (1) The r ocovory of a judgment by P against the gue st doe s not d ischarge tho
0mployor except t o· tho extent that his statutory ri ght of s ubr ogati on may h ave been
interf er ed with. In this c ase ther o has not boon £\ny i nter fe r ence wi th that ri ght.
(2) It is nocessaty t o l os e b oth oyos in the same a ccide nt in or der t o r e cover f or a
· t otal disability on th o theory of blindneSS: Otherwis e th e employc1 r would r ea lly :to
he lu f or other accide nts not c -;nne cted with tho empl oyment.
TORf'S
Worlanen 1 s Comp(;ms ati on
186 Vo. . 116
p wo.s kill ed whilo in tho employment of X, · a subc ontr actor, wh8n D, the c ontrnctor,
negli gently dr opped o. heavy pioco. of timber .• . All parti es c ame unde r worlanen' s c ompens at ion. P' s wife c olle ct ed her compens ati on fr oi'l X and then su ed D. ·What r es ult1
He ld.: For D. Under our s t atut o ther EJ i s a ri ght t o s u o " nny other party" who
negli gently injur es an employee while at work. But the principo.l c ontra ct or is not
such other party . (nor i s o. f e ll ow emp l oyee , 18 5 Va . 96 ). The "othe r party" r ef err ed
t o must be a strange r t o thu emploY1nont, so th o.t as t o s uch othor party th e accident
is not an industria l on t> . Hence b oth tho contr act or and subc ontract or c an only be
pr0coeded against as per tho t er ms of t ho o.ct.
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TORTS
Workmen Is Compensation19 2 va.. 518
In Virginia, at common law, if D ne gligently injures P, and P is further injured
oy the negligEmce of his doctor, P has two several causes of action and not one join
action, as follows: One against D for all damages since there has been no break in
the causal conne ction, and another against the doctor for damages due to his negligence . If he has already recovered tho whole from D, he cannot get a doubl e r e cover :
from the doctor •. . If the cas e is a workmen's compens ation case, the injuri es caused
by the negli gence O"f the doctor are includ ed and are payabl e out of compensation fun t
pt,rrsuant to the pro:visions of the statute. · In the instant cas e P was injured while
at work. The doctor s el e cted by the employer negligently treated him. P, aft er acc epting full workmen's compensation, sued the doctor, who demurred.
Hold: Demurrer overruled. The doctor is not a f e llow servant. The further injur~
by the doctor is not an industrial accident. The doctor does · not shar e in tho burdons of workmen's compens ation and is not entitled to its benefits. The actual compensation rec e ived by un injured employee is rare ly, if ever, compl et e c ompensation.
(SoP may sue the doctor. If he is successful he reimburs es the employer's insurance
carrivr to the extent it has already pa id for the doctor's negligenc e , and keeps tho
balance hims e lf.)
TORTS
Fed eral Employers Liability Act
183 Va. 162
X, a railroad empl oyee , fell from a bridge whil e engaged in the act of switching
cars. The bridge did not have ::;, walk:wr:w. It is the cus t om of r ailro ads not to ha ve
walkways f or t he ir emp l oye es . X'·s personal r epr esentative sued in the S.t at e Court,
all eg ing that r a ilroad was negligent, in th at it fail ed t o furnish de ceased with a
reasonably saf0 place t o work. Tri al judge struck out plaintiff's evidence .
Hold: Error. Custom is evid en ce of due care, but custom cannot itse lf make an un·
safe place a saf e place. ·whor e employees must use brid ges oft en, as wher e they ar e
near .switching f acilitie s, a j ury might find th !\t due c ar e r equired a wa lkway. It
was orr or to t ako this qu estion o.wo.y fr om tho .jury.
·
Not e: By the Feder o. l Employers Li ability Act, 45 U. S.C ., Section 53, assumption of
ri sk i s abolished wher e i njury or death r esults in whol e or in part fr om the negligenc e of the c arrier. Under tho ~bovo Act c ontribut ory negli ge nce of employe e is not
a. bar but diminishes t he damage s, and the f e ll ow s ervant doctrine is abolished. It
is still necos.s ary, howeve r, t o prove that the Rr.ilrond Company was negligent.
TORTS
Pl ead ing end Prn.c ~ ico
189 Vo. . 1
D ne gligently r an _int<J-r'' s car, injurin g the car and also P. P s~ed D f or the dam·
ages done; th~_~r-~·-·-r e c o ve r ed a judgment, and collected s ame . Then P., s ued D f or his
per s onal ;Lr:rj"uries . D contended that he should not be twice vexed f o ~ one and the
same _.wrO'ng nnd that a cause of action cannot be s plit.
\
· Hold: (2 judges diss enting) That whil e tp.o ma.j ority rule is as per\~· s contention,
ther e . i s a growing minority contra . An injury t o property is distinct fr om an injurJ
to the pers on. A c o.us e o f act i o n for the f ormer may be assigned, whil a oa.us e of
action f or the l atter cannot be . Tho st atuto of limihctions is differ t .. I f. no
action f or pers onal injuri e s has be en instituted and P dh1s fr om an ind$pendent_ c aus €
the action abates for the per sona.l wr ong but survives as to the pr opert~wr_on·g ·
Hence P has two ca.us es of acti on. Sinc e they a r o both i n co.se a.t comrno l aw~ he
c ould j oin thom by having two counts, but he i s not r equir ed t o do so.
.

\

TORTS
Pl<::adin g and Pr ac ti ce ·
178 ~a . 343 '
A' s attorney i n his clos ing ar gwnent s o. i d in Qn a cti on f or damages gro~ing out of
an a.utomobil e ac ci dent, "Any jud gnont will hnve t o be paid out of my cli e~t ' s own
ha.rd- oa.rnod vra.g0-s . 11 Was this pr oper ar gument?
No . It is only t elling the jury indir ectly t hat th o dof end a.nt carri ed o li abilit~
i nsur ance , and whether he doe s or not i s i~~at o ri a l.
I
TOR TS
Pl e ad i ng and Practic£
Evidence
Mi sc ull aneo us
187 Va. 53
P, who was a pass enger i n D's t ax i, su od D f or d?..magos as a result of injuries s ust a ined when D's t o.xi collided with o. pr ope rly parked c ar. D was oxce oding the speed

I
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limit by some ten mil 0 s a n hour. Ac cording to D an approaching car suddenly swervs;
d ir e ctly in front of D's taxi. To avoid a he a d':"on collision, D turned to his ri ght
into a parked ca r. At the time of the a ccid e nt P stated that D was not to bla.rno am
that h e ran into the parked car to avoid a h e ad-on collision with a ca r in motion.
He r e peate d the statement a we e k l at e r.
D stat ed in his grounds of defens e tha t he
h ad not b ee n n e gligent, but fail ed to ' stat e in thes e grounds that he was confronted
wi.th a sudden eme rge ncy for which h o wa s not to blame . On tho stand P sta t ed tha t
he did not know how the accid ent happened a.nd that he did not s ao a ny ca.:r swe rve sue
donly in front of D. He was then asked whe the r or n ot at certa in time s he had mad e
tho sta t eme nts s e t forth above . Objection to this qu e stion we.s sustained on th e
ground tha t since a sudde n emergency WJl.S · not stated as a ground of def ens e , ovid e nc (
on tb.a t subj e ct was inadmissible. Discuss the points invo lvfJd.
(l) Tho tria l court got off on the wrong foot. Wheth e r or not D fil ed as one of
his grounds of def ense that h e was confronted with a. sudd e n emergency is irrunat e ri a l.
His st a t ement that he was n ot ·n e g\igent wa s notice tha t he wou~d r e ly on P' s f a ilur e
to prove every el ement of his case. Tho sudd en e mergen cy was not an a ffirma tive dof onsG which D must s e t forth in his grounds of' d ef ons o if h o wishe s to r e ly on it,
but a fact showing th :1t D used due c ar e under tho circumsta nc e s a nd he nce was not
n e gligent. Matt e rs which constitute pl a intiff's prima faci e c a s e a nd . which ar e de ni ed by d e fendant's ple o.ding n oed not b e stat 0d s pecifically in his grounds of d o f ens o , for the pl e ading donyin g :them is its e lf sufficient notic e that d ef endant r e lies ther eo n.
(2 ) P' s stateme nts at tho time of th o acci dent wor e a dmissibl e a s s ubst antive ovid onee as part of the r e s ge stae .
(3) P's stateme nts a we ek l a t e r wor e ndmissi ons ag'l inst inte r e st and he nce admissiblo as substantive evide nce und e r an cxc e ption t o tho hears a y rule.
( 4) P 1 s stat ement t o th e e ff o ct thnt D wa s not t o blame , whe n us e d as an admis sior;
inf er e nc e
is not subj ect to the opinion e vi denc e rul o . Tho f act th atPdrcwsuch
whe n it wa s ago.).nst his int e r e st t o d o s o is e vid ence th at thEJ inf e r enc e was · justified.
( 5) And all o f tho a b ove st a t eme nt s a r e n ls o admi ss ibl e t o impeach P by. showin g
tha t he ma de prior inc onsist e nt s tat eme nts.
( 6) The fact th at D was <Jxc cod in r, t h u s peerJ. limit n:i ght vr mi ght no t h ave b een a.
pr oxima t e c a us e of P ' s injur~ a nd should b e l oft t o t h e jury.

an
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Pr a ctice
Find in g Instructi ons
137 Va . 181
Jl...ft\r" da.ma ge s r oc o ivod wh e n D's t ruck und e rt ook t o ma ke a l e ft turn a cr oss
· tho~s o of P' s onc oming c a r. Tho c ourt ins truct ud th e .jury tha t D wa s und e r a
. ~Y (1) t o givEl a. si gm.l, clearly visible t o traffic, of his i n t enti on t o make a
l eft-hand turn, (2) t o drive s a i d ru1tomobilc as clos e us pr actic a l t o the ri ght of
tho c e nt er of said i nt e rs e cti rm b o f or e ma ki'n g a lf; ft t u rn, (3 ) t o s oc th11t said l e ft
hand turn ca n b~ ma do in s af e ty; lll1ll ' if y ou b e li•J VEJ fr om tho e vi de nc EJ t hat the de f er
ant f a ilod in the ,a bov e pa rticul a rs <:. nd tha t s uch f a ilure wa s t he sol e proxima t e cau
of the a ccid ent, thoy shoul d find f or tho pl'l.i ntiff. The .court a lso instructed the
jury in anoth er gon or a l instructi on tha t t he ov er- a ll dogr eo of c a r e owod by D wa s
or d ino.ry ca r o undor tho circumsto.n eos •. P wa.s g;ivon a ver d ict, .and .D -s ou ght a n ow
tria.l. Should th o trial c ourt g i ve 1.\ new tri a l?
· He ld: Yes . The inst:ructi.Gl'l- :tho;.;t-D---ahoulct s 0o t hat sa.id l eft-h and turn ca n be mo..do
in saf e ty s eoms t o sta t u tha t h0 i s an insur er th a t no ono will be injured ; wh er e as,
h e owe s only a duty o f du o c a r e . Thi s vic e is n ot cur od by the othe r ins tructi on,
sinc e the first instructi on wa s a fi nd i ng instructio n complot o in itse lf, and the
s e c ond ins tructi on i s n ot o xplan ~t o ry of th e f irst but i nc on si s t ent with it, and
the r e is n o way o f t <:: llin g whe the r t hu j ury b ~ i ed th e i:r·· vo:rdi :ct on tho e rr on eous
finding instruction or tho c orr e ct gon or a l i nstructi on.
TORTS
P su od

TORTS
Misce ll Rn oo us
182 Va. . 573
P' s ca r and D' s bu s c o llided a t a s tr ee t Jnters e ct i on. Ther e was evidenc e th 'lt P
was tr avelin g at a mod er a t e s p eed , a nd th~r e was e'llide nc e tha t he was go i ng a t a
speed well in exc e ss of tha t a ll oweu by l aw. P w.s on D' s r ight~ The court i ns truc -
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ted the jury that the la1oJ of this State pro·iTides 'that where two motor vehicl~s app:roar.h and. enter an intersection at approxi.m ately the same time, the vehicle to the
left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle to the right. Was this e~ror?
Held: Yes, because it does not tell the jury that if P was exceeding the speed
limit he forfeited his right of way.
TORTS Dead Bodies Damages for Negligent Interment
191 Va.43
Plairr0iff hired Defendant undertaker to disinter the body vf her husband and remove it to another cemetery. Upon being informed by Defendant that this had been
done, Plair~iff paid a bill of ~S3, covering the charge for the reinterment and a
new wooden case to cover the casket. Later Plaintiff discovered that all Defendant
had done vias to dump the body in a shallow trench at the new cemetery and spread dirf
over it. Plaintiff got another undertaker to perform a decent burial at a cost of
~~135. She sued Defendant for this pecuniary .loss and mental suffering. From a verdici
for Plaintiff for ~1,000, Defendant appeals.
Held: Although there is no property right in a dead body in a commerical sense,
the rjght to burY. an resetv t
·ns will be p;otecte as ~asi-property
righ£; and an action ex delicto will lie against a wrongdoer who interferes with
that right.There is a conflict of authority as to whether or not recovery should
be allowed for mental suffering alone when unaccompanied by pecuniary loss; but herej
where the~~ was an actionable tort and a pecuniary loss over and above the mental
anguish, -the mental suffering of Plaintiff is a proper element to be considered in
assessing damages. NOTE: ,;rn 121 Va. 284 it was held that a mother was not entitled
to damages for mental anguish where the railroad negligently failed to notify her of
her son's death and the mutilation of his body on the right of way, since the
mental suffering was not accompanied by any physical or pecuniary damage.
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fonc_g_.
"Lh -La iG d on.·:, ·c'!cm. ·Ghc c, :~'l' r.:c l; :i.;:; to n. :_ V ·; the) (. :r:;:- of the c::Lt"G.lc li::,.'blc
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the.; s ole bcnofiuia:r.y. In an o.ction by tho infant 1 s u.dli1inis i:.r2.tor, · docB the c en··
i.Ti:hutory nogl,ig,pnQe...,of · thB ,fa thor b.::tr a rocov0.ry?
1
11
! l!o,.,cnw-should be allmwcl to profit by hir~ ovm urong .so tho fo.thcr c o-u.Jdnot
ccjJ .oct. So c 125 Va. 781. Hotc-(1 ) Gonora1 rulo-·\oThcro plaintiff is guilty of coni·.r fi bu7JOIJ' nc glic;oi1Ce l..•hich proxL1atol y contl·ibut os to his injury ho can not r e cover .
i!~j\;o~:?.~ T~oro <..tro som? ~c?ptions to tl:is ruloC:t )\B-64£. p:co~ide;; that ~ :n1dor ~ho _
'v :U:'I?:J-m.CC ;•xu~)loyors 1 LH1.0lllty, Act-o.pplJ.eD.blo to cor.c: >on co.r·. ~J.ers by rallrond 1n ll1·t;r,~<u td.o corJTicrco {~ tho L.~ct thilt st~ch o:·.:ploye o ma.y llc::.vo boon gt<.ilty of contr:i.butor:;,r
nogl:l 11r.mco ohD..ll not bo.r recovery, but tho dalim.gos shall be diuinirJhcd by tho ;jury
:i.n proportion to tho <lilOunt of negligence o.ttr:l butablo to or~ch Ol!lployoo, but if th e
employer sha ll havo violated <'--''1Y statuto enacted for tho snfoty of the employe e
iThich violati on sho.J.l ho.ve contribute:d to tho injury, tl:Jon c ontri butor;y- ncgli&;onco
can not oven bo s hoHn in ':1:Lti ~CJ.tion of dmnc:'.goo .(b)V56-4J/0 p-rovidcs tho.t if th o
crcM of a tro.i.n ft.i l. to p;ivc st::tutorv s:l..cr:nc.: "' c'n et ;>;;u:_p.Jlchiru; __g,_ g;rad.o_ c:rQSsi!::tg of c1
public hic;lmay tho f ac t that o. tr<lvo11o:c on such >:L[Jn•o.:r frdlod to oxorci~c duo ,car·o
in o.pprou.chj. ng such 8ros r3 ing ;::hall not bar rcccvcry but tho.t such failure mo..y bo con:::idorod :in mitigo:t:Lo::l of d01!JC.:.~·; n . But if tho nor:). igtmc~:: of tho driver of the c o.r :is
tho solo prox:irJato c o..u sc of tho i:lcc:Lclont thoro c~~n be no recovery . (c ) Undor uorb.non 1 3
coiL1~)o ns ation contribv.tor:>' llt)gligoi1CO ho..s no ol:'foct Pnlof3f. it o.mounts to a ui:Lful
disrogu.rg of <..t n o.p p:..~ ovod rule ::'ndo for the Gc.foty of the <)m.p1oyoo, or tho inju.ry
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21. Discus.s bricfi::
doctr~Lnr) of confusion c:~1 c1. :;;ourec of title to r.crsonal
proport.;y .
If X fr:::.udu1cntly Y~~.xod r::omo of hio :f\ mr,rilbo r~oocl:.; H i t~.l th o~JO of Y 1 s, Y h~~s tine
t o the ·.;hole . If X c~c·G cd ncg:Ligl;ntl:' Y he.,> tH.1 c to r..H e xcept \lha t X can clearly
provo to be b :~o . Ex::tT.'lplcs r..ro m~:xtt~rcs of c;rdJ1 , oi1 ; 1u:·.1b oJ.·~ctc . vrhoro each unit
ck;~t bo di stingr~ished fr orl m:::.. oth er unit.
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ncgli:Jonc o of tho p l C!.inti .f:!", f0r Hb.ieh p::.:r·;;y should ;judgment be

shovm t o bo princ :i.pu1l.y due to tho nug.ligcnco

oft~; ()

to tho concur~~inr;
given?
For the p.la:i.ntHf , i f tho ncglizonco of th;; :dahro.~.' c ci1SiB t-,od in 11ot ,-:; iving tho
proper sig1Kh1. Othoruis o ·:·.~'-' pl::t5.ntifE uovld be bo.rrcc: by his contributory n ogJj_...
>_:;uncc tmlc ss tho 1;:-.:::t clo.::.r ch:::·.ucc doctr·ino 1:1::ts ::.pplicahlo. Sco note (2) (b) to
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~~ 1\S~o~~ons ~~U:.l~od;·'ont co'l!tt~ fttJ.JfJ{,., :,~ oo:;.t lt L~'~~n ~ird ·p~~i~·, u
q,_r Jt ion
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~-mos one of then .:1nd sc..:curos c. judGno:c1t for 81,000. Tl~ o p:..:rty t:1.gainst whoiil th o
;j udgnont \.JG.S s ocur ed then sool:s 'i:.o hold h:i.n .j oint tc,J~ t i'c ..>.f3 0r :r.os_?onsiblo for ono}u::.lf of t he r occvory :1c;ainst bi:w . Co·dd ho cl o oo ·:·
!.fo. Thvr o i s no c ont.r ibu·:~ :: on be:tHc:o"'l j ojEt ·cort f oasors here <..tS Vfi';_r.2 ~, d oo ~; not
nppl.y '..Jr".; ro moral t urpi t1..'.c1c: is ::..nvolvod .
Hi\0

ublico.Uon pJ~ivil cgo J?
, lS a;so u ·o y pr J..Vl 0-gcd Hhc n vs oc. b:y ..:~ l .)r,:l.nlo.tor , governor, president
or judgo , vrhilo on 1~o.~;ocl in his ofiicl:~l cc.pc~dty( 2) It i~: t:,.>difiodly privileged
(i. o . in tho e. bs Gi.1CCJ of nc.l ico) uhor c nado in good .fcd.th to ono u:l.th lik e intor cot
or duty . Exc.:raplos o.re; b o ol~ r cvim1s , co· :::onk; on a c·ts of p1..1blic o.f'.t' icinls, lottors
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iron beam from one part of the shop to another. Can he recover from the company?
At common law there could be no recovery. Under Worlonen's
tion acts it is
jmmaterial how the accident occurred unless the 1n ur.ed party wilfully hurt himself
or intentionally violated a rule approved by ~he Industrial Commission. The ~c
·cl1Qor;y of workmen's compensation is that the industry should bear the burden of all
acc i dents occuring therein. ~ (1): Employer's'liability as distinguished from
W0rl:men 1 s Compensation Acts are based on negligence of employer. In the absence of
SQCh negligence there can be no recovery. The employers' liability acts have chapged
t~ common law in the following resp,ects. (a} Abolished fellow sergant doctrine (b)
abolished the assumption of risk doctrine where the risk is due to the negligence of
the employer (c) enacted that contributory negligence of the employee can be shown
only in mitigation of damages. Note 2: If an employee is injured his right to recover
from his employer might be governed (a) by common law (b) by an employers' liability
act if injury occurred to a railroad employee. (c) by Workmen's Compensation Act.
Note(J) ,The common law duties of an em lo er to his em lo ees are to furnish(a)a
r~sonably sa e
~
o a reasonably sufficient number of competent fellow
servants(c) reasonable instruction, rules, and regulations where needed (d) these
should be prop~
ey promul~
gt
and enforced.
f!
st (_}"'~ ' ~ cL.d ~ • rl /t ~
7. Define the octrine <f6: last clear chance •11 In 197 Va.233 the Supreme Court of
Appeals, "In the hope of affording a more precise method of applying the last clear
chance doctrinett, adopted the following ~s: (l)vJhere the injured person has negligently placed himself in a situation of peril from which he is physically unable to
remove himself, the defendant is liable if he saw, or should have seen, him in time
to avert the accident by using reasonable care;(2)Where the plaintiff has negligently
placed himself in a situation of peril from which he is physically able to remove
himself, but is unconscious of his peril, the defendant is liable only i f he saw the
plaintiff, and realized or ought t~ have realized, his peril in time to avert the
ac ~ent by using reasonable care.
TOii'I'S(,\OI~ti.nu.ed

vt•

1,
1

'14

~~~
uh~~t ~~~~~~ces, if any, is a plaintiff who has been guilty of contributory negligence entitledto recover?(a) Where the contributory negligence was not a
proximate cause of the injury(b)where doctrine of last clear chance applies(c}the
cases mentioned in notes to 20n
29. In the selection of appliances, what is the test of negligence in Virginia?
An employer 'ft onl y required to exercise such ordinary care and diligence in the
selection of appliances as may be reasonable in view of the work to be performed and
J:fe dangers incl~ent to the employment.

r30.Y'O 'what
'1. ,...M.-Ae..- ~
is meant by

'<-------

11
proximate causen in connection with the law of negligence?
By proximate cause is meant the efficient force producing the injury. According to
the 11 foresight rule" the test is whether a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances might have foreseen that his failure to use due care might produce some such
result as was produced. If so, his failure to use due care is the, proximate cause o~ 1
the injury. Under the R~~ent if defendant's negligence is a 'substantial factor
Caf sing the injury then 1t is a proximate cause.
f. rD X. L~s. t - - :1A invites his friend, B, to take a ride with him in his buggy. While crossing the
track of the N.&W.Ry.Co. in the city the buggy was struck by an engine and train of
the railroad company, runrdng at a speed largely in excess of the city ordinance,
without giving any signals of its approach. B was blind. A, who was driving the
buggy did not look and listen as be approached the track. Both men were thrown from
the buggy and badly hurt. Both sued the railroad company to recover damages for their
·injuries. Are both, or either, entitled to recover?
B could recover for the railroad's negligence was a proximate cause of his injury.
B could also recover from A for the same reason as it~pos sible to have more than
one proximate cause, i.e. more than one substantial factor or efficient force or
event. Under the circumstances B does not seem to have been guilty of contributory
negligence. A could also recover for his contributory negligence in this case

l-

f

'l'Oit 'J'~ (contim::.ed)
Revised August 1959
Po
f alls under one of the exceptions to the general rule, and only goes· in mitigation

r;~a~

.

;.~, "'passenge.f o~ ,,,~::~15oat,

in this State, is injured in a collision between i t
and another boat, due to the negligence of both boats. Does the fact that boat on
Hhi ch he is traveling is negligent affect his right to proceed against the othe:::·
bo at? Why?
No. The negligence of the boat on which he was riding would not be imputed to him
as that boat was not under his control. Hence he has a cause of action against either
oth. In or ~ to imp~e negligence t here must be some agency relationship.
:c... l 6-«.> ry"ac;. y_ u.d~o- IV
,~:s,.
·
• A has B arrested on a criminal chargJ~ a~~en before a magistrate, who, after
holding a preliminary examination, requires bond for his good behavior. This action
of the justice is reversed on appeal. What effect will the action of the justice
have on the question of probable cause in a suit for malicious prosecution?
The Virginia rule is that conviction before a justice though reversed on appeal is
conclusive evidence of probable cause (unless obtained by fraud or perjury), and
hence would b ~ bar to the action. Note: The elements of the tort of malicious prosecution are ~ The ~ommencement by the defendant Q~:iginal suit. This suit is
generally a criminal one, but if it is a civil one that ties up property or leads to
physical restraint(as lunacy proceedings)it is sufficient. In 186 s.E.45, 46 the
Virginia Supreme Court expressly ~ft the question open as to whether or not any
civil suit would be sufficient; ~ Favorable termination o
proceedjngs mentioned in (a) for the defendant there who is, o course, the plaintiff in the malicious
prosecution suit; ~ ~alice (for the jury to determine)in instituting the proceed~~mentioned in ~ ; ~ want of probable ca~ (for the court to determine) in
instituting the proceedings mentiol"-ed in (a); ~ Special damage (unless the proceedings instituted charge somethir.g that 1-1ould be slander per se if there was an
oral unprivileged publication of the ma·&ters involved in the aforesaid proceedings.
If any one of these elements is lacking the malicious prosecution iction fails.
~ f~ of J;d:~ ~ Y- 7: s-~~
§4:(a) A, who 1s twenty years Of~age, is engaged in the livery business and is sued
in assumpsit by B, who hired a hack from him, for injury caused by negligence by A's
driver. Can B recover? (b) A, a lunatic, deno~nced B as the murderer of C, in a
newspaper; B sues him for damages. Can B recover?
(a) No. This tort is so closely connected with the contract of hiring that to enforce tort liability here would really er~orce an infant's contract which is not for
necessities. Since the infant could repudiate his servant's contract of hire the
whole basis for holding the infant falls. (b) No. An insane person is incapable of
entertaining the specific intent necessary for such torts as malicious prosecution
nd defamation. See PP• 792-793 of Prosser on Torts(2nd Ed.)
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35 ~(~ ) -~~t risks are assumea by a servant?(b) What in general are the qytj es o! a

m~

to the servant? (c) When is it the ~ of the master ~ rna~ and promulgate
r~ for the operation of his work? (d) When is a foreman vi...&se -principal? {eJ Who

are fellow-servants?
(a) The ordinary risks of that t~~e of employment. Also at common law, the risks
from any defect which the employer after complaint has refused to fix, or, if he has
promised to fix same, has delayed an unreasonable t i me .-- (b) See 26, note (3). (c)
W9enever the nature of the busi ness requires such r ules for its orderly conduct,
e.g., the running of trai ns . (d) When he i s engaged in performing any duties owed by
a mas ter to his servant (e) Fellow s ervants are thos& servi ng a common master working under the same contr ol, deriving a.uthorit y and compensa tion from the same source,
and engaged in the same general business g although in di f f erent grades or departments. See 39 C.J. 550. But t his definiti on should exclude a vic e ~prinaipal who is
performing a non-delegatable duty of the common employer .

TORTS(continued) TtrY'f v.. 6,.../ht _.
Revised Sept.l959
.36. Dis·tiinguish bet ween a tort and a crime, and give an illustration of (a)An act
which is a tort ard not a crime; (b) An act which is a crime and not a tort;(c)An
ac t which is both a tort and a crime.
A t ort gives rise to civil liability. A crime is a wrong of such serious nature
t hat the state is directly concerned in protecting itself and bringing the perpetrat or thereof to justice.(a) Simple trespass and slander at common law, malicious
prosecution, slander of title (b) Speeding, fornication, hunting out of sea,s on,
prize fighting, bootlegging, etc. (c) Malicious mischief, libel, assault and
battery, larcenyo

37. Owing to the negligence of a telephone o

r, a train is wrecked, a passenger is injured,
x ress pac age lost. The company sues the operator for the
loss of its cars, the passenger sues him for the injury to him, and the owner of the
package for its loss. What should be the judgment in each case, and why?
The operator has negligently violated a duty owed in each case. The damage was the
proximate result of the negligence, so all the elements of an action for negligence
are present in each of the cases put.
Note 1: Facts about the tort of tres pass ~t realty.(l) The least unprivileged invasion Of another's land giveS rfi e to an a J.On Of t1·espass quare clausum fregit
regardless of whether actual injury occurs or not. (2) Mistake is no defense.
Note 2 (1) Conversion consists of the exercise of a dominion over personal property
which is inconsis t ent with the rights of the true owner(2) the usual remedy at
common law is an action of trover (3) It is no defense except as to punitive damages
that one acted in good faith. Note 3: (1) A nuisan~t e is e.ny unprivileged act done
.on the land of one person to the hurt of another's lands or some right connected
therewith. (2) If the nuisance is a public one o<1ly, the remedy is by indictment or
information. (3) If it is a private one the remedy is an action on the case, or, in
some cases by injunction, or abatement by self help u However self help cannot
ordinarily be lawfully used (l) Unless the party committing the nuisance has first
been asked to remedy the matter himself (2) Unless the nuisance can be abated without a breach of the peace. Note: ·rr ·the one abating the nuisance does more damage
than is reasonably necessary, he becomes a trespasser ab initio, for the privilege
of entry was given by a rule of law, and, after entering, he abused biB privilege.

Negligence iL j_
f D y;:c_~J 9.53 .§BJPifi12,ept J.P.i~~l
· 19.5 Va.l3
A ownOO"'"a half nu.~~~vll aut6mobfle race V a'i!fr! .ri:h'e r e was a guard rail and a 42 i n
high wire mesh fence around the track for tho protectj_on of spectators. B leased t he:
1'ace track from A who also owned and supervised the Atlantic Rural Exposition. It w2.
in the interest of both A and B to have large crowds at the races as A charged a
general admission and B charged an additional admission. P, a paying spectator, was
seriously injured when a wheel came off a car, hurtled the 42 inch fence and struck
him. The evidence indicated that in spite of all reasonable precautions wheels will
come off of racing cars at times because of the severe strains to which they are
subjected, and that when they do they not infrequently clear 42 inch fences, and tha1
such fact should have be~n known by A and by B. P sued A, B, C who was the driver,
and D and E who were the ·owners of the stock car.
Held:(l) The case ·should be dismissed as to C, D, and E. They had all exercised duE.
care and had nothing whatever to do with the staging of the races.(2) Both A and B
are equally liable. They should have known of and appreciated the danger. Since they
both shared in the gain, and bet>-roen them had control of the track and tho grandstan(
they are jpintly liable . It is no defense th ·;.t in some other placE:Js the fenc es are
lower than 42 inches. The question is not: Hhat is the height of the fences on other
race courses? But, Wa5 the fence on AIs race track ccm; tructed in such a way as to
fulfill the duty of care owed spectators? It was not. Nor has P as sumed the risk . P
was no expert on such matters and was justifi8d in assuming that all proper precautions had been taken for his s ~f e.- ty.
~
<
• ' _
S~r- s
._L
. "'-t. {:r: t (I!J'Y" <:. .s
TORTS
De ath by wrongf ul act
lJ,
Suppl&~nt :J-~& .<"Lo
19.5 Va .479.
X, a 1h :~ear old boy who tQ.d be · a t'1Jon:~Ciby <ili-s-fc~'f¥fivl dle still an infant, a;
turned over to his InatGrnal grandparents by his mother when only 18 months of age ,
was killed ins t r:m tly due to the gross negligence of D. The mother had r emarried .and
had had .five children by her second husband. The court instructed the jury that the
mother was sole bem)fici ary . Was this corr·ect?
Held: No. Class 1 is spouse , childron, and grandchildren. Cla10s 2 is parents,
brothers, and sisters. The e:Jg21'essi on "bro thers and sisters" inchde half 'rothers
and sisteJ:.S .
In the above case the court limited the damages to 11 such sum as would equal the
probable earnings of the deceased".
Held: It is- error to flx that amount as the damages. W.t1ile his probable earnings
may be consider ed ther e are other considerations also.
· Held further that benefici ari es may be allowed damages even though they might not
r easo nably expect to r eceive any of the earnings of the deceased. "There are other
matters, SUCh as lOSS Of dece
I
C . e , at~nd_SO ' ety, and the sorrow,
s';lfferi l}g_·and mental anguish occ asioned the beneficiari es by reason of his death. 11

1'0 R'l'S

~

TO RTS P.[.QOf of Neglige,nc e To i-ft.,•
19.5 Va .576.
p entered D's show r oom to look at a car. She had been walking on a thin rubber
matting. She stepped off this matting on D's invitati on onto a sloping t er azz o flo or
which was slippery.· She W'lS not warned of that f act. She slippod and f ell. The trial
court struck all of P 1 s evidence .
Held: Error. She was an invitee and enti tled t o notice of any:nef_oc.t - not appar ent.
Just how slipper y t he floo r was, the extent of the slope, and whether she was guilty
of contributory neglig<mc e were all jury questions.

JJe,.

TORTS
Liability of State Fr?\111:J ~,.,..,~., {:ac. d~~ ~
· , ,.Q..
i!95 V a . ~.55.
Case 1. Agents of the Stat e bm.lt a h1ghwa;y 1n ~awful ntrrmer. fs a &~t1tHereof
P's l and became cover ed with soil which was deposited ther eon by erosion of the
adj acent~ highe r land.
Held: P can compel the HighHay Commis sioner to institute eniment domai n proceeding~
to asc ertain the extent to which his l ~md has been damagcd(l82 Va .l9.5).
·
Case 2. Ag ents of the St2.te negligently oper at ed a stone quarry as a proximate r esult of which P' s land was d·1maged .

,·
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Held: P cannotrecover. The State has not consented to be sued in tort. There is 2
vast difference between injuring P's land while acting in a lawful manner, and i nj:J.rinB his land while act:Lng negligently. "The government does not guarantee the
i nt cgri ty of its offic ers nor the validity of their acts~ -lHH~ They are but servants
o:f the law and, if they depart from its requirements, the government is not bound. '1
I n such case condemnation is not compellable.
195 Va .671 .

TOl"l:I'S

P was invited by D to enter its warehous e to inspect some merchandis e . He stepped
on' a power mower in the ~isle in such a way as to cause the handle· to fly up and
knock some of his te eth out. The evidence was in conflict as to whether the mower was
in pl :1in view or partially concealed and as to hol-r well th o aisle was lighted.
Held: Verdict and judgment for P affirmed as questions of negligence and cont..ci.butory negligenco under the abovr: ci rtmms:t:.ances w,e:r:a_fo_r_t_h_e ~ry.
TORTS

Death by Wrongful Act

195 Va .714.

In a' death by wrongful act case couns<=:l agr eed that iwspi tal, doctor, and fW1eral

expenses came to $2506. The verdict of the jury was as follows: 11We the jury find
for the plaintiff--in sum of $7500. This amount includes $2506 for hospital,doctor~
and funeral expenses."
Held: Vl/8-638 r equires that the r ecovery be distributed to the beneficiaries
"after the payment of costs and r easonable attorne:y's f ec;;s, 11 and that it-, "shall be
fre e from all debts- a.nd liabilities of the deceas ed." "Ther efore the hospital,
mesical and funer al GJq)QJ:lS 0 S ar:G not tC C OV erabl ~ and
ot J2r Op.§r el.e,!llen~S Of
dg.mages."
1954.
Dcc.Supplement
TORTS Defamation Motion for Summary Judgment
196 Va .l.
C, an at'Eorney,publi.cly char ged that graft existed i n the Richmond City Polic e
Department and urged a grand jury investigation. Aft ;~r such an investigation no indictments wer e r eturned. The D Newspaper s o r eported and added that the Chief of
Polic e was much pleased at the vindication. It then stated that the Chief was asked
i f he contemplated filing a complaint against C with the District Committee of the
Virginia State Bar. It then added, 11 Under the State Code , trw State Ba r a s an administrative agency of the Supreme Court of Appeals may r equest a court of compet ent
jurisdiction to disbar an attorney for viol ation of the ethical code governing the
professional conduct of attorneys 11 • D moved f or summary judgmont becaus e nothing
defamatory was stat ed, and hi.s motion was gr anted. Was this err·Jr?
Held: Yos. A char g_o dispar aging ono ;i,n b ·
ro~£L.Inaei.a_by_ind.irecti o n,
and if s o made would bo actionable both ns s l ander per s e , and under the statute of
insulting words. Sinc e i t might be a r ens onablo implication from tho above that C
was guilty of tmethical conduct, a cause of s ction may exist and a mD.t erial issue
of f act is in disput e . Whore such an i ssue uf f act exists it is error t o grant a
motion f or summary judgmc>Qt.
TORTS
Blast i ng
196 Va .288.
pr s plas tJ"ri~g cracked badly nft er a consider.'.lble amount of plasting had been done
by D in the oper ation of .his qua rry some 600 f eot away and one piece of rock f ell
on P's promis es. D us0d as much ns 700 pounds of dynamite in some of his charges.
Expert t estimony and oxpGrimentat ion shotvod th::tt ::ts much ns 1, 000 pounds of
dynamite could bo us ed without damaging plast er 500 f eet away, and that ~racks
could be caused by s ettling and shrinkage . The jury f ound that D' s blasting was not
the cause of pt s dam.age but aw.<J.r ded P $1 nCJmi nul damagE::s f or the invas ion of the
piece of r ock. The trial court s c.: t the ver dict as i de and gave judgment f or P f or
~Pl5oo.

HE::ld: The verdict of the jury shnul d be r e- inst at <:. d as it w:.:ts bas ed on credible
evid(;nc e and it was f or the jury t·~· d '~ t e rmin e the f act of · causation or the l ack of H

June Sup.pJ.cment 1955.
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'l'O::l.TS Eminent Domain
196 Va.477 •
Section 58 of the State Constitution provides that private property shall not be
t.::~.}.en or damaged for - public use without just, oompensation. D, a Tunnel District,
-vrith power of eminent domain, caused the land around P's building to become s aturat·~<'
with water from a fire hydrant and from pumps PUi1lping water from an excavation. The
building settled and cracked and extensive repairs became necessary. D defended on
t•vo grounds: (1) that it was not neglig~t, and (2) that P was negligent in that she
had failed to provide the building with gutters and downspouts.
Held:(l) It is immaterial that D was not negligent,(2)Section 58 is self exscuting,
(3) if the damage caused by P' s contributory negligence is severable from the
damage caused by D1 s actions there can be a recovery for the latter damage. The jury
should have been so instructed. Since t
aais o.f .the action does not rest -in
negligence, P 1 s contri~ory- ne~ igence is no bar except as to the damage cause~ b~
h~r own negligence.
TO RTS

Damages

196 Va.505.

P, c3; trained nurse, was injured in an automobile acc:J.dent due solely to D's negli··

gence. She testified that she was a trained nurse, that she received $10 a night,
that she r11as on call, that her husband worked alternate 24 hour shifts as a Captain
in the fire department, ·and that she had two babies at home.
Held: Any recovery for loss of future earnings as a result of the accident is
void as bas€:a solely on specuiatlon. Sucn-damages n1ust be proved with reasonable
certainty. There is no evidence as to how many calls she might reasonably expect
or how many she could have accepted.
196 Va.532
TORTS
X, a twelve year old boy, was drowned in the same abandoned quarry in much the
same way as was another boy in 187 Va . 767. Since the prior case, V#l8-74 has been
amended. It requires every owner of property who knows about a well or pit to fill
the same with eartt1 after it is no longer used so that it will not be dangerous to
human beings, animals, or fovrls.
Held: The statute has no application to a quarry covering almost an acre. The well
or pit referr ed to means a small opening in the ground apt to become obscured by
weeds or bushes. Moreover the impracticability of filling up a large quarry with
dirt as f ast as stone, sand, or gravel is carried away, is very persuasive that the
legislature did not intend the statute to ' be applicable to such excavations.
TORTS Public Utilities Neglige~ e
196 Va. 642.
A public bus skidded on~ wet slippery pavement whi le rounding a sharp curve at a
low rate of speed. It struck the curb but continued on its way. P was jarred from
her seat. She did not notify the driver until all passengers had departed, had no
medical evidence to prove any serious injur;y , but sued for ~:i375 ,000. The jury found
for the Bus Co., but the trial judge ~ et the verdict aside and entered judgment for
$6,000.
Reversed and final judgment entered for the defendant. Skidding is not negligence
per sa, but only one circumGtru1ce to be considered along with all the other evidence.
In the instant case it was f or t he jury and their ver dict should be re-instated.
TORTS Gratuitous P~~en~rs ?
196 Va.659.
D owned a res t aura
and P was a waitress therein who normally got off work before
midnight. One night P asked D to stay past midnight to help him clean up telling her
he would t ak e her home if she did. They left t he restaurant at 1:30 in D's car.
He negligently drove it and she was killed. Is her pers onal representative entitled
to recover if D was not gro ssly negligent?
Held: Yes. She was not a non-paying guest. It was part of the agreement that i f she
would do extra work she would be t aken home . She had paid f or her transportation.

June Supple~ent 195S
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TORTS Vf o1ati on of ord~nance
6'~
~ ~2/ ,11:#-~
·
196 Va . 703o
"' Ar: ord~nance of the C~ty of R Jttovides-,..~.at }!o. passenge r shall enter or lea.Ye any
~axlc ab by way of the left rear door except on one way streets. Pis cab came to a
stop and the driver opened the left rea r door for her. As she put her ha nds on t he
door frame to pQll herself up a car struck the door slamming it shut on Pis ha nd.
He ld: P is guilty of contributory negligence which bars any claim she might otherwise have.
'l'ORT~3

:L96 Va . 817
P te stifie d that before he drove l1is truck into & street interse ction he l ooked
to the rir:;ht and l eft arid. saw no c ars . He HC'S struck .by lJ 1 s car as he entend the
i ntersection . There was no reason Nhy he <J.id no t s e e D 1 s car had he looked .
He l.d: For D. '1.'Ls driver of o. vehiclC: ap~roachinc an inter·section is under the
duty to s ee t!1.::.t ~rhich is :i.n pl ain vim·r. If he doe s not lle is ~;uilty of Q01~1Lo
ry neglieence as a matter of lav< •.

TO~'l'~j_s:wd

s~-

bu~9 ~t~n. P ;~ked wh~r
8

to
ho··lS(; .:md lot , and P u:i.sbe d to
:i.t Has
so colcl in the hous L and D r e] ,lie d. t hc. t there was s omethi;1~ 11Ton::;; ui th t he cont rols
of tbe fur nace and that she 1-1<18 :)hysi.call~r inc'-'.pable of firing it. As a me.t ter of
fact the furnace ua s cr<..c kc d but due to so ot the c raclc -v;as n ot obvi ous , ~ 0£r.d an
expert look C~t tht- f urnace a.nd t i1e n:x:: xTt sa :i_d th.J.t if t he controls werdfunctioning pro:~)erl:y the mc::tter could b e e.:1.s :Lly r <.: r;icd:i e J. 'J~h e e;c!icrt onl y m.:lde- a s u~e r
ficia.l 8 J~w-~:i.no. tion and f e.iJ.e rJ to discover- the cr2ck. ? per f ormed his part of the
contract and i s no1rJ std.n~; fe r damace s f o:r f raud.
He1d :
( T:ro judGeS di E:senting ) Fm.' D. On ti1c~:c;c facts i.t Has P 1 s duty to ascer ta.in t he true condi tion. :Ie r (?lied ..nn t h e ex11ert rathc tl:iaa n D. ·

196 Va . u32.
Held in a L t o 3 de cis ion th<rt an old i.-roman 1-rho cr os se s a :-~mch tra,;elle d highway, nncl ul1o looks befor e; she crosse s , end then sh:rt.s to Cl 'oss , and tvho does not
look a r:;ain be f or e she cros:;e s the l r.::: t h.?.ll of tl H~ hi shvJ~ry- is guilty o.f c ontribut or ne li ~S ence as a matter of law ·li>rhicl1 continues to the - moment of i mpact s o
that the l as , C e ar C ~ ance c trine is not applicGble o Judgment for pl aintiff ~~ 7500
.reversed and fimU.judg:ment entered for def endant .
TORTS

TORTS
1 96 Ve. , 960
P 1 s husband b ou?ht a hot tlr3 of sl1mr,poo .£'ron D, t llc l-JC! nufac turer . The dire c tions
reCJ.d : 11 1\. , i·tampoo t o be used ~!Hlwut s oe.p or- Hat er . Ileat t;ntil -vmnn, pour through
tlK hair a little a t r.:. Ume . f.ias s ac;e Hell. 11 P 1 s husband 1-ms a~') plying the shampoo

a.c c orciinr; to dire ctions dwn r l i ·t 2. ma t ch t o lii)1t a ci c;m·e tte . The r e Ha s a sudden fl ;;.sl1 anc.: P 1-r::,c ser iously burn ed . ;;;.~port evi dence by r.herrti :.> ts indicated concl,, s ive l y t hCJ t the : > hampuo C011lc1 not f hts h lml es.;; it '. Ja r> heat e d t o a t f)mperat ure
of 170 ck Jr:;r ce s ancl it wa s aclmi t ·~c cl 'Jy al l \.;;:J:;, tll:.s l iCJ S n ot t hE. case . P :..'e cover:-ed
a verdict anr.l judgment of ~~1) , 000 . '·!bat n ' e>ul i:. or: :.>.:vpcc:.l?
liE.ld : r~evc· s e d a nd h nJl juricr11cnt . i' l :;;:~; not 11rov ecl r•ny neg.lie:ence h11t only an
Ull£X1Jlained f ;r::e:1k. r.:.ccident.

-

llailro<J.cl Cr ossinr' J\cci clent
1C6 Va . 083 .
P wa D j_nju.r e<.l '!tihen his · t r ue)( 1r:'f> s trucl{ b7, an c n :__i ne on t gr <olde cr os s ing in Char lotte.:;vil1e . lt 'IJO S <J. c1c·or , col d. nicht . He tcs t .i.fie tl thv.t no s i ~na ls uer e r;i ven,
that h e s toppe d and looke d b e fore ) roce :::C..:in :::: acro0s , and t h2t he confclsed the locomotives 'neadl ir.;ht Hith s tree t and ot ;tt:r li:)1tc . '1'hc G.:. t -- of Ci~ arlot te svill e ha s an
orclinanc8 [(laking cro sd .rt(; s i gna l.;:; Vr r.? ).J.::·ot:.·r:ls :-'e rm:i.~; s ive . 'i'i1 e .~ 1.U'Y f ound for P
and the trial jucl.:3e re::f1.11J8d to ::;r; t 1c;i '.:le the verclic (~ .
Held: I..evers e d . 'i:hc ~;, t:~tut. c-: oi s n ot p •lnlicabl e: :i.r:; citi e s and totms (Vi;~ 56-4)1:
H ne e the doctrine ol' compa ratj vo nc c l:i -i.~ 0nce h.::w n o application . Failin:; to s ee
the train uhich Ha. s in ~')J.ain r:d .:;i:rt HCI S con·:·.rib1.1 t ory n egli ~cnc e as a mat ter of lau
which w9uld, in this cc.~s o , lJ G a c om~lete bar .:.ven i f t llC ungineer \.J<t 5 ne r~ J.i gent .
'l'OHTS

page S
197 Va . 46
p miss ed ~rve while aAvipg his ca.r and hit a stump. His body r111as thrown from
the car and into the highway. A few seconds later D ran over P 1 s body. It was night,
and because of the curve, D's lights did not focus on the point on the road ;.Jhere
p: s body lay. It is not known whether P was dead when struck by D.
Held: No recovery under the death by wrongful act statute. There is not~:sufficient
evidence that D was negligent, or, even if he .was,that the proximate cause of the
death of P was being struck by D1 s car.
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TGHTS
Deserting wife
in adultery as benef,iciary V~.112.
p sued D for wrong u y 1 1ng •
e
\v.. .as the 6nly beneficiary in Class
I. She had deserted H and had been living in adultery with X. Short.ly__; before H' s
death she returned to H and occup~_ed the same room 1•rith him over a single week end,
but on Monday after H had gone to work, again went back to X. She made no further
attempt to reestablish proper marital relations with H. Is she entitled to recover
under the death by wrongful act statutes?
·.
Held: Yes. There is no provision so far as the death statutes go for barring any
beneficiary unless that beneficiary t1as negligently or intentionally caused the
death of the deceased. In this respect the death statutes differ from(a)the statute
on dower(b)the statute on distribution of personalty in certain cases and(c)wor.kmen';
compensation, in all of which a deserting spouse(thereraving been no reconciliation)
is barred. Note-however that while the deserting spouse is not barred evidence of he
misconduct i s' admissible as to the amount of dam ages recoverable.

!lfo e:Jfe..:/197
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1-l;~J
89 s.E.2d 32, 197 VaJ.. 2
X was D sck d~iver and had been told not to take riders. B asked for a ride
and was informed of the ruleo X then relented and told him to get in. X had trouble
with the.gears. He momentairly took his eyes off the road to look at the gears
while going at a moderate speed. The right front wheels went off onto a soft shoulde
and before X could regain control the truck went into the di:l:.ch and t .1rned over
killing B.
Held: B was a tresp~s se r . The only duty owed him by D was to refrain from will. fully or wantonly injuring him . Here there was only or·dinary negligence at best. Jud
ment for B's personal representative as against D set as ide as contrary to law and
evidence.
TORTS

1ieftZ

7

Qtild three years of ae-e injured
89 S.E.2d 40, 197 Va.; X- 6
D drove his car to Mrs . X's house on business . He par ked the car near a mud puddle
on the side of the road. Whe n he returned he saw some children playing in the mud
puddle. Mrs. X told the children not to play in the nasty puddle. D and Hrs. X talk€
for five minutes and then D got into his car and started off. One of the children,
aged 3, was sitting in front of D's car in such a position that he could not have
been seen from the driver's seat. He was killed. D contends he was not under a duty
to search out children in conc ealed places before starting his car .
Held: For childfs personal representative. D knew small children were in the
neighborhood, and he did not see them leave. Under these circumstances a jury could
find(as they did) that a failure to check on their probably erratic activities was
negligence.
TORTS

89 3 • .6. 2d 54, 197 Va. ) ,:/ J
Held, that where P negligently entered a principal high111ay f r om a pri.vate road in
front of an approaching tractor trailer truck driven by D and loaded with cattle in
such a way that when brakes were applied the cattle would shift and cause truck to
get out of control, and collision was due to both these factors each was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law and neither could recover damages from
the other.

TORTS

·Clear
- Dooanbel~t 195.5 .
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TOriTS Las't.AChance Doctrine
89 S ..E.2d 49, 197 Va.233
p was standing on the ·shoulder of the highway about a foot from the paved surface
t a.l..king to some men in a station wagon completely on the right. shoulder of the highlA·ay. D was driving a truck the body of which. projected about a foot beyond the. ·cab
p1"tion ·thereor·; lT·aa:w· Fwheri some tl"iree- hu.nd:red yard:s 'away and failed to slacken his
speed, sound his horn, or change his direction until P was struck by the projecting
portion of the truck. The trial judge told. the jury that the "whole thing here" was
tJ vW much further to the right could the station wagon have been parked, and gave an
i.ns,truction to the effect that if P remained in a dangerous position which position
contributed to P 1 s injury then he is not entitled to recover and the doctrine of last
clear chance does not apply.
Held:(l)How far the station wagon was parked from the paved highway was irrelevant
asP had nothing to do with the parking of the car;(2)that the instruction that if
P remained in a dangerous position was misleading as it assumed without any evidence
that he was in a dangerous position;(3)The court then had this to say on the last
. ..\ [klear chance doctrine, . "In the hope of affording a more precise method of applying
j_trf>l
~last clear chance doctrine, we adopt the following rule:
.
"Where the injured person has negligently placad himself in a situation of peril
from which he is 1?~ 1
to remove hims elf, the defendant is liable i f he
saw, or should have seen, him in time to avert the acciden ) by using reasonable care.
\\~ Where the plaintiff has negligently placed himself in a situation of peril fr~ which
~ he is ~hysicallY. able to temQYB-hi mself,_ but is ur.conscious £f his pe~~J , the~efend
ant is liable only if he saw the plain~iff and r ealized, · or ought to have realized,
his peril in time to avert the acciden0 by using reasonable ca.re.
11 If upon retrial of this case there is credible evidence showing that the plai ntiff
Greear, negligently placed himself in a situation of peril between the hard surface of
the highway and the parked station wagon, from which situation he was physically able
to remove him~:~elf, but of which danger he was unconscious, and that the truck driver
saw him in such situation and realized, or should have realized, his danger in time
to have avoided striking him by using reasonable care, then the jury should be told
in an appropriate last clear chance instruction(embodying this principle)that under
such facts Greear w auld be entitled to r ecover."

cJ,_v.
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)-. . . June 1956 •
197 Va.490 .
p wno"Jff~:cf in ~lwp;rt News ;lttended a dance at Fort Eustis. D offered to drive her
home in his car . She accepted, and went to' sleep vlhile seated on the front seat. P
testified that he "dozed", and a l s o that he went to s l eep suddenly while driving the
car which ran off the highway and into a tre e injuring P.• The court left the issue of
gross negligence
to the j ury and gave instructions on contributory negligence and
unavoidable accident. The jury found for D.
Held;(l)Going to sleep is presumptively negligence on the part of the driver . Whether it is gross neglieence is ordinarily a jury question. tience it was proper in this
case to submit th e case to the jury under proper instructions.(2)The court takes
judicial notjce that people seldom go to sleep without any advance warning. D admitted
that he 11 dozed11 ,i.e. became s emi-cons cious . A jury could find that it was gross
negligence to continue driving . (3)The matter of P's contributory negligence s'1ould
not have been left to the jury since there was no evidence of such neglig ence . A
guest owes no duty to stay awake when she has no reason to believe that her host
cannot drive properl y .(4) Since D offered no evidence to excuse himself from driving
while asleep no instructj.on on unavoidable accident should have been given. These
l ast two instructions merel y served to confus e t he jury . Revers ed and remanded.
TORTS f-rt;);WI.H/e (~,.
197 Va.)40.
The D Electric Co. haJ-a; easement across P 1 s land and had dug a hole for a pole
on which to stretch the lines. The hole was three feet from a rocky, steep path leading from P's house t0 an outdoor privy . The hole was not covered up . After dark P's
little child started for the privy with P following. Tbe child fell down and started
to cry. p rushed to pick her up ~ fell down and lost consciousness. When shecame to ,

'l'OH.TS
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.
~- 33.~ l eft leg was in the hole- and her· right le.g .was Clti;:mpl:ed, up- ilnde-r her. What -is ·t-,!; <;1
only problem involved as to the existence of liability?
Held: The only problem is; m;·Jas the hole the proximate cause of the injury?" If P
f ell on the path and injurAd herself when she fell thereon the existence of the hole
v1as not a legal caus ?. of ner injury .... .It .:wa.s...held(.Sprat1ey) J'l!, ·dissenting)that wheth r:
t ho hole was a proximate cause of her injury was a question for the jury. Verdict
in favor of P re-instated.
TOHTS ift~ &J~ <rr.- CJt Or-J.. b.
r,t;~ ,_ cf{:.. A_ ~ rt12e /. 197 Va.572 •
D while negligently driving hi; h ar ran into a mot~c fe dri1en by A, aged 15. B,
aged 13 was sitting on the seat of the motorcycle and was killed. A was sitting ~n
the gas tank in front of the seat. An ordinance made it illegal for anyone to operate
a motorcycle while carrying thereon any persons for which regular seats have not been
provided. What effect, if any, has the violation of the ordinance on B's personal
representative's right to recover?
Held:(l)Both A and B were violating the ordinance(2)If B had been over 14 this
w auld· have been negligence per se, but since B was under 14 he is presumed to be
incapable of contributory negligence, so there was a jury question as to whether or
not a youth of B1 s age, intelligence, maturity, and experience should have known of
the danger.
-:;:;- slruc....~~s
.
Torts--Same fa~t~ as above. The Court instructed the jury that in ascertaining the
damages, "You shall find the same with reference to the probable earnings of the deceased during what would have been his probable life time, if he had not been killed"
Held: The court should not have used the mandatory 11 shall11 but some such permissive
word or phrase as "may", "can", or 11 are allowed to 11 •
Held also that while it would be error to instruct the jury that it might consider
damages equal to what dec eased might have earned, they may take into consideration
in determrnrng what damages are fair and just the amount he might have earned even
though·. deceased has not yet earned anything . It was also held that the jury could
t ake into considerat ·
'
ectanc- even thou h no mort "ty tables
w ~ in ro uced into evidence.
TORTS
197 Va.761
P sued D for common law libel and violation of the Virginia stat.ute of i nslJJ.ting
wo,rds for publishing of P that she and a~ot h er were oper ating a club which engaged
in the illegal sale of liquor and in gambling . Defense: Truth. The court instructed
t he jury that if they believed from the evidenc e that ' P was owner, part owner,
or l essor thereof and permitted, acquiesced in, or consented to such illegal use
the jury should find f or defendants.
Held: Error. The i nstruction is obj ecti onable as being too broad. While if article
published was substantially (even though~ not literally)true in t he ordinary and
accepted meaning t her eof, trut h would be a def ens e , the difference between operating
on the one hand anq l easing on t he ot her is too gr eat to be disregarded for proof
of leasi ng is not proof of ope.cati ng . Note : Th e court also held that D could prove
P's general r eputation since such ev-idenc e was relevant -on the qu.estion of damages.

cl; (&e-

TORT::; ~<' J D-f·
197 Va.811.
D backed ~ car out of her gar age a l ong her private driveway to the street. In
doing so she r an over a nei ghbor's infant child. The distanc e of the child from the
vehi cle when l ast s een by D, and the tim e t hat e l aps ed bef or e th e car was moved afte r
D saw the child were l eft ent irel y to surmis e and conj ecture .
He ld: P has not pr oved negligence. He had the burden of proof. (Thi s is not a r es
i psa loquitur cas e f or D had no cont r ol over the child). One i s not an insurer of
the s afet y of children t hough i f he has r eason to beU eve t hat a young child is
nearby he should be prepared f or any heedless act that a child i s apt to do.
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Page 8
197 Va.830
A statute protibits the stopp~ng of vehicles in the travelled portions of a highway. D violated the statute by stopping a bakery truck to make a few sales therefr olf!
He left room for vehicles to get by. On the issue of D's neglgence the court instructed the jury that if D stopped his truck in such an unreasonable manner as to
render dangerous the use · of the street by others he was negligent. Was this a proper
instruction'?
Held: No. The jury snould notbe ·invited to speculate on the reasonableness of the
stopping. The violation of the
· in itself negligence, and if this negligence proximate y contributed to the death of X, a four year o d child, D is liable.
TOR.'J'S

TO HTS ;J;;<ls'i,.r .. _ ( :---._ _ rc:C.t-es..>
· ju
.
.
_ 198 Va.~2
..
D Has dn·ITing1tlS car at a 7reckles ~'te of speed 1gnonng all the pla1nly V1Slblc
caution and speed signs. He crashed into a concrete abutment killing his gratuitous
guest, P. There was no evidence as to whether or not P saw the signs, or protested
or failed to protest to D. D asked the court to instruct the jury that "gross neP:ligence .is that degree of negligence which shows an utter disregard of prudence amounti.ng to a complete neglect of the safety of another. It is such heedless and reckless
disregard of the rights of another · as should shoclc fair-minded men." The court struck
out the l a st sentence of this requested instruction. D contends that P was guilty of
contributory negligence and that the court err ed in striking out the last sentence
of the requested instruction.
Held: No error~ D had the burden of proving P's alleged. contributory negligenc e .
No evidence at all does not sustain that burden. As to tbe instruction, the stricken
sentence was merely r epetitious sayi.ng tne same t hing in another way.

Ale:..~) of
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TORTS
Jqi,n t Enters;rise
fl
f<D
198 Va.l22
Hand W were ritts band and~if e. W owned the ~J.I. - They lived in Richmond. H was
troubled with bursitis and ·'went to Hot Springs, Arkansas, f or treatment in W's car.
W accompanied hi m. On th e way back Wwas injured in a collision due to the negligence
of H and of D. W s ued D. "[,~Jh at judgment?
H ~ ld: Judgment for VJ. 3he went along with H not to control his driving but from a
natural desire to be with her husband du:·ing his prolonged treatments. There was no
comm~nity of interest as he went for one purpo:.;e and she Hent fo!' another. The fact
that H was considerat e of.his wife and would stop the car whenever she wished him to,
does not make t1im her agent. Hence there :i..s no joi nt enterpr ise and his negligenc e
will not be imputed to her.
'l'ORTS
Dec .Supp .l956
198 Va.l54.
D published a f air summary of a notic e fil ed in a divorce case to which the
general public had access. There was no evidence of malic e .
Held: Privileged. Judgment for plaintiff reversed. Both privilet?e and truth ~r e
d~ f ens es at common 1 au and u nd er onr statute of insulting words.
TORTS · Gross Negligenc e
198 Va.J06.
Mrs. D volunt eered to take five old ladies to t heir r espective hom es i n her car.
Mrs. A sat on the front seat on the right side, Mrs.P in the middle , and Mrs . D in
the driver's s eat. Nrs. P was crippled and had never driven a car. Upon reaching
Mrs. P's home it was found that cars ' rer e park ed solidly in f ront of it. So Mrs. D
stopped the car in the traffic lane , put her hydromatic gear in low, turned on the
lights, put the hand emer gency brake on, got out, and opened t he door. As Mrs. P
attempted to slide under t he wheel she stepped on the acc el erator, and became wedged
in between the wheel as a r esult of the j erk. She did not r ealiz e what was wrong.
The car ran int0 a house and Mrs~ P was killed. Her administrator contended that
Mrs. D was negligent,(l) in parking in the traffic l ane( 2) in l eaving the gear in low
instead of in neutral , (.3)in failing to have tht:J brake on better, and (4)in having
Hrs.P get out as she did vJithout war ni.ng her, and that whil e no one of these acts
in intself is gross ner,liRence all of them combi ned are .
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Held: For Mrs. D. She was not.., as a matter of law, acting in utter disregard of her
g 1. :.~:;s t 1s safety. She put on the emergency br;;.ke in part at least, and turned on the
c a :r. lights. These act,s shovjed she 1r1 as thinking of Hrs.P's safety. She was not grossly
ndgligent.
'WJ£\.TS

L ,. +t- (.... ·- ru1 e-4~ n~ ,j f~ ~(Jy.,l-;.._s ~ B-1>-vl~ /)-«.S ~98 v~!.l32

~<'hile, ·pr; \ an invitee r~n D's premises, was unloading potatoes fr~ rioat into

P's truck, the float started to move, and he was injured. The float and the premises
were all in good condition, and the float had been turned over to P to be ul"'.loaded by
him. The float would not have moved had chocks been plac ed under the wheels thereof.
p could have seen at a glance whether or not chocks had been so placed. It was not
shown that it had ever been the custom of D to place choc}:s under the wheels as t he
floats were placed lengthwise across the doorways when being unloaded in such a way
that they could not move more than a foot without hitting the door frame and coming
to a stop.
· Held: D is not guilty of any actionable negligence as a matter of law as he has
violat~d no duty he owed P. Nor is D under any duty to warn of a danger(lack of
chocks)when such danger is obvious.
TORTS
Grossi o
198 Va.397.
A priva e road crossed
the D Ry. Co. 'rbis private road served
s everal plants and was .1sed a great de al. The view of the tracks was quite limited
because of curvature around t he base of a mountain. D did not give adequate common
law warning signals, and P was injured. P had no·t looked adequately to see whether
a train was coming,
Held: For D. The statutory comparative negligenc e doctrine only applies t a-railway
--- crossing accidents at public crossings. Those at private crossings are governed by
the common law. Hence P's rights are completely barred by his own contributory
negligence in driving upon a railroad track without looking , or without looking
adequately when his view was obstructed.
TORTS
Contribution statute {;- y,J-u.; -~
198 Va.425.
F and S were I'at h er and "ttdult son. The pump at F ' s house 1-ras out of order. S asked
E to fix the pump. E agreed to do so provided S would call for him and take him to
F's house. E expected no pay as S and E were good friends who did things for each
other frequently. While S wa s taking E to F''s house the car S was drivine collided
with P's car due to the ordinary negligence of P and of S and E was seriously injured. P settled with E for .~ 23 ,000. P is noH suing S for contribution under the
Virginia statute a llm.Jing contribution bett·reen joint tortf easors for to.ct..s of
neg1 i ge nce not i w.rol.:u:i ~g mora l t.!lrpitude.
Held: No contributiun allowed. hlhen P paid th e whole of the damages to E, he
steed in E's .sho es to recov er one half of whatever Sowed E. However S owes E
nothing as E was a gratuitous guest and S has not bee n gro ss ly negligent. A mere
interchanee of favors on a friendly basis is not enough to makfl E a paying passenger.
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198
Va.490
'l.'CHTS
t•A.X"'- C,+s ~
llf! h6~·23l . sul:Ssection 3 r eads in part., nAt. any inters ection where traffic io r es~:.j '-, .
ed to one direction on one or more of the roadways, the driver of a vehicle intendL1
t o to.rn left at any such intersection shall approach the intersection in the ex.trems
l eft-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of travel of
such vehicle -IH!-*11 • Defendant,· who was driving a tractor- trailer did not keep his
·v ehicle wholly in the left lan~ while making the turn. The evidence proved that he
could not make such a turn from the left lane ·without runrdng over the curb .
H e ld ~ For defendant. The law does not require thecrivcr of a duly licensed vehicle
to do the impossible. He is only required to keep as near the left as reasonably
possible to make the turn and still keep on the highway.

Jefl- -

TORTS
198 Va.495.
A was driving hiS car on the right side and B was drivii1g in the opposite directim
on his left side. Just .before the ~..?llision both A and B turned their cars in the
same direction and B was killed. Istho last clear chance doctrine applicable?
Held:. No. A nnly had a guessing chance as to what B was going t11 do, and a guessing chance is not a 1ast clear chance.
·

ohr--f--

TORTS--Contraci a--Q9XJJilolj racy--Statute of Lj.mitations X.tf..h j1tJ d-c::/:;tJ-8 v.l. 5;j
A an~ f, adu t and infant, were employed separately by ·A~tnur Murray a~- danc1ng
instructors. Their contracts provided that they would not engage in a competitive
business or serve as dancing instrue;tors f r; r t wo years af ter termination of their
employment with Arthur Murray . A and I decided to quit andret up their own dancing
school. Murray got injunctive relief against A, but I won out on the defense of
_infancy. The case was in the courts during the two year period as the result of A's
appeal so Murray .had no r eal r elief. Hurray i 'S nov1 suing A and I for the tort of
conspiracy. He recovered a judgme'nt for compensatory dc>.mag es of ,1~10,000 and for
punitive damages of ~r5,000 a gainst both A and I.
Held:(l) The five year statute of limitations for injuri es to property applies
rather than the cme year statute for purely personal injuri es, as contract rights
are property rights.(2) The def~nse of res adjudicata is not good as the i ssue in th.
present case is whether A and I are guilty of a corllipi r acy which is a different issu
than that in the prior case. (3) Infancy i s no defense against a tort, so I is joint
ly liable with A. (h) A can be held for conspiracy to break his own contract i f he
consplred with a,nother. (There is a conflict of authority on this point) (5) Since A
and I conspired to 11 steal11 Murray's bus iness punitive damages were proper. Decision
below affirmed.
·
TORTS --lR:.:.,G!ll Causation- - Evidence
198 Va • 608.
Taxis, by mumc1pal ordinanee, were r equired to have meters and to take the shortest practicable route which in the instant case was by way of Sixth St. The Director
of Public Safety testifi ed t hat there were mor e 11 blind 11 corner s on Sixth Street
than on Fi fth Street, a nd that he considered Fi f th Street the s afer of the two. P, a
passenger in D1 s taxi was i njured. 'l'he j ury found for P a s agai nst D. Its verdict
could have been bas ed on the t eetimony of the Director of Public Safety.
Held: Reversed and remanded . Whe r e two routes ar e equally available and are substantially the s ame(even though an expert might regard one as somewhat the more
hazardouO) the t aking of one route r at her t ha n anot her i s not a proximate cause of
the accident, but merely an antecedent circumstance . "It is clear that whether or
not Defendant's driver was gui lty of necligence that proximately Gaused or efficient·
ly contributed to the collis ion depends on the care or l ack of care with which he
approached an.d negotiat ed t he i nters ection and not on hi s previ ous decision as to
whether or not he would drive along F'ifth or Si xth St r eet !"
TORTS
Neg~~g enc e
.
198 Va.77 8.
D was constructi.ng a st orm se.wer . He had the s ewer p1.pe covered, and a manhole dug
preparatory to bricking it up . There was a confli ct in the evidence as to what
barricades had been put u p . A henvy r ain f i lled t he manhole and street with 1vat er
a nd toppl ed the barricade. Chi ldren wading in t he s treet inadvertently stepped i nto
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invisible manhole and were drowned. The court instructed the jury that D owed a
dut;:/ to take such measures as may be reasonably necessary to maintain the said stree :_,_
:w d adjacent areas in a reasonably safe condition while the work was in progress
:1nd to erect and maintain adequate barricades and other 1-1arning and protective
devices, etc.
Held: The instruction is far too broad. The underlined words practically made D an
:insurer to~hereas he is liable only in case of negligence. Reversed and remanded.
TOfiTS
198 Va.861.
D maintains a slaughter house and meat packing plant in Norfolk. A mixed breed
Brahrna heifer Heighing 1100 pounds became panic stricken and jumped over a fence some
five feet high into another pen. D, instead of leaving her there to quiet down,sent
employees in after her. She jumped another fence, and as the chase continued, she got
a running start, jumped the outside fence arufl finally ran into and injured P 'tvhile
he was about his regular duties in a shipyard. P sued D.
Held:(l) The statutes about lawful fences do not apply within cities , (2)That D owed
a common law duty to use due care with respect to animals under his control,(3 )that a
,jury could find that he did not use due care in that he should have known that this
particular breed is highly excitable and can clear fences up to six feet high when
excited,(li) that he sh,ould have left the heifer in the other pen until she had
quieted down,(5) that the trial court should have admitted evidence to the effect
that P did not lose any time from work, or any wages, as his employer shifted him to
lighter work until his injuries were better, and(6) that while he was entitled to
some damages for mental anguish and fright, an instruction was erroneous that unreasonably blew up such damaees.
Dec.Supp.l957.
TORTS--Fraud
199 Va.l8
D sota-118 acres of timberland toP. D stated that there were over 3,000 , 000 board
feet of timber on the land. After the timber was cut it was found that there were
only 2,000,000 board feet. D did nothing to prevent P from making his own estimate,
and it is admitted that the estimates of experts are onl;y approximations. P filed a
bill in equity for an abatement of the purchase price.
Held for D. His statement that there were 3,000,000 board feet on the Jlamd in
question was clearly only a ~tatement of opinion and hence there was no misrepresentation of fact justifying an abatement of' the purchase pnce. (A fl nding by a jury in
an issue out of chancery to the effect that there was fraud was only advisory, and
the court correctly disregarded it as the statement made Has, as a matter of law,
opinion only).
TORTS
Gross Negli~ ence
199 Va.55.
A non-pay~ng gues was seriously injured when her host drove the car into the left
lane and collided head on with a car in that lane. The court instructed the jury(l)
that it was negligence to drive a car on the left of the center line of the highway,
(2)that it is an act of negligence to operate a car in such a manner as to be likely
to endanger the life and limb of another, and (3) that it was an act of negligence to
operate a car without keeping it under proper control. The jury were also instructed
that if in doing any of the above she was guilty of gross negligence as the court
defined it, the ,jury should find for the plaintiff.
Held: Reversed and remanded. There was only one act of negligence and that was
driving to the left of the center line. It is ~ to break: or to appear to break
the 0
t into three acts thereb
oss · bl
·
the ·ur:,.- to believ that there
w~re three cumulative factors of negligence and hence gross neg igence when the jury
might have found only ordinarJ' negligence from the one act alone.
TORTS Death by Wrongful Act
199 Va.63
D negngently i njured f ather, mother and their only child. All died as a result of
the accident but mother and father pre-deceased the child. Child's administrator, P,
sued D under the death by wrongful act statutes. D contended that since all the
beneficiaries in class 2 (and there wen~ none in class l) had died pr s action abated.
Held: No. In Virginia the personal representative is the plaintiff, and if all the
members of a preferred class die before- recovery is had he can recover(if dec.erlent

TOTIT::: , Dec , 1957 Supi:J .
12.
could have recovered) for the benefit of a deferred class. In Virginia if there are
m beneficiaries of the first o
cond classes then the recovery belongs t o the
sstate o
e deceased. Under our statutes The awar of amages or ~E3 ~gfu l
death is the important matter, the manner of distribution is of secondary considerat io n.-:<- -;~ ~<- It is hardly conceivable that the legislature could have intended -;<- ~~- -:<that one through negligence ~<- ~~ -;~ might kill an entire family, and yet recovery or
:K> r ecovery against him be, in some instances, made dependent upon the moment and
~> equence in which his several victims died. n
TORTS
)~_,;· ~ f1~ ;-~ ~
199 Va.85
F, a father-in-lUw, volunteered to teach D how to drive a car. D had a learner's
permit. While D was driving the car it careened down a hill at a terrific speed. It
crashed into a tree and F was killed and D seriously injured. D does not remember
what happened. F 1 s personal representative sued D.
Held:(l) Plaintiff would have to prove that D was grossly negligent as the relationship of the parties was a social rather than a business one.(2)The doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur has no application for F was in at least partial control of the car.
(3) Even if it did apply it would not prove gross-negligence but only ordinary
negligence.
199 Va.lOO.
TORTS
P's decedent parked his car at night partly off and partly ona two lane one-way
highway to change the left rear tire. 1'he place ;.;as f airly well lighted by flood
lights from a nearby store and at least one t a il light was burning. D who was
approaching this car at a speed of 50 miles per hour did not see the situation until
within 70 feet of P 1 s car. He then did all he could to avoid the accident, but it
was too late and P 1 s decedent was instantly killed. Was P's deceased guilty of
contributory negligence? Would the last clear chance doctrine apply?
Held: The deceased was not guilty of co ntributory negligence as a matter of law,
but that question should l1ave been left to the jury. Tbe statute forbidding one to
stop on the highway is not an absolute one but applies only when stopping renders
the highway dangerous to others. Since the place was reasonably well lighted and
there was another one-way lane in the same direction t here was at least , a jury
question as to whether or not he was negligent despite the f act there were much safer
places nearby which he could have used.
Assuming, but not deciding, that decedent was negli gent the last clear chance
doctrine would not apply. Since deceased was not helples s but orily i nattentive, D
only owed a duty under that doctrine to use due care to avoid injuring deceased after
he saw his peril. The doctrine assumes that there will be effective time to act
after the discovery of the peril. In this case there was not sufficient time so
that if the jury in the next trial find that deceased was negligent, they must find
for the defendant.( ~te:Of courseD was negligent in that he failed to keep a proper
lookout for he shou
have seen the car before he was within 70 feet of it).
TORTS
Hunici pal Cgr porations /!1,41tt-Lh c.e__. e7" S;/--,.~~-1; - J::..-1J2 Va.• l §9.1-._
P was injured because of the ai'le ged negligence of Arlington County in the mair,ltenance of a parking lot that was a portion of the county road system. It consented
to being sued as it was covered by i nsurance.
Held: The county was immune from suit. Si nce this immunity depri ved the court of
jurisdiction and lack of jurisdiction carmot be waived the suit should have been
rilismissed. NQ:!:.e that while a county has such an immunit
does not have so far
e_s the main~nce of i s s ree· s J.S concer11e •
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-".4. j
199 Va.l96
TORTS--Pleading and Prac~ce· 5(i Libel
D, a small loa n company, wr6te --"il. false a1Jdd~famatort'retter to P 1 s employer, an
agency of the United State~, with a request that the agency bring pressure on P to
pay although p was not in defa ult. D knew the l ett er whi ch was written in February
of 1955 would be placed in P 1 s file. In March of 1956 the question of P's promotion
came up, and his file was reviewed by his superiors some of whom then saw the letter
for the first t i me.D could have reasonably foreseen that this new publication would
be made. P sued D more than one year after t he first publi catio n but '1-lithin l ess

t han one year after the

TORTS, De(;.195? .Supp .
l3o
D relied on the one year statute of limita-

republi~tion.

~ . ions.

Held in a 5 to 2 decision that the action was not barred. D was liable for the
republication if he could reasonably expect such a republication. Hence a new and
independent cause of action arose at that time(The dissenting judges argued that the
republication did not constitute a new cause of action, but only increased the
d~mages recoverable in the original cause of action.~
TORTS
Fraud
199 Va.254
D agreeo~ o buy a farm house from P after he had asked if the premises had ever
been infested by termites and was told that the premises had been inspected by T, an
exterminator, in 1950 and three or four times later and that as far as he knew there
were no termites in the buildings. He was not told that termites were found in 1950.
After signing the contract D had X make an inspection and he found live termites in
portions of the buildings. D refused to pay the purchase price, and P sued him for
damages.
Held: For D. He has the defense of fraud. pt s words were not the :whole tr..u.th and
were aesigned to lull D into a false sense of securi tl• Whether or not there were
termites i n the buil dings was a ques t ~on of fac t rather than opinion.
TORTS
Workmen's Compensation tJr-- ~~
199 Va.409.
On a co~~truction job P worked for one independent contractor and D for another. P
was killed as a result of D's negligence. Does workmen's compensation or common law
goYern the rights of the parties?
Held: Common law. D and P are strangers to each other even though their work may
result in a component part of the same structure. Note: Had P been a loaned employee
under a duty to take orders from D then Workmen's Compensation statute would have
applied. But if he is not a loaned employee and is only co-operating with D, then
common law applies. Whether P is a loaned employee under a duty, or only co-operatine
is for the jury to determine in close cases.

jJ

TORTS h~ ~-J /?J, ~· vlze
199 Va.460.
This cas~o1ds t f:Wt under V# ."46-203 and 46-244 a pedestrian who starts to cross
a street on a green light conti ues to have the right of way over cars despite a
change in the light while he is crossing as long as the pedestri~n acts expeditiously. A green light is not the same as an absolute order to a motorist to proceed.
It is rather a conditional one subject to the exigencies of the situation.
TORTS
S~er
PrJ yUe~e
199 Va.495.
R hurt ~ f oot i n an accident occurring during and arising out of his employment. R went to a doctor who treated the foot unsuccessfully and who told the workmen's compensation insurance carrier that the best thing for R's foot would be fo r
him to go back to work. R then went to P, a chiropodist, who discovered that there
was a chipped bone. While P was successfully treating the trouble, D, an agent of
the insurance carrier, told R that he should go to a diff erent kind of doctor, and
that P was "a doctor for ingrowing toenails, flat feet, and falling arches." P
sued D for slander, and D defended on the ground that the occasion was a privileged
one and that he had no malice.
Held: For P. While reasonable words of persuasion would have been privileged because of the common interest of R and the Insurance Carrier in R's speedy recovery,
the .~ords used were unnecessarily belittling and hence a jury could find they were
spoken maliciously. If such be the case the qualHied or conditional privilege is
lost.(Hudgins, C.J. dissenting on the ground that the alleged defamatory language
was not so strong, violent or disprop~ rtionate to the occasion as to raise an
inference of malice).

TORTS, Dec.l158 Supp.
TORTS
199 Va.897 ~
In an action for damages growing out of an automobile accident P testified to
facts that indicated D was negligent, and D denied such facts, and testified to othe
facts that indicated P was negligent which facts were denied by P. One of the inotructions given by the Court was, "E,ren though each party to a collision exercises
all the care the law requires of him nevertheless it recognizes that accidents
occQr. In such an event they are known as unavoidable accidents. If from the evidencl
you believe this case presents such an accident, you should find in favor of de-

fendant~ 11

Held: Re;sersible error under the evidence in this case. The term "ugayg idable
accident" '('means one which due care by both parties would not have prevented. Here
the evl.dence showed no such thing. The "accident" was either due to P 1 s negligence,
or to D's negligence, or to the negligence of both. The jury should not be given
an easy way to decide the controversy by an ins'truction not supported by any evidencesince this accident was clearly one caused by someone: s negligence.

si,U(~
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TORTS.
of fY'trt-f ·199 Va.903.
A and B were b~others. A was driving a car in which B was asleep. The car went off
the highway on its left, struck several objects, hit an embankment of a cross road
and came to rest on its top when it rebounded~ A was killed instantly when thrown
out of the car and B who was A's guest was hurt. There were no eye witnesses. B sued
A's estate.
Held: For the defendant estate. 1rfuat caused the accident is pure surmise. B had
the burden of proving that A acted in such a manner as to show "an utter disregard
of prudence amounting to complete neglect of the safety 11 of his guest. Merely showing a possibility that he actad in that manner is not enough.
TORTS
200 Va.ll4.
P tripped over some cereal boxes in D•s supermarket vihile there to make a purchase.
The aisle where she tripped was six feet wide and well lighted. She stated that she
di.d not see the boxes on the floor because she was looking for the particular kind
of cereal she wished on the shelves.
Held: For D. Even if D were negligent he was under no duty to warn P of an obvious
danger. P is barred by her contributory negligence in failing to even glance at the
floor on which she was walking.
TORTS
200 Va.l27.
D lent his car to a girl friend who did not have a driving permit. She drove the
car negligently injuring P who sued D. What judgment?
Held: For D. The injur:y WOQld have taken place whether or not the friend had a
permit. Failure to have a permit was not the proximate cause of the accident. There
was no evidence introduced that the friend was not a competent driver and that D
knew that she was not. In f act it seems that D reas onably assumed that she had a
driver's license, but even if he knew she did not have, D1 s l ending his car vTOuld
only have been a violation of law and negligence per se , but still not a proximate
cause.

~~~
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TORTS--Libel--Privilege tJ-f
Jtr
200 Va.212.
D and F wsro rival editors o~ly newspapers in Princess Anne County. D edited
the "machine" paper and P the 11 refo!'m 11 one. P made defamatory statements about D who
replied in his paper that they were deliber ate falsehoods. P then sued D for common
law libel and insulting wo:::-ds under our statllte .• (Vh'B - 630)
Held: The trial court should have instructed the jury t hat the occasion was a privileged one. When D's reputati<m was attac ked he had the privilege of counter attacking.
However D will be liable if he exceeds the privilege by acting maliciously and going
beyond the bounds of permissible sell defense. l.rJhether or not D has exceeded the
privilege is a question of fac t for the jury but the court should instruct the jury
what would constitute an abuse of the privilege.

TORTS, June 19)9 Sllpp.
TORTS
200 Va.294.
D employed P, a brickmason, to repair the wall of a brick house. Later he also
employed S as a laborer to assist P. S built a scaffold out. of some half rotten
l umber. The defects were not obvious but a reasonable inspection would ha.ve di sclosed them. P was seriously injured and sued D who defended on the ground that
P's injury was due to the negligence of a fellow servant.
Held: If a jury should find as above D would be liable even if S and P were
fellow servants. An employer owes a common law duty to _furnish his em lo ee ~th a
r~sonably safe place to work. This is a non de ega a
e u y. While S was performing this duty he was a vice principal and his negligence towards P is D's negligence
It was error to strike P 1 s evidence • .
moRTS--Defamation
f.-~+ of ~p~,-~~ )),P-ttt-1-4 J-06 s.E.2d 620, 200Va.572
D through error wrote a letter to ptdl employer to thf ~ct that P owed him a sum
of money, and"that P had never honored his contract promptly, and that it was now
four months past due. P was not a merchant. P sued D for libel and under the statute
of insulting words. P failed to allege that he h~d suffered any special damage.
Heltl for D following 182 Va.512. Geqeral damages will not be presumed where, as
here, pis a me
ic and has no ~l_n@~~ ~redit. It is not libelous per se
to s ate that a man does not pay his bills promptly-liniess such a person is a merchant. It would plaoe'too great a burden on merchants who must write dunning letter.s
to hold them liable every time they make an honest mistake. Since 1940 the trial
court has·had the right to pass on the question as to whether or not words are insulting. Note: Words that are defamatory(libelous)per se when in ermanent form are
actionabl~hou
roof ·
·
~he mqJOr~
rule,
th~ are not actionable if not l~b ~lous
un aaa,_ung~~ doc
e~o f_ libe~
p~r quod, they result in special damage,
oral, would cons±.H.nte slande:r: per s~
TORTS
107 SoE.2d 402,200 Va.722.
D was a neighb?r and close friend of X who had two children, S, a girl aged 12,
and P, a boy aged 6. D took S and P to their school every day on his way to work
over a long period of time. On the day in question P got in the back seat of D's
four door sedan, and because the rest of the seat was occupied l-rith D's laundry,
S got in the front seat. P closed the door tightly. After D had driven some distanc(
and while he was making a right hand turr!- at a reasonable rate of speed P fell out
of the car and was injured.
Held: Judgment for P reversed~ He was a gratuitous guest and D is not liable unless he has been grossly negligent. The gratuitous guest rule applies whether or
not P is an infant. It was not gross negl~gence to allow P to occupy the rear of the
car by himself, or to become absorbed in driving properly rather than watching p
at the moment of making a turn.

TORTS--~eifBy

ol-c_jv:;~~b(~ D.~ j,
200 Va. 736
general · contractor who was engaged ~~dnstructing a new highway for the
D was
State. S was a subcontractor for the grading. The highway had to be built over one
of the main lines of Railroad. Permission was granted to D to cross the line in the
course of the construction of the road. D agreed to use great care, to notify Railroad in advance when heavy equipment was to be moved acro s s the line, and to save
Railroad harmless from all los ses as a result of D's crossing it. D sublet the
grading portion to L. One of L1 s employees drove an enormous earth mover and scraper
across the line without any advance notice some 200 feet in front of a passenger
train which was clearly visible . The engineer applied the emergency brakes. L's
employee jumped to safety but P, an employee of Express Company on the express car
was seriously hurt. D contended he was not liable because he had no control over thE
operations. Held: Contention unsound. As a result of his contract with Railroad he
owed a non-delegatable duty. But i ndependently of the contract he also owed such a
duty at common law. Operating heavy, slow-moving machinery across a railroad line is
an extra-hazardous activi t y, and one who undertakes such a thing_cannot escape
liab"lit b
ettin some one else to do it for him so it is immaterial that L was
an independent contractor as far as P is conc erned.

!]lht -

·
LeO:}ol959 Supp. 'l'orts page 16
200 V.;l.791,
A verd~c . f ~~125, 0~0 in favor of a 16 yr. old girl l'Yho lost her leg due to the
aeghgence of D was sust.a ined. It is not so high as t.o shock the conscience or' the
8ourt when one considers that she will ~e permanently crippled and very probably wil:
never be a wife or mother. The money is scant compensation for deprivation of a
normal life of one so young.

'l'OH.'l'8--:f4f!1i1fis

'1'0R'I'S--Liabili ty of Chari table Hospital
200 Vae 878 o
P was burned t6 death while a pat:t~nt in the D Hospital in an oxygen tent. Assuming that his death was caused by the negligence of an employee, but that there .was
no negligence in either the employment of or the retention of the employee -is D
liable under the death by wrongful act statute?
Held: If the D _H ospital is a c a t.a~p'tal it ~annot be sue!Lby: the e_cipi~IJ.·!
of its benefits ev§~gh_auch recipient is a paying patient. While this rule seem:
to be on the way out, it is too well established in Virginia to be changed by judicial decision. If the court held for pfs personal represent~tive there would be
liability on all charities for all torts not barred by the statute of limitations
even though most of them carry no insurance because of their supposed immunity. The
rule is one of debatable public policy, and if it is to be changed this should be
done prospectively by legislation. In this case the charte~ provided that the
hospital was to be operated solely for charitable purposes. There were no stockholders. Its directors received no pay. It expected those of its patients who were able
to pay to do so. It took in patients whether they could pay or not and charged off
the accounts of those who could not pay. It had operated over the years at a s light
loss. Thus it was a charity by charter and in practice both of which are required
for immunity from tort liability to those who are the recipients of its benefits.

f

TORTS--Federal Em~lo ~ers' Liability Law
J?.Z /}
200 Va. 908.
P was employed y he V1rgi nia Railway Co. to weigh coal cars just before discharging their content.s into ships. It was necessary for him to throw a hand switch
to get a certain car on the scalE::s • . The switch was defective and when he exerted
all his pressure to throw it, it kicked back and injured him.,
Held: P is entitled to recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45
U.S.G.A ##51 et seq. for the Act provides that the railroad is liable for injury or
death resulting 11 in whole or in part.tt from its negligence, or by reason of any defect, due to its negligence, 11 in its * ~~ appliances, machinery, * * or other equipment." "Under this· .statute the M- st ~f a · jury case is simply whether the proofs
justif t
lusion that e
er ne l i ence l a;yed an art even the ali ht st
i n.-producing the i 'ur -1~ *·"
~ORTS

Pain and Anguish at so Mucb per D~
201 Va.l09.
P entered a store owned by the D Corporation to purchase a television set. There
were a number of sets on a shelf that had been built by an independent contractor
P 1 s hl;lSband said to the clerk, 1lThat shelf is loose"ll and the clerk replied, 11 Don•t
worry it has been like that. We are going to fix it. 11 Hardly had this been said,
when the shelf and sets fell pinning P t.o the floor. At the 1rial P's attorney used a
blackboard to add up the damages. Among the .items ligted were traumatic arthritis at
50 cents per day--$5,475.00; and seven weeks on crutches at $10 daily- ~~490.00.
Held:(l) It is immaterial that the shelf was originally put up by an independent
contractor since D has not properly inspected and repaired it. (2)But it is improper
to value pain and mental anguish by the day. Different people feel different amounts
of pain under similar circumstances, and pain varies in intensity from time to time.
If experts cannot measure these matters with accuracy, certainly lawyers cannot. All
this is for the jury, and while it was permissible for P~s lawyer to use a blackboard he should not have been allowed t.o usurp the functions of the jury by telling
them the exact value of pain and mental anguish per day.
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TORTS "[I ll
/b... {\" L.Aro~.S. ~n..C: . {~~ e_.110 S.E.2d 177, 201 Va. 1.83~ · Tl1e Vir inia ublic railroad crof:lsing comparative ne 1·
... u.±..e..Cll#'.:5.6d.l.-1.6)
i s not applicable to crossi ng.s-w
·ties and towns. In the a.bsence

of an ordinance, common lal-7 principles are applicable to accidents at such crossings
In this case P crossed almost directly in front of an engine and tender in broad
daylight at a crossing in an incorporated town. The engine and tender were backing.
P thought that they were going forward or standing still as no crossing signal
was given.
Held: While it was common law negligence for the engineer to fail to give such a
signal, P was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to
note what was obvious, and in blindly relying on "the implied invitation to cross 11
(if there was one)from the failure of the engineer to give a signal. The last clear
chance doctrine is not applicable as there was no opportunity for the engineer to
prevent the accident after he saw P and realized his peril.
TORTS c~ >~j;. ~C.:1JS~
110 S.E.2d 189, 201 Va. 244.
p was an invitee ~n D1 s store. As she was going downstairs and rounding a newel
post at a landing she slipped and hurt herself. There was a showcase on the landing.
The stairs were polished hardwrrd. There was a handrailing on the left but none on
the right. P was wearing what she described as "normal ladies' wearing shoes" with
an M.average heel" ~ inches high in the rear, 2! inches high in the instep, and 9/16
by 9/16 of an inch across the bottom. Immediately after her fall the manager asked
her what caused it, and she replied that she had tripped on her heel. When she
slipped the heel on her right shoe was broken off. She claimed that D was negligent 9 .
(l)in having a showcase on a landing thereby distracting a~tention and narrowing th6
landing (2.) in not having a handrail on the right side of the stairway also, and
(3) in not having anti-slip treads and nosings on the stairway.
Held: For D. There is nothing to show that any of the alleged defects caused her
fall. She may have fallen because she tripped on her heel. It is elementary that
where the evidence shows that any one of several things may have caused tbe i~~~ry,
for some of which the defendant is responsible and for some of which he is not, and
leaves the real cause to speculation and conjecture, then plain·(;iff has failed to
establish his case.
TORTS
110 s.E.2d 193, 201 Va. 157.
D's employee took a routine blood srunple from a seventeen year old boy while he
was seated in a chair. She then turned to attend to the sample. The boy rose at
once, blacked out, and fell on the hard floor injuring himself. The employee had
not expressly told him to wait a few minutes before getting up. Evidence indicated
that persons were more apt to faint if given warnings, but that she could have said
ttwait to get up until I remove the pledget I have placed on your arm."
Held: Judgment for plaintiff reversed~ There is no eviden~e of negligence.
Ordinary care was exercised and that is all that is required. D1 s employee had no
reason to expect that the patient was a special case, or that he would arise abruptly the moment she temporarily was caring for the sample.
TORTS
110 S.E.2d 198, 201 Va. 193.
1 was visiting D at his home and left at 1 a.m. He soon returned and told D he
could not get his car going. D pushed L's car onto the main highway, but he could
not get it started. It was raining hard, and the ligh~s on L's car had gone off.
D instructed L to make a left turn at a certain street. Instead L made a right turn
in front of a car in which P was a pass enger. P was badly hurt and sued D. The court
instructed the jury to the effect that if L and D ·were engaged in a joint enterprise
they should find for P which they dido
Held: Reversed and remanded . There was no oint enterprise here. L and D were not
mutual agents. They did not have equal con ro • was merely trying to help L get
his car started. Whether or not D was using due care himself is another question,
and so the case was remanded for a new trial on t hat issue.

.. .
Jl;If,.), ._ I'd ! fJ- .sW. .l-o(L_
TORTS
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201 Va.239.
D, a
lC:I..<:-dr:l:'v.er, in violation of V#46-231 cut the corner excessively in mOJ.{i:ng e:.
left turn and collided with a car in which P was a passenger. While the jury was deliberating, the foreman asked the Court whether, if a person violated the letter of
the law, would negligence be presumed. The Judge replied that negligence is never
'
presumed but must be proved. Counsel for P excepted.
Held: Reversed and remanded. While the Judge's statement may be true as an abstract
proposition, the jury should also have been told that violation of a statute js
negligence per se, and that if such negligence is a proximate cause of an-.inj~t
wgl Sll
t
diet fo
gmgg s for such in ·ury_.
TORTS--Co~ributory Negli~nce

br-i~ tJ , fule.!>.f,-,' ~Vv
.201 Va. 358.
p crosse a highway in a non-residential and non-business area, where cars and
pedestrians have equal rights, in front of a truck some 100 feet away. P did not
quicken his pace nor did the truck driver slow down or change his course. At the
time of the impact P was just a step from the curb and safety.
Helq: P is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Split second
timing is not due care. He was co-author of his own misfortune. Hence the trial
court correctly entered swnmary judgment for the defendant.

TORTS-•!ight of Way
r~~~ i tJ-,-t-rL d J .
201 Va. 380.
V#46. -2~ provides(w1th some exceptions sene of which are applicable to this case)
that the man on the right has the right of way. It also provides that the driver of
any vehicle which is being operated at an unlawful speed sha+l forfeit any right of
way he would otherwise have under this section. D was approaching an intersection at
an illegal speed. Does this give F, who was on D's left, the right of way?
Held: No. D forfeited his right of way, and F never had the right of way. Hence
neither had the right of way and each was under a duty to the other to use due care
to avoid a collision.
TORTS--Grfui taus or Pa;;,d ng Gu~st?
201 Va.426.
p bough a second hand car from D paying cash for it, and telling t..i.m he wanted it
by Monday for a business trip. D agreed to paint the car and to have it ready. P
went to D's place of bus.iness twice on Monday and 1•vas told each time that the car
- w~s not yet ready .for delivery, but he was assured he could have it Tuesday. P went
there Tuesday and the car was still not ready. P complained to D and said, "You know
I need the automobile to go to Virginia Beach to see about a job". D then offered
to drive him there. P accepted the offer. On the way back D drove negligently but not
grossly negligently and P was injured. Under the guest statute V#B-646.1 the owner
or operator is not liable in the absence of gross negligence unless the injured
party pays for the transportation.
Held: D is liable. Payment need not be in money. D was driving P as a result of a
business transaction to keep his good will and to make good in part his own default
in not having P's car when it was promised with knowledge that he needed it for a
business purpose. This is not a mere exehange of social amenities.
TORTS--Evidence
201 Va.466.
p waslllft passenger in a car drj.ven by X headed in an easterly direction. As X was
about to go over the crest of a hill there were two tractor-trailer trucks approaching him. The first of these dimmed its lights. The second one then attempted to pass
the first one on X's side without dimming its lights and the driver of the first
truck(although it had not yet passed X)then brightened its lights. X turned to his
right and put on his brakes. This caused his car to skid broadside across the road
in front of the second tr.:J.o"tor-trailer. P was injured. X Has convicted of reckless
driving, and the trial court admitted evidence of such con-viction, and struck P•s
evidence.
Held: Reversed and remanded. It was error to strike P 1 s evidence as a jury could
have found that the failure of the driverc of the tractor-trailers properly to dim
their light(which was negligence as a matte~ of law)was a proximate cause of the
accident. It was also error to admit evideroe of X1 s conviction of reckless driving.
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.P was not a party to that case, and the civil and c rirninal trials are separate and

distinct.(Note: As to this latter point the SlllJreme Court of Appeals indi cat ed that
t h e Heller ~ 149 Va.82, 106, in which it was held t h
n ct·on b an in§_ured
to collect fire insurance after he had
Q~Qted_o~etting fire to the
pr emis es to defraud the insurer was barred, was not a repndj ation of the.-g.cmeraL rule
bui-a special exc Qpt~n~o).
TORTS--Damages
201 Va.522.
p was 1nj ured in an automobile accident, but did not lose any time from work. However she lost 159 hours time in securing medical and physiotherapeutic treatments.
Is she entitled to compensation for this time assuming that the jury has been
instructed in the usual way with reference to pain and mental suffering?
Held: No. Loss of time and the deprivation from carrying on normal activities is
compensable as a form of mental suffering, and hence already covered by the instruction on that item of damages.
TORTS-~D~ree of Care Owed Gratuitous Ouest in Airplane

201 Va.557.
D offered to f l y P from Fredericksburg to Beckley, West Virginia without charge.
She accepted the offer. Although D was not well acquainted with the Fredericksburg
field, fog was rolling in, and visibility was poor, he attempted to take off. In
doing so he lined up his lights incorrectly. As a result P was killed when D taxied
the plane into the side of an unlighted building near the runway. The Court instructed the jury that D owed .a duty of due care to Pin spite of the fact that she was a
gratuitous passenger. D insisted there was no liability on him unless he was grossly negligent.
Held: For P's personal representative. The automobile guest statute-d~es-not-&pply
to airplanes. It has been on the books since 1955~ The fact that the legislature
over these many years has not extended it to airplanes shows that it was not intended to apply to them. Travel by air is so different from travel on the surface
(especially in that one cannot leave a plane as readily as a car when the pilot
proves to be negligent)that the common law Virgir.~a rule applicable to ~ratuitous
b~lments and free automobile transportation should not
~d ~planes.

TO~TS {)r;, .. 1/t...lj) ;,._

C/r D<;..->1 #\.(
5, /-,.~t.t201 Va.564.
City Hall Avenue in Norfolk runs east and west and is a four lane highway with no
island in the center. Metcalf Lane makes a T intersection with City Hall Avenue on
its southern side. This lane has no sidewalk, is only 11 feet wide and is used only
for one way south bound traffic. P who was 77 years of age was walking west on the
south side of City Hall Avenue. He wished to cross it, so he walked until he came to
the Lane and then turned north at a right angle. He wore dark clothes and the night
was dismal and raining . P looked both ways, and was a foot over into the third lane
when he stopped to let a taxi headed west ·' go by. This taxi was in tile fourth l a ne
(on his extreme right)but veered over into t.he third lane far eno'ugh to strike p a.
glancing blow. The taxi should have stayed in the lane furtherest to its right.
Held: (two judges dissenti ng) P_is . uilt o co
"buto r y:
gligenc.e-.a a matter of
l~ e should not have s ood ·
·
'n the 3r d lane but should have stepped back
when he saw the taxi coming over his way. The Court r e-udfated t
·
o - the
street comparative sa
doctrine in view· of increased traffic conditions.(The
d1ssenting judges thought t hat P 1 s contributory negligence, if any, was a question
for the jury as a 77 year old oldster should not be required to dodge taxicabs
operated in violation of law) Note that P did not have a r i ght of way, as he would
have had, had there been a side1-1alk on the east s ide of the lane and he had been
walking across City Hall Avenue 1vithin the lines of that sidewalk extended.

/

·_~OHTS--In~ur~ to ; ~e ~old
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201 Va.834
During ·"C l ebi Vu0Tr which there was a band and parade a five year old child
~arted across three lines of a six lane divided highway and was killed when struck
by D's car. r1'he Court instructed the jury that D had a right to assume that no one
vrould cross a street between intersections, and that the jury should find for D if
t he child ran from behind an obstruction under such circumstances that he had no
chance to avoid striking her after he saw, or should have seen, her.
Held: Error. D knew children were present. A cQild is not governed by the s~e
r.1,1.les as ·j s an a.Q.ult. Deceased was too young to be contributori,ly negligent. Since
th'ere was no obstruction for her to run from behind it was error to give an instruction not supported by the ~ridence.(Note:The fact that D was driving in the
third land instead of in the first was not a proximate cause of the accident.)

f

TORTS*ltMunicipal Corporations
1/H-: ~ ~ D-f Dt·{~
201 Va.879
P stepped i nt o a conceaied hole in a grass plot owned by the City which adjoined
the main street in Virginia Beach. The City has much trouble with erosion and makes
a dai+,y inspection of the plot. Holes sometimes appear suddenly. P sank to her knee
and broke her leg.
Held: Judgment for P reversed as she failed to show that the City had actual or
constructive notice of the defect in time to remedy the situation. The defect and
the injury are not enough to make the City liable as it is not an insurer, but
liable only if negligent.
TOJiTS-:-Punitive daruages from drunken driver f't.VV\t; 1:., L })il-K.. 4 .;g1 Va.90.5
As car was struck from behind by D's car uhile P's car was ~opped in a traffic
lane awaiting the green light.• D had had two drinks of Vodka and showed signs of
intoxication. The jury awarded P $3,000 compensatory and q~4,000 punitive damages.
Held: This is not a case for punitive damages. D did not run into P's car on purpose. She had nothing against P. She merely failed to keep a proper lookout. There i
nothing to show that she acted in a ..spi ·
lschief criminal indifference or
C3f1SCious disregard .of the_tightS:o£-O-thers.

-

TORTS--Owner of· car as grat.nitans guest of. u:iyer
201 Va.919.
D asked P, to drive him in P's car to D's employer so that D might ask his employer for a loan. P replied that h~ doctor had told him not to drive until an injury
had healed. A little later D a~d if he might drive P's car for the purpose above
stated. P replied, 11Yes, tf I go with you. 11 This was mutually satisfactory. D drove
the car negligently but not grossly negligently seriously injuring P and killing
himself. The trial court held that P was D's guest since no one received any compensation.
Held: The owner of a car is not the uest o·
ersDn-he_permits _t~ drive his _car
within the mean~n of
automobile ~e st statu-te. The owner remains the host even
if he e s his guest drive. Hence P need prove only ordinary negligence to win his
case.
TORTS--Ex~losivesp-R~~a loquitur

116 S.E.2d 38, 202 Va. 176.
p deede land t o the Commonwealth for a highway. In this instrument the highway
plan and specificat.ions were identified, and P covenanted that the considerations
paid to him "Shall be in lieu of any and all claims to compensation and damages by
reason of the location, construction, and maintenance of said highway" except such c
may be caused by negligence or departure from the plans. The contractor, D, found it
necessary to do a great deal of blasting. After the blasting there were some 200
cracks in P's house which was situated some 550 feet from the highway. Rain came
through the cracks. Due to D's negligence P's spring and reservoir were damaged by
improper drainage. The jury returned a verdict in favor of P for some $4400 but did
not separate the damages due to blasting from that due to improper drainage.
Note: The Court expressly s~ted that whether one used explosives at his peril,or
whether one is liable only if negligent, had never been decided in Virginia. It ther
said it was unnecessary to decide the point in this case as P had released the
Commonwealth and its agents from liability except for negligence. Hence D will not 1
liable unless he was negligent.
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Held: No liability for injui'ies caused by bla.sting, It is impossible to blast wi t,~'
out causing vibrations resulting from the blasting, and cracks caused thereby do not,
f!'OVe negligence as the doctrine of res ipsa loqui t.ur does not apply. No expert
t estimony was offered to prove that excessive charges were used. p has failed to
prove negUgence, and the burden of proof was on him.(The case was reversed and remanded with directions for a new trial limi t:ed. to the amount of damages caused by
D's negligence in failing to provide proper drainage.)
TORTS-Proo.i'
of negli gence
116 s.E.2d 48, 202 Va.60.
z
P was a passenger in a car going south in the southbound lane. This car collided
with D's car which was going north when it swerved from the northbound lane into the
Southbound lan.e. D testified that he had a blowout in his left rear tire and that
despite his best efforts the car swerved as described above. The Court instructed
the jury that if they believed from the evidence that it is as likely as not that
the left rear tire blew out, producing without defendant's fault a sudden emergency
in which he operated his car as a reasonable person would have done under similar
circumstances, they should find for the defendant.
Held: Error in that the instruction is too favorable for the defendant. The phrase
"as likely as not" is incorrect in an instruction on the burden of proof. "It suggest~
a guessing process which ought not to be resorted to in arriving at a verdict. In
this instance *** it placed the burden on the wrong party and in effect required the
plaintiff to prove that the tire did not blow. out". ~ (1) The fac · t 's car
wa5 on the wrong side made a p~ima facie case of negli gence £or P. (2) The burden
of going forward with the eyidence the
·
to
to show wh it was t fier_ci_. (3)
If th e ur reasonabl believP.d that D's tire blew out thereby creati
a sudd~n
emergency, the burden was then on P to show by a preponderance of the whole
that there was
li ence on the
rt of D vThich was a roxim te ca
juries. Reversed and remanded.
TORTS--Negli~ence ~~r~s todg]j n~ ~¥ in ~treet
202 Va.4o.
p who
mon ~o age waso \ 1ng unattended acro~s Ocean View Ave.,
4
lane busy thoroughfare, when she was struck by D's car. The court instructed the
jury that motorists had a right to assume that pedestrians would cross only at
intersections and that since D was faced with a sudden emergency, that principle
was applicable.
Heldt The instructions were erroneous. There is no presumption that such a child
will cross only at intersections, and hence the instr~ction given, is inapplicable.
The sudden emer enc doctrine had no a plicat.j on as child did not dart out ·from
behind a car ut was toddling towards D's car. D, in the exercise of due diligence,
should have seen the child in time to avoid hitting her. The fact that other instructions properly stated the law is immaterial as the jury may have relied on
the erroneous instructions.

was u

a

TORTS School Board Immunity
202 Va.252
School Board permitted X to use a high school auditorium for a concert for which
an admission charge was made. P, a paying patron, fell in the aisle because of the
slippery condition of the floor.
Held: p· hasno cause of action against the Board either on the theory of negligence
or that of nuisance. The Board is an agent of the State in the performance of a
governmental function and has the irmnunity of the State from suit. This immunity is
not lost because it has permitted third parties to use a school building for an
educational or cultural purpose.
TORTS--H~nicipal Corporati ons

202 Va.274
The city of Norf olk passed an ordinance requiring all occupants of premises adjacent to sidewalks to remove the snow therefrom within three hours after the
cessation of the fall. D failed to comply with this ordinance. P broke her ankle
when she slipped on the sidewalk adjoining D's premises.
Held: No liability on D. While the violation of a statute or ordinance is ne lig e~oe per se, that pri nci pl e of 1 a
a ip __ a
SJ.nce the
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m··dinance r1as enacted for the benefit of the City of Norfolk and not for the
·~e;:·c.~on o
ir persons.
a~ e ~n er ac ~on against the City ecause she
failed to give the City the notice required by V#8-653(ordinarily 60 days written
notice after accrual of cause of action).
'£0RTS
202 Va. 278.
P sued D for injuries ar1s~ng out of an automobile accident. Over objection the
Court instructed the jury "that if they believe from a preponderance of the evidence
that P was susceptible to emotional upset or more susceptible to emotional disturbance than an ordinary person at the time and place of the accident, and that this
condition in her made her injuries, if any, more severe, or more aggravated, or
difficult to cure, then she can, if she is entitled to recover, recover for the
additional ·aggravation and difficulty resulting from the injuries, but not for any
pre-exiating disability .n
,
Held: A proper instruction since it correctly states the law.(A nervous person is
entitled not to be ne li entl in ured and if ~he i .~nag~d-mo~haa-aa-average
ersort more
to compensate her).
TORTS--Malicious ProsecRtion
202 Va.299.
D, a lawyer, parked his car near where workmen were building a brick wall in such
a way as to obstruct the work and to create a traffic hazzard. P, the chief of
police, requested D to move the car. D refused, so after another ineffectual request
p moved the car some 75 feet and notified D what he had done. D became enraged and
swore out a warrant against P for the felony of unauthorized use of an automobile
with intent to deprive the Ol,;ner of its use temporarily. P was tried and acquitted.
p then sued D for malicious prosecution and recovered a judgment for $1,000. D
appealed claiming that since P actually did corr~it the crime he had a defense to
the malicious prosecution suit as a matter of law.
Held: Affirmed. There is no evidence whatever that P intended to deprive D of the
use of his car at all. There is no crime under the statute(V#l8-220.l)without such
an intent. All the elements of malicious prosecution could have been found by a
jury to have been present.
TORTS
In~ry to Seyeg Year Old Boy
202 Va. 347.
· p, a seven year old boy, was struck by a car possibly driven by D although D never
admitted his car struck P. Because of P 1 s injury he had no recollection of the
accident and there were no admitted eye witnesses other than P's five year _old
brother. There was no evidence of any negligence on D's part nor was it proved just
where p was when he was struck, nor his whereabouts just before he was struck, or
how he entered the road. 'l'he trial court struck P's evidenceo
Held: Affirmed. P had the burden of proving D's negligence. This is not a res
ip~a loquitur case, and since P has not sustained that bu~den the trial court acted
correctly in striking P's evidence. Under these circumstances it was immaterial that
D knew children were accustomed to play in that viciruty.
TORTS--Gross Negligence
Q2est Statute
202 Va.548.
pta int~a te was a gratuitous gueSt in D's car. D was driving his car something
over 40 miles per hour well within the speed limit. It was raining and the two
lane hard surfaced highway was wet, D's car was, as far as known, in good mech&ni~, ~
cal condition. The two rear tires lV'El!'e worn alrrost smooth but still in good enough
condition to pass inspection. X's tractor trailer was approaching D's car. When
the two cars were about 60 feet from each other D's car veered across the center
white line and then for some unexplained reason went into a 180 degree skid so that
the back of D's car was in X' s lane. X did not even havs time enough to apply his
brakes and pta intestate was killed. The jury found that D was grossly negligent
and rendered a verdict for $10~000 for P which the trial courtr refused to set aaide.
Held: Reversed and final judgment entered for D. For him to have been ~uil~ of
gross ne li
he must have shown an '"'utter disregard of prudence amounting to
e-
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?Ondcrance of the evidence. If reasonable men can differ it is a jury question.
:a D clearly was not guilty of gross negligence, there is no jury question. Here
it is plain that P ha8 not proved gross negligence. The cause of the accident has
not been explained. D may have become sick suddenly. Something may have gone wrong
1vi th the car. D may have inadvertently gone over the white line and the car may
have just then come into contact with the slick spot.
ohflegllgence
202 Va • .535.
As D was driving his ear in a snol1 stonn because of which he could not see the

TORTS--I~ ~ructipna o.n law

center white line or the edge of the hard ~urface of the road he saw P approaching.
In order to give P plenty of room D veered to his right. There was ice on the road
under the snow and D's action caused his car to skid first to his right against a
bank and then over to the left of the highway in front of P•s approaching car. P
was hurt in the collision.
Heldt (J_) P is not entitled to an instruction that D was guilty of negligenoe as a
matter of law for being on the wrong side of the highway. This fact only made out a
prima facie case of negligence and cast the burden of going forward with the evidence
on D. If the jury believe that D did everything reasonably possible to avoid the
accident or even if they believe the evidence to be in equilibrium it should find
for D, as P had the burden of proving ~'s negligence. (2) But it was error to instruct the jury that P had the burden £o convince the jury of D's negligence. One
of the meanings of '"convince" is to have beliefbeyond'd.O'Ubt. P need prove hi~ case
only by a preponderance of the evidence. {3) Nor was it proper to tell the jury that
if D crossed the center line they nmight asswnett negligence. Rather such fact only
cast upon D the burden of producing a reasonable explanation.
TORTS--neg matj on-swnrnarx i qdgment
202 Va • .588.
The D Fifpaper published a letter in its "Letters to the Edi tortt feature which
stated of P, who was Superinter.dent of Schools, and who was active as a segregationist, NHow can we as citizens prote~t our public school property from unscrupulous
leaders? We are tired of his continuous crusading, and having our children suffer
* * *·'' It was stipulated at a pre-trial
conference that there was no actual malice
on the part of D. The Court granted D 1 s motion for a summary judgment in his favor.
Held: Affirmed. Since P was a public officer statements made with reference to
him in that capacity were qualifiedly privileged. Since P has admitted that there
was no actual malice the qualification is satisfied. P cannot have a better case
than his own admissions give him when those adffiissions are made with full knowledge
of the facts. Hence there is no jury q uestion and a awnmary judgment for D was
proper.
TORTS

202 Va.605.

p who was of a nervous di~position and predisposed psychologically .to emotional
ups~ts, slowed down her car as she app~oached a red stop-light. D, who was driving
a car immediately behind her put her foot on the brak~. She was wearing tennis
shoes and her foot snipped and hit the a~celerator. This caused her oar to run into
pt 8 ear. Only slight damage was done to the car3, but P, who was then pregnant,
suffered a whip lash injury and developed a permanent conversion hysteria which a
normal person would not have developed. D requested an instruction to the effect
that if her foot slipped through no negligence on her part the jury must find a
verdict for D. The court refused the instruction and also allowed damages for the
permanent hysteria.
Helds Affirmed. While i t is not negligence as a matter of law for one's foot to
slip neither is it due care as a matter of law. Sin~e this was a finding instruction lt should have been a complete one. This instruction failed to tell the jury
that it was D's duty to keep her car under proper cont~ol under the traffic conditions then existing. It wa3 for the jury to say, from all the evidence, whether or
not the collision could have been fores e en~ anticipated, or avoided in the exerci~e
of reasonable care. As to the damages, art is a g ~ral rule that one who neglig~;m.t
ly inflicts a personal injury on anoLher is respon ble for all the Ill effects
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Htic:h, conE>iderin the condition of health in which the plaintiff was when he recef ved t he i n.N_ry:, nat_urally and gecessar~ y follow su~:h injury. Hence a defendantis
Li &o~ ity is in no way lessened or affected by reason of the fact that the injuries
l'lOuld not have resulted had the plaintiff been in good health * * *".
'.1~CR.TS

202 Va.646.

P owned a house which was neated by natural gas furnished by D. The pipe from the
Gtreet main to the property line was owned by D, and the pipe from there to the basement was owned by P. Without any warning, there was an explosion which killed P who
was watching television in a room over the furnace. Before the explosion A smelled
gas on the outside of the house. After the explosion D dug up the pipe. That owned
by D was in good condition while that owned by P showed signs of a fracture. The
jury found in favor of P's personal representative. The trial judge set the verdict
aside as contrary to the evidence.
Held: Affirmed. The source of the leaking gas was not proven, but rested soley on
surmise. The doctrine of re~ ipsa~~~ is not applicable as P had control of,and
was responsible for, a portion of the line. P's personal rep~esentative had failed
to prove that D was negligent.
TORTS
202 Va. 731.
p worked on the second floor of a manufacturing plant. Some of the madhinery broke
down, and while waiting for it to be repaired) P stepped out on the metal fire
escape for a smoke~ It was ~ark and there was a drizzling rain falling. When he was
through with his cigarette he flipped it into the street below. In doing so his hand
struck an uninsulated electric ~ire maintained and controlled by the City of Richmond
He suffered severe injuries. He ' first sued the City but lost because he had not
given the City the statutory 60 days notice required for the maintenance of such an
action. He is now suing the D Electric Co. which furnished the electricity. It is
admitted that the wire in question was placed too close to the fire escape. There
was no evidence that D knew this fact, or that D owed any duty to supervise,repair,
or inspect wires strung by the City.
Held: For D. In the absence of actual knowledge that i t was feeding electricity
into wires improperly placed by another, and of a duty to inspect same, there was no
violation of any duty owed P by D and hence no negligence on D's part.
TORTS Immunity frgm Snit
202 Va.452.
The Elii'abeth River Tunnel District v1as created by the legislature for a declared
public purpose to construct and operate a bridge-tunnel system across the Elizabeth
River. Its activities are by statute stated to be governmental in nature. The project
as constructed does not permit use by pedestrians. To provide for them the District
entered into a contract with the Virginia Transit Company under the terms of which
severa~ busses are operated by the Company which controlled the actual operation and
repair of the busses· and employs the persons necessary for such operation. P was
injured as the result of the negligence of the operator of a bus. She secured a judgment against the District and the Compa~y. Both claimed immunity from suit on the
ground that they were State agencies engaged in work of a governmental nature.
Held: The Tunnel District is Dffinune from suit except in so far as the State has
consented to its being sued. '!'here is no such consent, as far as tort liability is
concerned. The Tunnel District is part of the State highway system. The fact that the
act creating it provides that it can sue and be sued creates only procedural rights
and is not a waiver of immunity. It was then held that the Virginia Transit Company
wae an independent contractor and not a State agency, and that it had no such
immunity.
TORTS
~ ~li eence
202 Va.752.
D owned a truck. Since it was to be driven for a long di stance empty he deflated
the ti.res to a pressure of 30 pounds. At the end of the trip and before reloading
he asked P, a service station operator, t o inflate to 90 pounds. The tire assembly
was held in place only by the air pressure . It came apart while being inflated and
injured p ~1ho sued D on the theory that when one person puts a thing in charge of
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::.;;other which he knows, or in the exercise of due care should have known, to be
.:la.ngerous, he owes a duty to such person to warn him of the danger.
Beld: For D. There was no evidence to in~tcate that he knew or should have known
anything was wrong. D was under no duty to have an expert mechanic examine the tire
assBrnbly when he had no reason to suspect anything was wrong. Since the tires were
~mder the control of P when the accident occurred the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
has no application.
TORTS--Res ipsa loguitur
202 Va.826
p owned a radio tower. D owned an unfenced parkway lot nearby on which he kept a
number of second hand cars and trucks for display and sale. The parking lot land
sloped in the direction of the radio tower. J.ights on the parking lot were turned
off about llp.rn. each night. Among the cars parked on this lot was a heavy truck.
There was evidence that D had the truck in its lowest gear with brakes set. In some
unexplained way the truck rolled down the incline and ran into P 1 s radio tower
damaging it so badly it had to be rebuilt. The truck was not damaged. On examination
it was found to be in neutral with the brakes completely off. P sued D. The court
instructed the jury that if it believed from the evidence that D's truck ran off its
parking site into P's tower, these facts raise a prima fac~ presumption that defendant failed to use reasonable care.
Held: This was error. The instruction above should not be given unless the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur applies. It d~es not apply in this QaB
s D did ot have exclusive control of the cars in t
~
ot. The accident could have been due to
causes or which D was not responsible. ~orne trespasser may have changed gears and
released the brakes as a prank or even maliciously in the early morning hours. Where
the injury may be due to one of several causes for some of which D would be liable
and for some of which he would not be liable there is no presumption that the
damages were due to D's fault and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application.
TORTS--nama
rmanent".
121 S.E.369. 202 Va. 900.
In an ac ~on or personal injuries growing out of an automobile accident the only
issue was the amount of damages. The Court instructed the jury in part as follows,
"You may also consider the nature, character, extent and duration of her injuries,
wheth~r temporary or permanent and their effect, i f any, in the future." The only
evidence that there was any permanent injury was Dr. Wis testimony that he thought
pt s shoulder blades would give her trouble and "that's going to be prolonged".
Held: Error to give any instruction about a permanent injury when there was no
e~dence of any such i nj ury. "'Prolonged' implies ultimate c~re. 'Permanent' implies
that there will be no cure·" Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
TORTS
121 S.E.373· 202 Va. 948.
p was a passenger in a private contract carrier bus owned by D which carried certain passengers to and from their work for a charge of $3,00 per week. When P was
about to get off, the street gutters were overflowing from a storm. The street was
some six lanes wide counting two parking lanes. The bus driver straddled the second
and third lanes from the west side at a 4.5 degree angle so that he could discharge
p in a dry spot. Traffic in the rear of the bus had to either wait or to pass the
bus in the first west lane or in a lane on the other side of the bus which was being
used for traffic in the other direction. As P alighted he was instantly struck by a
bicycle which was passing the bus in the lane nearest the west sidewalk.
Held: A judgment for P even though supported by a jury verdict must be set aside
and final judgment rendered for D. P is barred by his c~ ributary pegUgence as a
matter of law. There is no r oom for a difference of opinion. P should have looked
to see whether anything was corni ng when he got off a bus stopped in the middle of
the street at a 4.5 degree angle .

/
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12 l SoE .2d 375.

.,
.
~O 2 Va.913.

P entered D's supermarket to buy a can of lemon juice. These cans were on a shelf
just high enough to be out of her easy reach. She braced herself with her left hand
b y· grasping a shelf some thirty inches from the lemon juice and was in the act of
getting it when some cans of V··B juice fell on her left hand. She did not touch the
v..a juice, which was piled four or five cans high. These cans were 2.2 inches in
diameter and 4 inches tall. The trial judge gave summary judgment for D.
~eld:(tw? judges dissenting) Affirmed. There is a chance that pts extra weight
wh~le brac1ng herself caused the cans to fall so the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
has no application. What really happened is purely a matter of conjecture(Ground of
d~ssent: The Co~rt s~ould have taken judici~l notice that cans of small circumference
p1led four or f1ve h1gh might fall, and whether or not piling them that high on
shelues that high was negligence should have been submitted to a jury).
TORTS
121 S.E.2d 379l202 Va.9a6.
While P' s car was stopped in a line of traffic by a car waitJ.ng to make a left turn
Dis truck ran into it. D claimed that the accident was caused by a sudden mechanical
failure of the brakes. An inspection of the br~ces after the accident showed that ·
they did not work and it was admitted by all that the accident had not affected the
brakes. There was expert testimony to the effect that their failure might have been
due to an air pocket. They worked up to within a few feet of the collision. The
trial judge struck defendant's evidence.
Held: Error~ This could have been an unavo~?able accident as D claimed. He was
entitled to have a jury pass on his theory w 1ch had some support in the evidence.
Note: Be sure to see this cas~ on another point on p.593 of the Pleading and
Practice Cases.
TORTS Malicio~osecution
121 SoE.2d 466,202 Va•1001.
The X Onion ~~ttempting to wrest control of the employees of the S Plant from
the Y Union. It had four organizers who distributed pamphlets to employees of that
plant as they went to work. One of these employees, R, was a member of the Y Union.
She filled her water pistol with a bluish liquid and squirted D who was one of the
organizers for the X Union. D swore out a '~>Tarrant against R, and also against P who
was an organizer for the Y Union. D's reason for including P was that he was confident that P had put R up to the squirting since P was the local leader of the Y
Union. Before swearing out this warrant D consulted L, a lawyer. D failed to make a
reasonable investigation of the facts and hence failed to tell L some, and misstated
other, material matters. L then ad,is ed that the warrants be obtained. There was
clear evidence of malice by D against P. R. was convicted, but the case against P
was nolle prossed when no evidence could be f ound to support it. P then sued D for
malicious prosecution and was given a ,judgment on a jury verJ::i:ct for $5,000. D
contends that since he acted on advice of counsel he was privileged to institute the
action, that the damages were excessive, and that the following instruction was
erroneous, 11 The court instructs the jury that, if you find from a preponderance of
the evidence that the plaintiff has esta~lished t he essential elements of his cause
of action, as defined in other instructions of the court, against the defendant,then
the plaintiff is entitled, without f urther proof, to recover d.amages(note that
"if any11 is omitted) for:
(1) The harm to his reputati on which(normally) resulted from such an accusation as
that which was brought agai nst hi m; and(2) The disgrace which(normally) resulted
from the initiation of such proceedings." The word "normally" was deleted by the
court without objection from D.
Held2 Affirmed. Since D failed to make a full and fair di sclosure to his attorney
the rule that one who acts in good faith on such advice i s immune from liability has
no application. The instruction 1vas based on the rule set forth in #670 of the
Restatement of the Law of Torts, and the law as there stated was expressly approved.
In a case of this sort general damages are presumed . Hence the qualification "if
any" with reference to the damages is not required. While the word "normallyn
should have been included in the two places indicated, D's failure to object to its
being stricken by the court was an acquiescense thereto. Nor is $5,000 general
damages so high as to be unreasonable in the light of all the circumstances.
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"'ORTS--Guest or Pa~ng Passenger-contributory Neglige~e l24S.E.2dl91,203 Va.372 .,
D ownecf a car in ew yo'rk. She andh'er friend, P, decided to vist Williamsburg.
D and P each put $5 into a "kitty" to defray the automobile expenses of the trip.
'l'hey each put in more money from time to time as needed. The 11 kitty11 was in a
separate pUrse in D's possession. When D entered an intersection against two stop
signs and a red light her car was struck by X's car and P was injured. Prwas sitting
on the front seat but failed to warn D that she should stop in obedience to the
signal and signs. The trial judge ruled (l)that P was a paying passenger rather
th,an na guest without payment" and hence D owed a duty not to be ordinarily negligent
and (2) that P was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to warn D of what she was doing. He therefore refused to give any instructions
on contributory negligence.
Held: Affirmed. She was being carried for a consideration and hence the guest
statute about gross negligence had no application. There was no evidence to indicate
that up to the time of the accident D had driven carelessly. A passenger may assume
that his driver will use due care until he has been given reason to believe the
contrary. In the instant case P did not have time to give a warning after she discovered that D was driving improperly. Since there was no evidence of contributory
negligence, no instruction on that matter could have properly been given.
TORTS--Pleading and Practice
203 Va.378
While P was in D's super market a customer knocked a bottle of starch from a shelf.
It broke when it hit the floor and its contents spilled over a circular area of some
.five feet in diameter near the entry to one of the check-out collnters. The manager
immediately closed this counter, sent one of the employees for a mop, and posted a
guard to warn the customers of the condition of the floor. While the guard was
directing a child to another check-out counter, and just as the man who had been
sent for a mop arrive~ on the scene, P, who had turned around to call to one of her
grandchildren, stepped into the starch, slipped, and fell, suffering injuries. She
sued D. Assuming proper motions, if needed,
(a) If the jury find for D, what, if anything, should the trial judge do?
(b) If the jury find for P, what, if anything, should the trial judge do? Give
reasons in each case.
Held: 'r here is no negligence on D1 s part as a matter of law. Reasonable people
could not differ. Hence if the jury find for D, judgment should be entered for D.
If the jury find for P, the ver dict shoQld be set aside as contrary to tho evidence
or without evidence to support it, and ,judgment entered forD as provided by V#B-352.
In the above case the jury found for P and the trial court entered judgment on the
verdict. Held reversed and final judgment for the defendant.
TORTS--Res Ipsa Loquitur
203 Va
,124 S.E.2d889
P, a two and one half year old cbild, his mother and her mother entered D's store
so that the mother of P could assist her mother in the selecti on of a dress. There
were two rooms at the rear of the store. One of these was used as a dressing room,
and the other as a combination dressing and storage room. While P's grandmother was
in the dressing room P unexpectedly broke loo s e from his mother and ran pell mell
into the other room. Ther e was a terr ifying crash , A large full length mirror had
fallen on Pl He recovered a verdict of ~2 0 ,000 upon which judgment was entered.
Held:The child >vas an invitee and not a mere licensee. Hence there was an affirmative duty of care owed to him. Bllt it vJas error to give an instrllction under the
theory that the doctrine of' ~ ipsa_loquitur was applicable. The room was one open
to the general public so D did not have exclus ive control over the mirror. D testified that the mirror was kept back of some dress racks and tnat it wa8 not in use at
the time as there was another mir ror attached to the wall. P 1 s mother testified that
it was leaning against t he wall with its base on a polished floor. How it got there,
and for how long,was not. shown by tne evidence . The doctr i ne of.!'~~~ loquitur is
inapplicable if the accident 1nay have very well happened without D's fault,and it is
also inapplicable where the evidence of the cause of the accident is just as accessible to the plaintiff as it is t o the defendant. i(eversed and remanded for a new trial

TORTS--Pleading & PI;actice
TORTS P,28
203 Va.472.
P and D were carpente r~ working for the X Corporation. P was under a duty to get
on the job a few minutes ~ early as he was custodian of the tools. D was also under a
duty to arrive a little early to prepare ice water for the other workers. D negligently ran into p with his car while each was preparing to perform the duties
mentioned above. P sued D, and D filed a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of
Court.
Held: Plea sustained. Here there was an accident occurring during and arising out
of the employment as both men were then charged with duties even though the regular
1-vork day had not started. Hence p1 a only remedy is under the Workmen 1 s Compensation
Law which is administered by the Industrial Co~tission and not the courts.
TORTS--Municipal Corporations--Go~ernmental or ~Qp~tary?
203 Va.551
P was i nJured when the car in whiCh he was r1 ng ntt a .tree trunk which was proj ecting a car's width into a Norfolk street and which was not lighted. The City
showed that Hurricane Donna had passed by a few hours before leveling some 800
trees across the streets and that it was doing everything humanly possible to make
the streets passable for emergency equipment.
Held: No liability. The ole ~ ng of the etFs9ts of debris where there has been a
disaster resulting from an act of God is~overnmental function in the performance
of which the City has the immunity of the S:ate.(In fact the r~gular remoyal of
g<i!bage is a governmental fn pc ti on, 152 Va.278 ,288).
...

-
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TORTS
203 Va.596.
A felon, F, was known to be in a certain house and heavily armed. C, . th~ Chief of
Police, requested D, a member of the Virginia State Police Force, ~d P who had
been specially deputized, to help in F's apprehension. It was 4:30a.m. and foggy
and dark. By prearrangement D stationed himself at the back door while C accompanied
by P knocked at the front door. As an~icipated F ran out the back door with a gun.
D fired at him and missed. P heard the shooting and ran towards it. In the dark D
mistook P for F and shot him in the arm. P sued D.
Held: For D. He was confronted with a sudden emergency. The shooting was acciden4·
al, and P assumed the risk of being mi~taken for F in the dark. Note: The court thus
found it unnecessary to decide whether D was protected from suit by the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
TORTS--Landlord and Tenant--Negli ~ ence
203 Va.638.
L and T=Wufe Iathllota and t enan • The lease provided tha~ L would keep the premises
in repai.r. T complained that the upstairs shower leaked causing water to come through
the ceiling onto the kitchen floor. L hired X to make the necessary repairs • .However
the leak continued and T slipped and, fell in some water on the kitchen floor. T
failed to prove that X had been negligent. There was evidence that X's use of
ttpermatext• was at least one proper way to repair the defect.
Held: For L. The rule in this State is that negligence cannot be inf·erre<;i from the
mere fact that the trouble continued after it was ~~upposed to ha:ve been fixed. L is
not--an nsurer that the defect has been remedied.
TORTS-Fraud

203 Va. 760.
of Virginia, Inc. is a Virgin:i.a Corporation which owns several stol'es
and .has contracts with a number of operators in Virginia. Its stock was owned by A
and B. Things were not going too well, so A and B placed an advertisement in the
Wall Street Journa.l to. the general ef fect that they would sell the stock for $30 1 000
and that the business made a gross profit of some $25,000 per year. P saw the advertisement and. paid $25,000 cash and gave his notes for $5,000 for the stock. Before
P, who was an experienced businessman, bollght the stock he went over the books of
the Corporation .and asked the auditor whatever questions he wished. The books had
been properly kept. A and B did not in.form P that there was general dissatisfaction ·
on the part of the operators, that some of t he s tores would not reopen . next season
(the stores closed in the winter months), and that one of the stores needed repairs.
Heldt pis not entitled to any relief. Since P made a partial investigation and
Dairy~ueen

TORTS P.29.
'ras at liberty to make a fuller one, he relied upon his investigation and not on an:·
misrepresentations of A and B. Quoting Chancellor Kent, 11 The common law aff ords
ever y one reasonable protection against fraud but does not go to the romltic lengt h
of giving indemili ty against t.he consequences of indolence and folly or a careless
i ndifference to the ordinary and accessible means of information". P could have
talked to the various operators and inspected the stores.
TOR'rS- -l~u? sance

203 Vao 711 ..
I. D operates a coal processing plant ir.. an industrial area. Some six tons of dirt
and waste material come from its smoke stacks every day and some of this settles on
pts farm. The T Power Co. operates a steam generating plant about two miles away
and some white ash therefrom also settles on P's farm. P sued D for damages. The
Court instructed the jury that P could not recover any damages from D unless he
proved what part of the damages were caused by D and what part by T.
Held: Error. The inst1~ction could be understood as requiring P to prove the
exact amount of damage caused by each. This would be an impossibility. P need only
prove the proportion within a reasonable degree of certainty.
II. The Court also instructed the jury that they should take into consideration the
location of D's plant, its operation, the nature of the surrounding community with
respect to the purposes for which it is adapted, and all other pertinent circumstances, and determine whether defendant's operations were unreasonable.
Held: Error. The instruction is vague, lays down no standards, invites speculation, and incorporates a principle of law that has been repudiated over and over
in Virginia. In his t e o
n's ri hts are not measured by another man's
~· P had certain natural rights to reasonably fresh au ~n he canoo
e_ eprived of them witlillut-DLs-pa~ng_him_damage s just because P lives in an industrial
~ N~ There wa~ no need 11 to balance the equiUes 11 a.s P_did.__n
sk for an
injunct!_Qn.
TORTS--Joint Adventure--Independent Contractor
203 Va.740
In the cons t ruction of a public school, W was the general contractor who had
general supervision of the site, G was a subcontractor for the excavation work, and
the status of R who operated the excavation machinery was in dispute. One piece of
this machinery needed repairs. R took this piece from the job and negligently left
the bowl off the ground while he went to get a replacement part. P, a nine year old
boy, was killed as a proximate result of this negli gence. There was evidence that R
was a sub-subcontractor who leased G's equipment, that he was under G's control and
hence G's employee, and that R and G were engaged in a joint venture each having an
equal voice. P's personal representative sued W, G and R. The trial court struck
plaintiffs evidence so far as Wand G were concerned and plaintiff appealed.
Held: It was error to strike this evidence as far as G was concerned for it was a
jury question as to whether or not G wa.s a joint adventurer or an employee or an
independent contractor. If R was either of the first two, G would be liable. But it
was not erro:c to strike the evidence as to w. A princ i pal is not 1·
o
rtf
of his independent contractor unless the lJork
without creatin
nu
1s a case o
ilit or involves a non-delegable
General supervision over the site for the purpose of seeing that su -con rae o s
perform their contracts does not give the principal contractor control of his subcontractors' employees.

.!rORTs-.. plead~n~ and practice
·'J: TORTS p.~~ -- -::17<.¥ .;:>
203 va.876.
D was dr' iv ng a car through a cdt~tr1r~igh~ which i1 tersected Route 2 in the
out so that the drivers of cars on these highways could not see each other until
tlJey reached the intersection. D failed to see a stop sign just before he came to
Route 2. As he entered he was struck by X's car on Route 2 and P, who was a gratuitous guest in D's car, was injured. The trial judge ruled that D was guilty of gross
negligence as a matter of law and submitted the case to the jury for the sole
purpose of assessing the damages.
Held: Error. Reasonable people could differ as to whether or not D was guilty of
gross negligence. Hence it was error to take this issue from the jury. Reversed
and remanded.
TORTS--Common Carriers
203 Va.892.
P telePfioned the D Corporation for a taxi. It sent one driven by X who by chance
knew P, and who had taken her on trips an~dates. While X was taking her to her
destination he said to her, 1tHum, I ain't got no money and I ain't made no money
today." P replied to the effect that X needn't think she was going to give him any
(other than the fare). This answer infuriated X and he struck P with such force that
she needed medical attention. P sued D and X. Is D liable?
Held: Yes. D is a common carrier of passengers and is under a duty to protect its
passe ers from insu s an a uses o o ers an a or or rom nsui s an
aouses of its own amp yees. ence t i s Irnm:ter iai that the argument in this case
WAI over a private matter having nothing whatever to do with the employment.
TORTS FG--l}d_ s-- t~<e.- f-/~
203 Va.913.
P wedt into D's store to purchase groceries. When she was standing close to the
shelves, reaching ior a package of sugar, with her right foot under the bottom shelf
which was a few inches above the floor, she put her weight on her right foot to
turn, and her foot slipped on a small piece of celery which was dark inc olor and
underneath the bottom shelf. Does P have at least a jury case?
Heldz No. "In some jurisdictions the courts permit juries to speculate on how long
a foreign substance had been on the floor or how it got there. Such decisions are
in the minority. In theseminority decisions a description of the substance such as
withered, old looking, dirty, or grimy has been held sufficient to allow the jury to
infer that the substance had been on the floor a sufficient length of time to reuire the defendant in the exercise of reasonable care to have known of its presence'
ut none of this in Virgj~al ~The plaintiff cannot be said to have made out a case
for the jury when 'It is neces~~l _for _!_he jury to specu a~ o guess-Hl- C>oFder- t'o
allow rec Y.Br.y." · ·

I

TORTS Instruction on the ~of Negligence c:_.~ dl~
203 Va.934.
In an atltomobite negngehcecase the Court [a;~ lthe foll6wing instructions, nsimpl·
negligence is simply a lack of due care. And an absence of due care constitutes
simple negligence. · In this case the plaintiff insists that she is entitled torecover on the theory that the defendants, at the time of this accident, were failing
to exercise due care and were therefore guilty of simple negligence."
Held on appeal that the giving of such an instruction is reversible error. It
leaves out any mention of proximate cause as an element of negligence. It puts undue
emphasis on the degree of negligence by using the adjective Ksimple" over and over.
It is argumentative rather than explanatory. It is not cured by a later instruction
on proximate cause as the above instruction is inconsistent with the later one.
The instruction is merely an attempt on plaintiff's part to have the court apparently agree with his theory of the case, and shoul~ refused.
TORTS PleadiJ! and Practice
203 Va.955.
B, L, J, and W went oUt in J's mother's car for a joy ride. While the car was
going at a speed of some 85 miles an hour through an S curve where the maximum saf'e
speed was 50 miles per hour it left the highway and J was killed and B and L were
seriously injured. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether B or L was
driving. L sued B and J's estate alleging that B was grossly negligent and that he
was J's agent. B counterclaimed alleging that L was driving in a grossly negligent

TORTS P. 31.
manner. J's personal representative counterclaimed alleg~ng that L was ordinarily
negligent. The trial court refused to order separate trials on the counterclaims.
The jury found for the counterclaimants and against L. Note: If one guest is driving
th host's car he owes a duty of ordinary care to the h~whocannot be a ues£
in his own car but is not lia
~he
~ts although the driver and the
others are all equally guests)unless he is grossly negligent. This is because of
the wording of the guest statute~V#B-646 . 1 ) '*No person transported by the owner or
operator of any motor. vehicle as a guest without payment---"·
Held: Affirmed. Rule 3:8 provides that the court in its discretion may order a
separate trial of any cause of action asserted in a co.unterclaim. There was no abuse
of discretion here. The case is uncomplicated. The only matter in issue was whether
L or B was driving. The fact that a different degree of care was owed J is not
important as the jury could follow instructions. Further note: L in suing B contended the driver was grossly negligent. In defending the counterclaim L contended
there was not sufficient evidence to show gross negligence. That is, if B were
driving B was grossly negligent, but if L was the driver, L was not grossly negligent. Held: L cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time.
TORTS
204 Va.36
As P approached a 400 foot two lane bridge he saw that D's car which was coming
over the bridge towards P was in a skid. P at once stopped his car. D's car continued
to skid, came over onto P's side of the road and struck P's car injuring both P and
his car. The uncontradicted evidence showed that there was no ice on the approaches
to the bridge, that D had gone over the bridge a short time before and encountered
no ice, that D's car skidded 200 feet before striking P' a car, that it was very. .
difficult to see the ice on the bridge from the driver's seat and that two other .
cars skidded on the bridge at approximately the same time. The jury found for D.
p appeals on the ground that the physical facts show D must have been travelling at
an excessive rate of speed and that he was violating the statute by having his car
on his left side of the highway.
Held: Whether or not D was negligent was a jllry guestion. He was not negligent as
a matter of law. A jury could find, and did find, that the accident happened without
any fault on D's part. He did not voluntarily or intentionally drive his car on the
left of the road.

·roRTS

De r
204 Va.41.
D, while driving his car, struck P, a minor who a passed his 14th birthday but
was not yet fifteen years of age. P was riding a bicycle. There was evidence to the
effect that P was subnormal mentally--a high grade moron. What degree of care does
p owe so as not to have been guilty of contributory negligence?
Held: Since he is over 14 years of age he is not entitled to the benefit of the
rebuttable presumption that a child over 7 and under 14 is presumed to be incapable
of negligence. But 'since he is still a child(no upper age indicated)the general
rule is that he mus£ exerc~se that amount of care expected of a child o£ like age,
~rience, discretion and know
or not he did so i n the i nst ant case
shou
ave een left to the jury.

·---

TORTS
Negligence Trespass
/ vcs.;:..~ ss
204 Va.81
D owned a railroad and was in possession of a certain freight train made up of a
diesel engine followed by a caboose and fifty frei ght cars. It proceeded along a
siding until it reached a switch. This switch had been tl~own so that the train
could go over to the main track. After 9 cars had passed over to the main track the
train was stopped for a proper purpose for about two minutes. During this period a
muscular five year old boy threw the switch back to its original position. To do
this the boy had to remove an S shaped hook, lift a 30 pound weight to an upright
position and let the weight down in a reversed position. This was the first time
in forty years that anyone had tampered with one of D's switches. Within a moment
or two after the switch had been thus tampered with and in ignorance thereof,
employees started the train. After it had proceeded a few ear lengths and reached a
speed of five miles an hour the engineer thought something was wrong. And there wasl

TORTS p;,32
'J.' hc: cars back of the flWit.ch proceeded up th~ s:J.de track they were on, became derai1 ,
ed, and ran into P1 s building. P sued D for the resulting damage on both negligence
and · trespass theories .
Held: No liability. There was no negligence on D's part. It had no reason to
suppose anything of this nature might happen. It cannot be expected to post a guard
to guard against the highly improbable. The sole proximate cause of the accident was
the act of an irresponsible person. There is no li
s
to
tl!e better view s '
'
pt
on
~t was not a
voluntary, mistaken, or negligent one. It was not engaged in an extra hazardous
ac1Givity. Nothlng 1S t o be galned by shifting the loss from one innocent person to
aQ£ther such- persoey.
TORTS VinJ:at.i op of Stt3tute Proximate Ca.J;!se
204 Va.96
While D's car was approaching the deceased some 300 feet away, the latter was in
the act of crossing a street between intersections. D did not slow down but attempted to pass in front of deceased by veering to D's left. This caused deceased to become confused and while he was hesitating as to whether to keep on going, or go back,
he was struck and killed. D now contends that even if he was negligent, deceased's
personal representative is barred from recovery because it is negligence as a
matter of law by stat11te for one to cross a street between intersections.
Held: Whi le deceased was ~lilt of_negligence) a jury could ha e found ~hat the
sole proximate cause of his de t: w s the n gligence L D- in ailing_ to slow_down
an' n 1V ng to his l~ft. Hence a verdict against D should not be set aside.
Deceased did not become an outlaw just because he was actin~ negligently. No
mention was made of the last clear chance doctrine.
TORTS
Punit ive Damages
) .< reo-u e ...-eel .~, cl€..t:_~t-cl h9~E,l~!-..X grossl y and wantonly injured P. Before trial X aied and D qualitfed ~a~
administrator. P asked for an instruction on punitive damages but the Court refused
to give such an instruction.
Held: Affirmed. Since the object of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer
and since this object is f rustrated by his death, no such damages can be recovered
against his estate.

W

TORTS
204 Va.390.
D owned a right of way for its towers which supported high voltage lines. The
tower in question was on the ridge of a mou~tain far from any road or place where
children were apt to play. P, aged 12, climbed the tower and touched a high voltage
wire which was 23 feet f~om the ground and suspended 3 feet from the tower. P has
no recollection as to. how he climbed the tm..Jer. The cross bar nearest the ground
was 7 feet from the ground. P could have "shinned" up a t ower support, used a
grape vine or rope or pole or climbed up s ome bolts near the ground.
Held: In the absence of evidence, there is no proof that D1 s having bolts in the
tower support close to the ground was the proximate ce. uoe of P' s asce: d .ng the tower
and touching a wire 23 feet high and 3 feet from the tower. Although D owed a high
degree of care, since electrici ty is inherently highly dangerous, D is not liable
1n the absence of proof that its acts or omiss i ons caused the injury. The trial
court properly· set aside a jury verdict ln favor of P.
TORTS Blasting- Nuisance Dama~ es
204 Va.414
D used explosives in the operation of a quarry 500 feet from P 1 s home under a
use permit secured from the County Board of Zoning Appeals. P 1 s home was built in
1758 by a noted colonial architect but in the course of time large cracks had
appeared in the walls and there had been considerable settling . P had to leave this
home(which was built on the same ledge of rock that D was quarrying)when it appeared that the front wall had buckled. Houses near by had not been damaged by D's
blasting. The evidence showed that D's blasting amounted to a nuisance, but failed
to show negligence. D contended that he was protected by his us e permit. P sought
an injunction, damages for inj ury to the hous e, and for costs of moving. The
Chancellor allowed the last ite~ only and both P and D appealed.

TORTS P .. 33
Hel d: Affirmed. The us e penni t could not authorize D tocommi t a nuisance since t h::·.
c~.~ unty itself could. have given no such authority. ID the case of a nuj s ance there
;n~y ·be liability without. negligence. No damage to the house as a result of the blasting was proved with reasonable certainty. What portion of the damage, if anv, was
due to blaeting, and what portion to natural deterioration over the centurieswas a
matter of pure speculation and conjecture. This is not enough. But an award of
damages of the cost of moving because of D's acts is not plainly wrong and hence
will be affirmed.

~

TORTS C~venant not to ue
e
204 Va.428
L own
rucks and tractors
to
according to mileage
driven. By the terms of the lease G was to hire the drivers and furnish gasoline and
oil; L was to keep the vehicles in repair; L was to obtain insurance for himself and
G who was to be a coinsured; G was not to be liable for any damage done to the
vehicles whether due to its negligence or not: and the insurance was to expressly
provide that no insurer would be subrogated to any of L's rights against G. One of
the vehicles was damaged by the negligence of D, an employee of G. L sued D's
administrator. The lower court held that the lease in effect contained a covenant
by L not to sue G, and that a covenant not to sue G barred an action against G1 s
employees.
Held: Reversed and remanded~ The following distinctions were drawn:
(a) A release of one joint tort feasor even with a reservation of rights against i~
another is a release of a;Ll joint tort feasors.
(b) A release of the employer is a release of a negUgent employee.
(c) An accord and satisfaction with one joint tort feasor coupled with a covenant
not to sue that tort feasor and with a reservation of rights against another tort
feasor is a discharge of the latter. 191 Va.306; and now the instant case which is
different:
(d) A covenant not to sue an employer without any accord and satisfaction by the
employer and made before any cause of action arose is not a bar to an action against
an employee. The covenant or promise not to sue was clearly meant for the protection
of G and no one else. Nor is there a release for at the time thf- lease was made
there was no claim to release.
·
TORTS Ch~itable Hospital Immunity
204 Va.50l.
p was injured when she fell out of bed while a pati ent at the D Charitable
Hospital. There were no side rails on her bed.
r
Held: C itable hospitals are not liable to a
~ tort, corpora e or otherwise. save failure to use due care in the seJection end
retention of personnel. This is our settled public policy. Otherwise there is
danger that the hospital's ability to do charitable work will be lessened by a dissipation of its resourc es. If this policy is to be changed, the change should be
made by the legislature. (A bi ll modifyi ng our present rule was defeated in the
1962 Session) . Note: Thi s immunity does not extend to cas es in which non-benefici~
aries of the char1ty
are 1pva1 v eu as a v1 s itor to see a pat1ent.
I

•
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TORTS Contributory Negligence Last Clear Chance
204 Va.509
p parked his car in the mr&dle of the block and then proceeded to cross the street
to a store. In so doing he violated V#46.1-230 forbidding crossings at other than
intersections when not necessary . There were other cars parked on both sides. There
wer e cars coming from both directions. P watched his chance and made it to the
center line. While standing ther e wai t ing for an opportunity to get across the next
lane he was struck by D who was approaching from the opposite direction to the
traffic that P was watching. D wa.s not negligent in not seeing P sooner, and he did
everything possible to avoi d striking him after he saw him. If P had jumped into the
next lane he would have been hit by a pas sing car.
D
Held: P was gui lty of contributory negligenc e as a matter of law, and since never
had a last clear chance t o avoid stri king P tha t doctri ne has no application. The
center of a street can no l onger be regarded: as a camparat.jve z.o.ne_of_s•fety.

-

TORTS P. 34
TORTS'" Skiddi
on Lane as Negligence
204 Va. 601.
TNhile . D was going down a moun a1n on
nding road(Route 60) at a speed of 25
mil es per hour in the rain and while leaves were on the highway she skidded int~ th€
opposite lane of tra~el hitting P's car. D's car was in good ~echanical condition.
\fuen she started to skid she applied the brakes a little harder to no avail. P sued
D and the jury found for D. The trial judge set the verdict aside and ordered a new
trial on the issue of damages only. The jury at the second trial awarded her .~15,000
which the Court approved.
Held: Reversed and first verdict re-instated, and all proceedings thereafter
annulled. It is nQLne.gli~ _§!, but only- presumptive erid.ence of neglig_ence
to be in the w~g_l~e. In the instant case it was at least a jury question as to
whether D .was driving too fast, or acted with due care at the time of the skidding.
The jury should have found for D if the members thereof believed she was free from
negligence, or, since P had the ultimate burden of proof, for D if they believed
the evidence was in equilibrium. Hence it was error to set aside the first verdict.
TORTS Unlawf.'ul Speed v. Unreasonabl e Speed
204 Va.624
V#46.1-221 read~ 11 -!HH<The driver of any vehicle travelling at an unlawful speed'
shall forfeit any right of way which he might otherwise have hereunder" and only\
applies to cases involving the general right of way in favor of the driver on the
right. V#46.1-222 reads in part, "The driver of a vehicle, in an intersection and
turning therein or approaching the intersection shall yield the right of way to
such other vehicles. 11
Held: That under the above statutes that one approaching an intersection at an
nreasonable speed does not forfeit his right of way to one making a left turn
therein, and that such speed is material only on questions of negligence and whether
the party making the left turn was acting reasonably in thinking that it could be
made with safety.

~

·-

TORTS Injury to 7 year Old Child
204 Va.634 •
.While Jj was dn .vi ng h1s car at a speed of ten miles an hour along a street in
which to his knowledge children were accustomed to play, P a 7 year old child rode
out into the street on a tricycle from between two parked cars. D's bumper struck
the tricycle and it became wedged between the bumper and the street. D testified
that he thought he would do less injury to I:' if he came to a gradual s·top than if
he ground the tricycle and boy on the pavement by stopping suddenly in a slidding
stop. The jury found forD, and P appeals.
Held: Affirmod. There is nothing to show negligence on D's part. He was confronted
with a sudden emergency. It was for the jury to determine whether he acted reasonably at the time of the emergency even though what was done appeared afterwards to
have been the wrong thing.
TORTS Liapil j t ;y of Charitable Hospital t g .Pl:ina:tQ Wurse
20L~ Va. 703.
D was a charitable hospital and under Virginia law immune from suits by recipients
of its charity except for negligence in the choice of, or keeping of hospital
personnel. P was a special nurse paid by her patient who was a helpless old man in
a semi private room. X was a powerful 17 year old youth weighing some 190 lbs. xrs
leg was broken in an automobile accident and he l"as put in the other bed in the
room. His leg wae placed in traction by a weight ·and pulley device. When X learned
that one of his friends had been killed in the accident he had some sort of a
mental breakdown and threatened to·· kill those about him. He was restrained by
hospital personnel and given a sedative. Despite the fact that these episodes;
continued he was not remov~d from the room for special treatment. X got out of bed,
jabbed p while her back was turned and threatened to throw the weights at her~ P
attempted to push X back into the bed am became entangled in the traction weightpulley apparatus. She suffered a severe injury. Is D liable?
Held: Yes$ p was not a recipient of the hospital's chariaable bounty,but had the
status of an invitee. A jury cuuld and did find negligance on D's part. The Supreme
Court of Appeals refused to broaden the qu.astionable doctrine of charitable immuni t.y

,TORTS P.35
TORTS ~ipaf Qgr pnrations Duty Owed Children Pla~ing in Street
204 Va.752
The Ci ty of Norton, hereinafter=ea±-1&l~eed c4RFF@'te drainage pipes weighing
900 lbs. each on the green between the sidewalk and the street parallel to each ethel
and perpendicular to the sidewalk and street. No precautions were ~ taken to prevent
t hese pipes from rolling. P, a 12 year old girl, jumped up and down on one of the
pipes. It started to roll and her leg was caught between two of these pipes as they
came together. She was seriously injured. ~~aimed it owed no duty to persons play
ing in the street, that it was not n~gligent, that even if it were, the sole proximate cause of the accident was P's act in playing on the pipe, and that P was barred
by her contrib~tory negligence. The trial court struck P's evidence and P appealled.
Held: It was error to strike P 1 s evidence. It was a jury question(under proper
instructions)as to whether or not D was negligent, P was contributorily negligent,
and whether D's negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the injury.
The following statffinents on basic negligence law are of more than passing interest:
(1) nrn **'.t-we pointed out that . when once it has been determined that an act is
wrongful or negligent, the guilty party is liable for all the consequences which
naturally flow therefrom, provided the injured party is free from contributory negligence. 'The precise injury need not have been anticipated. It is enough if the act
is such that the party odght to have anticipated that it was liable to result in
injury to others.'" {2) "'Where it is claimed that the defendant's act was not the
proximate cause of the injury beca~se the result could not reasonably have been
foreseen, it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether the result should reasonably have been foreseen. 111
It was also held that, by the better view, a municipality owes the same duty of
f are to provide a reaso~abl~ safe street to children playing in the street as it
~oes to children travel1ng 1n the street.
TORTS Violation .of-- s-tatute-Proximate cause
204 Va.893.
P's intestate was walking on a dark highWay with his back to the traffic in violation of statute. A jury found that D struck P's intestate and killed him instantly
while driving around a curve, on an unlighted highway, at a speed of some 37 miles
per hour, on a dark, wet, misty night, with the headli ghts of his car on low beam,
and that his negligence constituted the sole proximate cause of the accident.
Held: While the conduct of P's intestate w&s(contributory) negligence as a matter
of law, reasonable people might differ as to whether or not it was also a proximate
cause or a remote cause of his death. In such a caso the question is for the jury
and its finding will not be disturbed on appeal.
TORTS Pleading and Practice Finding instruction
204 Va.
D's taxi struck P 1 s truck at a street intersection. There was conflicting evidence
from which a jury could have found thct both parties wero guilty of contributory
negligence proximately causing the collision, or that P used due care while D was
negligent, or ~t D used due care whil~ P was negligent. The court gave a finding
instruction to the effect that if the jury believed P's eviC..ence(which, if true
showed only that D was negligent)it sho ~ ld return a verdict in P's favor.
'
Held: Reversed and remanded. The ab~o~v~e~i~n~s~t~r7u~c~tl~·o~n~i~s~a~f~i~n~d~i~
n ~~~~~~1, and
fails to take into consideration the
that t
that p
ilt of contr1 u o
the collision.
TOR'l'S .Qj.ving of instructi one in t lle abs ence of evidence
205 Va.l
p drove his car eastwardly from his private driveway on to u.s. Route 2?0 which
runs north and south. He stopped before er.tering the highway and looked in both
directions. He testified that he saw D1 s tractor trailer approaching from the
south at an estimated distance of half a mile and thought he had plenty of time to
enter the highway, make a left turn, and proceed in a northerly direction. Just as
he completed his left turn his motor stalled. He succeeded in getting the car
started, and when 75 feet north of hls point of entry he was struck frorr. the rear
by D's tractor trailer the driver of which was kill ed. There was a clear view for
at least 420 f eet. There was no evidence thnt the deceased driver had applied any
brakes. The court gave an instructi on on thn l aw of sudden emer gency.
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Heidi This was error. There was no evidence that there was any sudden emergency
not due to D*s fault. No instructions should ever be given unless they are based on
evidence in the case before the jury.
TORTS UGtoreseeable conseQ~ence~
205 Va.12
D's servants installed an automatic washing machine without first removing certain
shipping bands. When P used the washer it behaved like a beserk robot and frightened her to such an extent as to cause a moderate nervous breakdown and to aggravate
other physical weaknesses. D aFgUed that he was not liable for such injuries as
they were not reasonably foreseeable. Note the following language from the opinion.
of the Supreme Court of Appeals:
~ether reasonable care was exercised depends upon what a reasonably prudent
person, with knowledge of the circumstances, ought to have foreseen in regard to
the consequences of the act or omission. However, the precise nature of the consequences need not be foreseen. ~~ Once the act or omission is determined to be
negligent with respect to the injured party, the negligent party becomes liable for
all the injurious consequences which result naturally from such act or omissionJI
TORTS Mal 1 ci nus fr oeecnt:i on Effect of Acquittal
205 Va. 149.
P•s dog severely bit D's daugHter. Under the l ocal law it became P 1 s duty to keep
the dog confined for a certain period of time at a place within that county. P sent
the dog to Massachusetts after having secured the permission of the Director of
Health of said County. He had no authority to give such permission. D swore out a
warrant against P for violation of the , County Ordinance. P was acquitted. P then
sued D for damages for malicious prosecution and recovered substantial compensatory
and punitive damages which the trial court refused to set aside.
Heldt Reversed and final judgment entered for D. She had probable cause as a
matter of law. If this is so it is immaterial that she acted maliciously. Moreover
the action of malicious prosecution is for the benefit of the innocent, and the
guilt of the plaintiff may be shown even though the plaintiff has been acquitted.
Public policy favors the exposure of crime, and persons who expose it should not
have to take chances on the ultimate conviction of the person exposed where such
person is actually guilty or reasonably thought to have been guilty.
TORTS--Watch Your Door&
205 Va.l53.
P was fhj ured wli'e n she mistook a plate glass panel for an open door and walked
through same. The door and panels on each side were of standard construction,
approved by architects, and in general use.
Held: A verdict and judgment thereon for P must be set aside since P was clearly
guilty of negligence as a matter of law. R.eversed and final judgment.
't::I;.~~~~~~=:Act
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Proof of Damages

s e e that f t was error to

case
that in dete
n dama es the ur
~
Ce&$ed'-s-in-e-e1.ligence and
health whe:r.!LnQ evidence was offered on these matters.
I t w~ also held that a jury could ro erl consider d eased' a fe ~ectancy
where ther as evidence or" his age --In death oases proof of life E!ltpectancy by
mo~tal~ty_ tables_is nQt requi~ed.
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TORTS ~aet C1ear Qbanoe
205 Va.l59
pte intestate was struck and killed by D's car as P and his intestate were crossing c Avenue. pte theory of the case was that her intestate was not gui lty of any
negligence. D was driving at an excessive speed but P 1 s intestate stepped in front
of n•s car immediately before being struck. The trial court gave an instruction on
the last clear chance doctrine.
Heldt Error. That doctrine does not a 1
jur:ed paz:.t y lola egligent,
nor does it a 1 wh
~&-lor defen~ae
ac
\Wed pBJ!ty plaoed-himseJ.t. ·
position- of peril.- The doctrine
pre-suposes that there was an opportunity for defendant to act.

TORTS P. 37
TID,RTS Collil,s ion w1 :Jib MuJ e Wandering on Hi~way at Night
205 Va.,l71
D owned mule~ which were under the immediate control of S, a shrecropper. S
violated inatruotiona as to the proper method of closing a gate or gap in the fence
so that it was possible for a mule to put his he~d between some wires and lift up
the gate . sufficieht~y to cause it to fall flat on the ground. At any rate nrs mules
escaped from the enclosure and were wandering on the highway at night when P ran
into one and was injured when his truck overturned. The gate was lying flat on the
ground. The mules had·--never escaped before and no one can tell for sure hot-J" the
mules escaped.
Held: Verdict and judgment for P must b~ set aside and f'il'..al judgment entered for
D. He is liable only i f he was negligent and his negligence was a proximate cause
of the injury. Here we have' only conjecture and .peradventure. P had tl1e burden of
provir.g that D's(or Sts) negligen~e caus~ the injury. No one knows how the mules
got outo Some third party may have opened the gate. It is not up to D to prove
that a third party opened the gate, but for P to prove that the escape of the mules
was due to S's negligence. This he has not done.
TORTS M~stciool Corporations Less9r ...J.as::;ee
205 Va.298.
The R i~ and the C Church made an agreement which was carried out to the effect
that the C Church would convey a certain church annex to R, that R would let C use
part of the premises on Sundays for churoh purposes, and that R would keep the
premises in good repair. P, while attending Sunday School walked along a corridor
and was struck on the foot by a falling 35 pound fire extinguisher that had been
improperly installed on the wall and severely injured. Is he entitled to recover
damages from the City which was using the building on week days for public welfare
purposes?
Held: Yea. In effect the City of R was leasing a portion of the premises to the
c Church. P was invited to use the premises for the purpose for which he was using
them. The City was under a duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of these
premises to all persona who came thereon in the right of the C Churoh. The City
was not en
.
· n(and hence immune from suit) when i t
entered into the above agreement with the C Church.
TORTS Slip~g_on-wet floor
205 Va.406.
P entered a st ore while it was raining. The floor thereof had a plastic covering
which was slippery when wet. P slipped and was awarded a $10,500 verdict for
damages sustained. The trial court set aside the verdict and P appealed. The evidence was in conflict as to whether or not D had a cocoa mat at the entrance to help
prevent water from being tracked in and as to whether or not D had reasonable
notice that the floor was wet and a reasonable time thereafter to mop up the water.
No warning was given P of any danger.
Held: Jury's ve~ict re-instated. Whether or not D was negligent or P was contributorily negligent were questions for the jury. The jury could have found that
n•s failure to warn, his failure to have the mat in position, and his failure to
mop up the water amounted to negligence. The..,.Supreme Court of Appeals expressly
repndiat.ed the rule of law in several jurisdictions that there can be no liability
because the storekeeper has no control over the weather, cannot prevent some tracking
in of water, and the customer ·knows as much about the weather and the danger of
slipping on wet floors as does the storekeeper.
TORTS Municipal Corporations

' ..-'
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Liabilitl of contractor after acceptance of work
2o5 va.424
A, a contractor, and B his subcontractor dug a sewer line for the City of R exa&t•
ly as per specifications. R inspected the work almost every day. The line was
laid and the ditch filled in in an approved manner. Then the City put some crushed
rock on top and rolled it down. Then it put asphalt on top of the rook and rolled
it down. After a heavy rain' the ditch settled almost a foot in one place. Although
R had notice of this defect there was no light or barricade of any sort. P was
injured when the front wheel of his car went into the depression. He sued R,A and B.

TORTS P.38
Held: R is liable, but not A or B. Dj.gg:L1:g a sewer line is not an extrA hazard...
(iUS undertaking and A and B cannot bo held since they were independent contractors
whose work had been accepted by R. None of the exceptions to this rule apply in
the above case.
TORTS Customer slipping on !l~or
205 Va.409.
P enterea Bi§ !tore arid was ·invite4 by E, an employee, to go to another counter :~
to see some merchandise, E preceded P. Someone had spilled some Coca-Cola on the
floor and P slipped and fell. Can a verdict in her favor be sustained?
Held: (the Chief Justice dissenting). Yes. A jury co.u ld have found from the
evidence that E should have seen the mess on the floor and warned P, that p could
not have seen it because E was immediately in front of her and besides she was
being asked to look at merchandise. Hence she was not barred by any contributory
negligence.
TORTS ~~~ Clear Chance
205 Va.69l.
X, who was subject to epileptic seizures, was collecting cabbage leaves at the
city dump and ·placing them in a box. As ha was about to cross D1 s railroad tracks
he was taken with a seizure. He sat down on the track with the box in front of him.
He was for the time being powerless to comprehend his danger and to escape therefrom. E waB the engineer of an approaching train. He saw the box but was uncertain as to whether or not there was a human being ~n the track so he sounded his
whistle and slowed down from 20 to 18 miles per hour. When he definitely discovered that there was a man there it was too late to stop and X was killed.
Heldt On the above facts jury could have found that D had a last clear chance to
have avoided the accident. Even if X were in a position of danger due to his own
negligence he was pewerless to escape. Under the rules laid down in the Greear
Case(l97 Va.233 fo
h
estatement..-D:was under: a..d.u.t t.o_kee
r..oper
loo out to disoVer such a peril and act w'
~able care after he shQuld-have
discover
o ng own rom 0 to 18 miles while there was still time to
iiQid running over a man could have been found by a jury not to have been reasonable care. Hence it was error for the trial court to strike P's evidence.
TORTS Mator Vendors of Ice Cream .eta.
205 Vae719 and 205 Va.727.
Dl solo ice cream f rom his enclosed truck. He was parked for the time being on
his righ~ half on the shoulder and half on the paved surface of the road. P was a
five year Qld child who had crossed the road and purchased an ice cream cone. As
he was returning to his side of the road he was struck by D2 who was dl~iving a car
headed 1n the opposite direction from that of the truck. P sued Dl and D2. The
trial court struck P's evidence.
Held~
Reversed and remanded. A ju.l.'y could have f ound that Dl was negligent in
that he had parked his truck i n such P way as to ren~ a r the highway dangerous to
others(in that D2's view was :.,bstructo11 and so "1-ras P 1 s) in violation of V#h6.1-248.
It could also have found D2 negligent :, :. ~. that he shoulc.1 have realized that children
are apt to be near ice cream ·rendors' t n ~0 ks and hence should have slowed down
enough to keep his car under C•.'ntrol in t.l-Je event a child darted out from behind
the truck.
TORTS Dul:y Owod? Legal causation
t..vY~~ ~ ~ 205 Va.822
A cartoad"'i5Fgrlifn was shipped from the mJ.dl·~cst o~er t e nes of the A Carrier,
tbtion the N Carrier to Norfolk, and then to Belt. Line in Nor olk. It was the duty
of p, wh~ was employed by the X Grain Elevator Gorporation, to help unload cars
cf grain after X's engine had taken the cars fr o!,l Belt Line, and shunted therri to .
the propel" lecation. After P had unloaded the ca.:· in questi on X1 s engine ran into
;tJ, gently se> as to couple it automatically. Thex 4 was a slight jolt after which a
siiding door on the car in which P was standing f ell on P injuring him. P want~
vorkmen's o~mpensation from X; and damages from Be :~ Line and N.
Jlelds p is, of course1 ent.j..t.]ed to workmen's compe~ .8ation from hi s employer. This
j.s the limit of P's rights as against him. But the \ !Odonent s compefleation act
doelf not deprive P of his right to sue third parties 1o'ther than hi s fellow
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for torts cormnitted by them. But N is not liable for negligence as it
has not violated any duty it owed P. The only duty of a connecting carrier is to
inspec:t cars given to it to see if they are in proper condition for transportatione
If Belt Line is a terminal carrier it was under a duty to make a casual inspection
to see if the car was safe for unloading. There was no evidence in this case t~
show that a casual inspection would have suffic ed to discover the defect, so it is
imrna·terial that no inspection at all was made. Hence Belt Line's failure to lnspect
'1-ras not, a legal cause of the injury. Nor does the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
apply as Belt Line did not have exclusive control over the car and its door.
e'mpl~yees)

TORTS ~Bal Causation
205 Va.646.
X, a titteen y9ai' 6ld boy, and an excellent swimmer, drowned in D's lake which
was open to the public for a consideration. There were some 300 people in the lake
at the time of X's death. No one heard any cry of distress. X just disappeared.
His body was recovered after a ' search was instituted. There was some evidence that
D had an insufficient force of life savers on duty. Because of this negligence a
jury found for X's personal .representative.
Held: Reversed • . Even if D were negligent, there is no proof that such negligence
was a proximate cause of X's death. If there had been ten more life guards it is
pure conjecture that any one of them would have noted that X was about to sink and
drown as there was no reason to suspect that such a think was about to take place.
The Court refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as D did not have
exclusive control over X. D was not an insurer of X's safety.
TORTS
G-re ~
u . /J.
205 Va.903
pts house was ~maged by~ttions when D, pursuant to contract with the State
Highway Department, blasted rock in the construction of a new highway. The evidence
indicated that D had an expert in charge of the operations and no negligence was
proved. The trial court instructed the jury that D was absolutely liable for damage
caused irrespective of negligence.
Held: Error. D~ while ~erforming his contract with the State, in a proper manner,
has the immunity~ £ the St~e_tr_o~~~ t. 194 Va.836 followed.

-
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TORTS Ne~ligepce trains blocking crossing
205 Va.949
X malic1ously set fire to a building i n P's amusement park. A portion of the fire
fighting ··~uipment was delayed because of moving trains of D blocking a street crossing for fifteen minutes. There was an or~inance prohibiting the blocking of streets
Q~traiQP for more than eight minutes.
P ol~imed that as a result of this delay the
fire got out of control and spread to other-buildings.
Heldl(l) There was no violatiQn of the ordinance. It does not a 1 to moving
t~ins.
To hold otherwj se waul d he to~
en th of trains
thus to
interfere unlaWfull with interstate cornm~~ce. (2) Even ·if there was a delay caused
by D's negligence, whether or not the other buildings would have been saved or
destroyed under the facts of this case if there had been no delay was a matter of
pure conjecture and speculation and would have been insufficient as a matter of law
to have shown legal causation by a preponderance of the evidence.

i f i.r
~ TORTS P~40
TOT:TS
VjiJ-rf\W'-- ~ .':>.
206 Vac45
P, as an employee of X, delive d a truck load of lumber to D. P's only duty aftGr
the lumber arrived was to loosen the chains around the lumber. D used a fork lift
to unload the truck. The fork lift was equipped with a counterbalance. 1rJhen the
load to be unloaded was extra heavy D requested the drivers of the trucks to stand
on the counterbalance. In the instant case P did as requested and was injured when
the fork 1 ~t unexpectedly til ted. P had frequently helped out D in this manner
in the past. P collected >vorlonen's compensation from his employer, X, and is novr
suing D in a court of laH claiming ·that the latter was negligent. D contends that
this was an industrial accident and hence P' s ri hts are limite to ~e.c..QJl:.e:ry.. under
wo ~
hat, even if this is not so, P assumed the risk.
Held: D ~ wropg. D_was a third party as far as P was concerned. P did not work
forD and owed D no duty of help. Nor ' was there any eviden~e to indicate that P
knew of any danger, and hence he could not have assumed the risk.
N$-J. • If P reeovers a ainst
·
ura
.,.. ·
of com ensation r c
Note 2. The Court permitted the jury to take the pleadings to the jury room. This
was e1:-ror, but under the facts of this case, harmless error.

TORTS Railwa
·
nflict of E ·
ce f~-1?-~.J- :· .~t.. ~~~ J. 2~ .9~ ~.)-»K was
w en an automobile he was driving .w(;ls struck broad~ide by D's fre~ht
train at a grade crossing in the Gcuntry, K wa.s guilty of contributory negligenC•3
as a matter of law, but by Vf/'56.,hl4 nuch negligence is not a bar i f it is not V"l o
sole cause of the accident and the ra:l.lway company has failed to give the signals
required by statute. In SlJ.Ch a case, the contributory negligence of the driver
must, however go in mitigation of damages~ · The jury found fo~ KTs personal representative in the amount of ~~25,000. The~e were several w~ tnesses of the accident
some of whom were in cars w~th the windows down ~ and the drivers of which knew
that the freight. train was c~ue and were listening for i t s signals. They testified
that no signals wore given until after the train struck the car K was in. The
crewmen testified to facts that would indicate that proper signals were given. There
was thus a square conflict in the evidence~ (Since the 1.;itnesses for the plaintiff
were listening for the signals their evidence that no signals were given is not
merely negative evidence to the effect that t hey heard no signals but positive
evidence that the required signals were not given "
Heid: Affirmed. Under these circums~ances the plaintiff with a jury verdict
approved by the trial court in her f avor occupies the strongest position known to
the law. There is credible evidence in support of the verdict and a complete confltct in the evidence,. This 1 court will not usurp the role of the jury as a trier
of facts and the weigher of test~nony .
TORTS U~sulated Electric Wires
206 Va.l27
p work~ior a sewage di sposai- plant. It was P's duty to keep the pipes of one
of the tanks free of sludge. To do this he st.ood on a l edge of the tank and used a
20 ft. squeegee to manipulate the sludge. The squeegee on the occasion in question
became clogged with sludge and P rais ed i·~ from the sewa.ge to unclog it. There
was an uninsu.lated high voltage elec t ric wire 16 feet above the ledge on which he
worked or about 10 feet over his head . The squeegee came in contact with this wire
and p was seriously injured. The wire Has located 8 f eet hi gher than the National
Electrical Safety Code r equired f 0r uninsulated wires. The D Electric Co. had no
notice that employees of the pla.nt used anything in their work that was apt to come
into contact with the wires. Thus this case is dl sti nguishable from the orchard
case where defendant had knowledge that metal ladders were used to thin apples and
the trees were higher than the lines.
Held: There was no primary negligence on the part of D and hence no l i ability.

TORTS Po4l.
TCRTS Contributory Ne gl ·j gence
206 Va"l39
P h3.d the right of 1vay and supposed of aourse that D would yiel<! at the inter::; e~tion where P' s and D's cars collided., Accordingly she paid no at·tention to what
D was doing. D negligently failed to see P' s car and drove into her.
Held: P is barred by her contributory negligence. Her own testimony proves her to
have been contributory negligent. ·· The fact that one has the right of way does not
absolve him from the duty of keeping a proper look out.
TORTS Guest St ahJte
206 Va.l53
P's inteDtate was a guest in D's car. D drove this car across an intersection
controlled by a stop sign without properly looking to see if there was any approac~
ing car. In a suit by P against D the Court instructed the jury that D owed a duty
ofslight care to her guest to stop and look at the step sign, to keep her vehicle
under proper control, and two other specified duties, and that if she .6ailed to t'I.C ~
slight care as to any one of these duties, then she uould be guilty of gross nr--:(:_.:_
gence, and, if this failure was the sole proximate cause of the accident then th ~;
verdict of the jury should be for P.
Held: The instruction was erroneous. A failure to use slight care as to any on<')
of the above duties would not necessarily mean that D was dri'lring with an utter
disregard for the safety of her passenger
Since reasonable persons might dif'n c;-' ,. <::
as to whether or not D was guil·ty of gross neglig'O'Ince in entering the hight•my •.-· ! ·.. l-out properly looking the case l-Jas properly submitted to the jury on the issue •<'
gross negligence. Reversed and remanded so that on the new trial proper inst~·t.~ ··,:i..:Y':\:
on the law of gross negligence can be given.
Q
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TORTS Railway Crossings Co
e
Vl/'56- 16 provides that. if.f~a~
ra~i~l~w::=a::
y!:lra~~~~~~~
its rain approached a public crossin the ne li. en~-an.-i.n,}w:ed....per.soll.-S.1u,,.:..; c~n~
e a bar to h s ac
u rather oea in mi ti ation of dama ges thereof. The' <'•
signa s are spa
ou 1.n detal
far as railway crossings in the country m ' d
concerned.
a it o incorporated town has no ordinance then common law ~
applicable
f the Ci
a...a
i ance
e that ordinance sets fo l'l.:.l1 t-h~
du Y• P was injured while crossi ng nvs tracks in the City of Staunton.. P's view
o~tracks was blocked by a warehouse and a box car on a siding in front of the
warehouse. A city ordinance forbade the blowing of train whistles in the city unless neces sary to sound a warning in an emergeney or near e:ii:r:1rgency~ In the in s~: a. n~,;.
case no whistle was blown and there was a conflict in t ha evJ.dence as to v1hethe1· e J.•
not the bell was sounded as required by ordinance. Th r~ tri2I court inst..;:·ucted t :rl<-'>
jury that if they believe that a reasonable man .in the opera t 5.on of the train vmdd
have sounded the whistle then P's contributory negligen~ e , i f any, would not be a
bar to his action but would only go in mitigation of d~nages.
Held: Error and case reversed and remanded. An ordinance prohibting the sounding
of a whistle except in an emergency by way of warning and not even speci fying the
place, time o:.- r.1anner of sounding is not a law specifying what signals n,u ·~t be
given. Rather it permits the railroad to give s i gnals that -would be proy:,e:::- at
common law. Hence a failure of the en gineer to blow the whistle even if :,here we:r0
an emergency is not a failure to give signals required by law and no instructton C·.~
comparative negligence should have been gi ven wi th res pect to such failure. On the
other hand the signals required by the ordinance are required by law(Mr. Justice
Gordon doubt.ing) and on a retrial only the bell facts and law should be considered ..

so

~~~u.J.:~..ill---L;L:.aL.~O-i:l.ucu..w..~~~~~~~1:lU~..!ti:
r~

206 Va. 220
a privately owned shopping center par king
lot failed to gi ve a signal tha·C. she was about to turn. D ran into her. The Cour-t
ins tructed the jury that it should find P was guilty of negl igence i f she failed to
give the si gnal. This instruction was based on the language of V/146.1- 216. The
jury accordi ngly found for defendant.
Held: Reversed and remar:ded. The motor vehicle traffic laws are not applicable
to cars bei ~iYen...on -:R ivate prop~_:!iy . T~e1·e common la~ princi ples apply.
ere is no absolute dutf at common law to give s i gnals. 'l'he Court's instr:uctf on
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pravented P from properly arguing t.hat due care on her part under the circumstances
Ciid mot require the jury of a signal.
TOR.TS Du~ Owed Social Guest
143 S.E.2d 827,206 Va o 450
P e>.nd "117 f amily were visiting D, a friend, at D's invitation. D had a horse named
13
i3uckshot11 • After the children had been taken for rides without mishap D invited P
to ride Bu¢kcb.ot. He did not question P about her riding experiences or vmrn her
that Buckshot was nervous and high spirited. He gave P a fevJ directions ar,d helped
her mount the horse. P held the reigns too high. This was thought by Buckshot to
mean that he should take off. He did and P fell from the ho1•se as he was making a
normal turn at fairly high speed. There was no evidence that Buckshot was a vicious
horse. The trial court inst ructed the jury that P could not recover unless D was
(lll i..lty of gross negligence.
: Held: Error to give such an instruction in the above case. A ~istinction ~s
drawn between the passive negligence of noLusing-due_can to Jla,y_e~remi~ in a
re~sonabl
safe condition for a licensee, and active ne i ence with r
ect o a
l ipensee1an invited soc~a guest is not an invitee but a licensee) kpown to be
p~In this latter case there is a duty to use ordinary care· not to injure the
licensee. Whether or not such care had been used, and whether or not P assumed the
risk, and whether or not P was guilty of contributory negligence were under the
above fact.s questions for a jury. Reversed and remanded.
TORTS Cop tributory Hegligence 4 s Matter of Law
143 S.E.2d 839; 206 Va. 336
P, a northbound motorist, l'll'hile roads were I n an icy condition observed that while
D on his right had the rig4t of way at the crossing in quest,ion the latter had come
to a stop while P was some car lengths from the crossing. P erroneously assumed
that D was waiving his fight of way and did not lessen the speed of his car. P
struck D's car as it entered the highway in front of hiso
Held: P is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The fact that D
was extra cautious under the circumstances did not warrant P in being extra careless.

.

TORTS Pleadipg fWd IXagtJ,ce T~.>fr L ~
_s 143 s.E.2d 866,206 Va. 344
Mrs. C owned a car. She, F, a 17 ye~ld"youth, and several others consumed 16
cans of beer over a three or four hour period, but there was no evidence as to how
much of this beer, if any, T had drunk, or that T was in fact drunk when he later
drove Mrs. Cts car at some 80 miles per hour causing it to overturn in an accident
in which Mrs. C was killed. Her administratrix sued T. Although T requested
instructions on contributory negligence and assumption of risk, the trial judge
refused them.
HeJld: Properly refused. Instructions should never be __give~unless there is evidenc'
to which they are applicable. In t e instant c as e there is no eviaence that Mrs. C
knew that T was unfit to dri ve. To give the instructions asked for would be to invite tho jury to find a verdict based on guess and conjecture.

I

TOR.TS Dut~ed Sgg1al X!isj tor
143 S.E.2d 872, 206 Va. 425
P, a t we ~year old boy, was at D's home as a fri end of D's son watching D remove
the motor from a power lawnmower for use elesewhere. When D was unable to dislod ge
a portion of the me~hanism he took a large screwdriver, and attempted to pry it loose
The two boys were watching, and D then told them to get back-~not because it was unsafe to be so close, but because they were in the way. The boys then stood up, and
D struck the blade end of the screwdriver a sharp, hard blow with a hammer. A piece
of the screwdriver was shattered and severely injured P 1 s eye. The jury awarded P
$20,000 and pts father $5,000 having found that D failed to use due care and that P
was not guilty of negligenoee
Held: Affirmed. This case involves the same principles as the ~est-host horse
injury case decided this date. Even thou
a mere licensee(an invited social
guest who is
itee there was a duty owed to him by D no
njure him by
negl e
y_ cond
activi J.es in hi s ~se nce.

.1 .
,,
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206 Va.370o
P, while ~~ing his car, decided to pull off the road to examine a road map. He
slowed down gradually while looking for a suitable place. He was struck by D from
behind. P did not give:· any signal as he had nop yet decided where he was going to
stop or turn. Did such conduct on P1 s part bar an action against D?
Held: No. The statutes(V#4 6.1-216 ~nd 211) QO not reqaire one to signal every slow
down in speed, but onl sto
d turns wb.en_sJlch.-.S.to.ps_an
rns may effect other
tra 1.c. A gradual slow down is not a stop within a meaning of t.he s a uw.~

TORTS Landlord and Tenant
206 Va.412.
P, a ff~year ol d gJrl, is a daughter of T, a tenant in L1 s apartment house. The
lease contained a provision to the effect that children were not to be allowed to
play in or on the common passageways. One of these passageways had a railing set :tn
three inches from the side to protect its users from a four foot fall. P, and other
children, played on the railing and the outside 3 inch ledge. P fell and was injured. L's supervisor had repeatedly warned children not to play on the railing or
ledge, but they would frequently come back as soon as she was out of sight. P conte~ded that L was negligent in not providing a safe railing for the children to
play on, in not policing the area properly, and in not notifying the parents of the
children.
Held: For L. He was under no duty to provide a safe r~ng_f.o the-Children Jvo
pl~- A railing is not meant to be played o~.. The duty of supervision of the
chl~dren was on the parents and they should not ge' allowed to shift it to third
parties. L was not an insu _r_o.Lthe_sat:ety-o.f-all_tlJ.~ildren.. in.Jlis---.a:Rartmen"l:,
hp~

TORTS CoQtributory Negligence--Passing in Interse9!ion
2U6 Va.613.
While dr1.V1.ng south on Aberdeen Road, a two way street having one lane of travel
in each direction. P attempted to pass the car in fron of him. P had not completed
this act when he came to the intersection of Galax Street with Aberdeen Rd. and D,
who was traveling west on Galax St. and attempting to turn north on Aberdeen Rd.,
collided with P in the intersection. A jury returned a verdict for P.
Held: Judgment reversed. P was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law. There was no conflict in the evidence on the critical point that the collision
occurred in the northbound lane, within the intersection, and while P was still in
the act of passing. P was thus uilt of reckless drivin as defined by Code
46.1-190, by
·
ntersection, and also violated the "Rules of the Road,n
Code 46.1-205, in failing to~avel on the right side of the highway when crossing
a intersect on'. The violation of either of these statutes is negligence sufficient
to support a civil action if suCh negligence was the proximate cause of the injury
sustained. It is clear that P was guilty of negligence and equally plain that hie
negligence was a proximate, efficient cause of the accident.
TORTS--Railway crossing
206 Va.649.
A switching cperatlon was in progress on the eastbound tracks of the D railway
company as plaintiff approached the crossing from the south and he was forced to
stop his truck. When the end of the last unit of the switching train cleared the
crossing, plaintiff immediately started forward notwithstanding the presence of a
reflector sign reading '"2 tracks,., and the continued operation of the flashing red
lights and ringing bell. He passed over the eastbound tracks safely but, as he
drove onto the westbound tracks, his truck was struck by a westbound freight, inflicting permanent i njuries on him. D introduced positive evidence that the westbound freight gave the required statutory signals while plaintiff's evidence consisted of statements by persons otherwise engaged that they didn't hear any such
signals. A jury found for defendant and plaintiff appeals claiming that, even
though he is guilty of negligence, yet under the saving provisions of 56-416 he is
not barred from recovery if defendant failed to give the statutory signal.
Held: Judgment affirmed. There was no positive contradiction of the positive
evidence that the statutory signals were 8iven. Plaintiff had no right to have a
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jury speculate upon the insufficiency of the warnings given in the absence of evidence of their inadequancy. Moreover, even if the signals were not given, plainti ff
must still prove that the railroad's negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident and that but for it the accident wouldn't have occurred in order to recover
under 56-416. Here, plaintiff's conduct in ignoring the imp~rative warning of the
signals without any reasonable excuse amounted to an utter abandonment of care and
caution. He might as well have intentionally driven his truck in front of the
approaching train. His negligence was such as to constitute the BC·le proximate
cause of his injuries.
TORTS--Loss throu h re ossessi"n of ro ert
206 Va.c-65.
Plaintiff, who was engaged in the bus ness o hauling coal and sand, was involved
in an accident with D which resulted in his hospitalization and a twenty to thirty
per cent general disability. Plaintiff's equipment was purchased on conditional
sales contract and about )0 days after the accident a tractor and two trailers were
repossessed by the conditional vendors because plaintiff had failed to keep up his
payments. At the time of the accident there was a substantial unpaid balance on
the 3 vehicles and plaintiff was several months behind in his payments. Plaintiff's
adjusted gross income for 1961 and 1963 was $32 and $1451 respectively and in 1962
he showed a loss of $953. D claims that the trial court erred in admitting, over he~
objection, evidence as to the alleged damages resulting from the repossession of
these 3 vehicles because such losses were a remote and not a proximate cesult of th~
collision.
1
Held: Judgment for plaintiff on this item reversed. Negligence carries with it
liability for conse uences which in the light of attendant c ircumstances,~could
reas na ly have been antici ated b a rudent man bu no for casual
sw c
though possible were wholl~ i pr~bab~e. One is not charged with foreseeing that
whiCh could not be expected to happen. It is apparent from the evidence that
plaintiff was not conducting a profitable business, and it would be highly speculative to say that if he had not been injured in the accident he would have been able
to keep up the payments on the vehicles and prevent repossession of them. Moreover,
even if it be assumed that plainitiff's future profits would have been sufficient
to enable him to meet his installment payments, it cannot be said with any degree
of certainty that he would have applied the profits to these obligations. Illness
or unforeseen emergencies could have arisen which would have required the consumption
of all the profits to the exclusion of the conditional sales obligations. Therefore
these alleged losses were speculative, remote, and not the natural and proximate
result of any wrongful act on D's part.
TORTS•Gross

Ne~l~gence

206 Va.693.
aefendant, and defendant's wife were riding in the front seat of a Ford.
Defendant was driving, his wife sat in the middle and plaintiff sat by the right
door. Aoccording to plaintiff's version after defendant had stopped for a stop sign,
he took off at a high rate of speed, spinning the wheels of the car; he asked defendant to slow down but defendant just laughed and went faster; when they reached a
11 S11 curve in the road about o4 1l1f a mile from the stop sign the car was traveling
between 55-65 m.p.ho and skidded on the first part of the curve; plaintiff again
asked defendant to slow down but defendant laughed again and kept going faster; that
defendant lost control of the car on the second curve, plaintiff's door flew open
and defendant's wife was thrown against plaintiff causing him to fall out of the car
and be seriously injured. Defendant's wife's testimon ~'Y corroborated plaintiff's.
Defendant denied that he was driving in the manner claimed and stated that his top
speed was 45 m.p o h~, that the car hadn't the power to perform as plaintiff alleged,
that plaintiff had only asked him to slow down so plaintiff could take a drink and
that there was nothing wrong with the door latch on the car. The jury found for
plaintiff and defendant appeals claiming that he was not guilty of gross negligence
and, even if he were, it wasn't the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
Held: Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. Proof of gross negligence depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case. Here the jury was justified in finding that
defendant's excessive speed, failure to heed protests, and deliberate inattention

Plaintiff,
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to his driVing constituted gross negligenc~. - !~der for defendan~gligence to
be a rox te cause of the i ur it i~ no~ __ t!_ecessary that he should have forseen
the precise injury that_happe:n_ed. It is suffit!fent if any-or diniry; -careftiland
prud ent person ought, under the circumstances, to have foreseen that an injury might
probably result from the negligent act. "It is a matter of common knowledge that it
is impossible to drive an automobile around a curve, at a high or suddenly accelerated rate of speed, without going off the traffic lane, or sliding, or causing
passungers to shift or lurch in their seats, or be tossed about or -;;hrown against
one another, or against the car doors,; and the courts take judicial notice thereof."
TORTS--MeglQal Malpractice--Statut of Limita ons
206 Va.810
After Doctor D had performed go er operati on on plaintiff in 1946 she had pain
and a stinging sensation in her throat. She told Dr. D about it several times but
he said she was doing fine and would be all right. Later in 1949 she told Dr. H
about a lump in her throat when he ~perated on her neck for the removal of cancerous
tissue but he also said it was due to her earlier operation and would be all right.
In May 1962, Dr. X discovered that plaintiff's troubles were due to a misplaced
surgical needle. Dr. K operated on plaintiff in Oct. 1963, and removed the needle.
He testified that the 1946 and 1949 incisions were close together, that the muscle
in which the needle was found would have been disturbed in both operations, and
that he couldn't say whieh one it was related to. Dr's D and H both testified that
the scrub nurse kept a count of all needles and that to the best of his knowledge n~
needle was lost in his operation. Plaintiff brought this action against Dr. D in
March 1963 and now appeals the granting of summary judgment for Dr. D on the groundG,
inter alia, that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.
-:Heid:-Jlldgment for Dr. D affirm~d. Virginia is committed to the (mi1or~ule
that in ersonal in
tiona the limftati on on the right to sue beg~n
when the wrong is done and not when the plaintiff discovers
e-ha-s- been da-maged.
nS'tatutes o£ Iiiriitation are statutes of repose, the object of wh1Ch is f;o compel the
exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time. They are designed to
·~
suppress fraudulent and stale claims from being asserted after a great lapse of
time, to the surprise of the parties, when the evidence may have been lost, the
facts may have become obscure because of defective memory, or the witnesses have
died or disappearedtt(l8S Va.S61). Plaintiff's evidence completely failed to
establish that Dr. D concealed plaintiff's cause of action from her by trick or
artifice which would have tolled the statute.

a

TORTS-Right of Way ~~ ~
206 Va.737.
Code 46:1-221 provitles that w~en 0wo vehicles approach or enter an intersection
"at approximately the same time", the man on the right has the right of way(with
certain exceptions). Does this mean that the driver on the left has the right of
way if he enters the intersection first?
Held: No. In such a situation neither driver has the right of way over, or is
required to yield to, the ohBer. Each is under the duty to exercise ordinary care
to avoid a collision. (Note: If the driver on the left enters the intersection
slightly before the driver on the right does, the latter would still have the right
of way because the two vehicles would have approached or entered the intersection
»at approximately the same timen with ~meaning of the statute.
TORTS--Violation of Ordinance &~ <il._L)
206 Va.9.Sl
A city ordinance requ~red that all ~~tops be clearly marked with signs indicating them as such. V Bus Company, a common carrier within the city, had an agreement with the City Board of Education to pick up children at school and discharge
them at convenient places along the route, some of which were not marked as bus
stops. P, a boy of 12, got safely off the bus at one such stop, and then suddenly
ran across the street in fron of the bus and into the aide of an automobile sustaining serious injury. P sued the bus co~pany on the theory that, since n~ sign
had been erected, there was no definite proof that this stop had been authorized in
the agreement with the School Board. Consequently the ordir~nce had been violated
and the violation led to the injury.
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Held: P cannot recover. The violation of an ordinance constitutes actionable negligence only when it injures someone of the class to be protected by the ordinance's
enactment. The city ordinance was not :enacted so that the plaintiff might be
benefited, nor for school children in general. It was rather enacted so that the
public might know where one alights from or boards buses. The fact that there was
no sign did not have any direct relationship to the driver's care and so is not
actionable negligence. Nor was the driver bound to keep P on the bus since the
passenger on a common carrier may alight at any stop which he desires, be he infant
or adult.
TORTS
~d ~r207 Va.343
D owned property u~n which he maintained a residence for X, his mother. He retained complete control of the property and performed all maintenance thereon. In
the course of this upkeep, D erected an iron pipe which protruded some distance
from the ground ~ Six months later, P, a frequent visitor, paid an evening visit to
X, but, at the suggestion of X~ left her car in a different place from the usual
parking area, a place where her entrance wa s much nearer the pipe~ In the darkness
P failed to see the pipe and tripped over it, injuring her leg thereon. P brings
this action against D for negligence in not warning her about the pipe, despite the
fact that it had been there for six months.
fw"' f "-.4
Held: For P. A social guest is only a lic•ensee and not an invitee.Lf(t'rice there is
n~ duty u12on +.be ..pos:o lilssor to make the premises safe for such a person and he ie
li2 ble only for wil lful or wanton injuries. However, the court, relying on Restateof Torts 2d 342, notes several e=tioQ~ to this general rule. The one here
applicable concerns dangers not ~rent to the licensee and which the possessor
knows or has reason to know, might create a hazard- Here D is held as the putative
head of the family and~ thus, under a duty as a posses~or to warn the licensee of
any danger of which he has knowledge and which P might not. P, parking in a different area, was placed . in an imminent danger of which D should have known and P was
under a duty to warn her.
TORTS
207 Va.491.
As D approached an intersection, the traffic light changed from green to amber.
D applied his brakes and found them ineffective. His car careened into the intersection and collided with P's car. P brought an action for damages and, during the
presentation of evidence, D admitted that he had tried his brakes earlier and
found them to be only half-pedal, though he thought he had enough brake to stop
him. After the evidence had been presented D's counsel asks for an instruction
telling the jury that a presumption of due care attaches to the D and follows him
throughout every stage of the trial only to be overcome by a preponderance of the
evidence. D's counsel also asks for a sudden emergency instruction and court
grants both.
HeldJ(l) As to the presumption of due care instructions, reversed. Here the undisputed evidence proved that D ran through a red light. This is a violation of
statute and makes out a prima facie case of negligence. At this point, the burden
of goi ng forward with the evidence on the issue of negligence switches to D to
show why he broke the law.
(2) The defense of sudden emergency is proper here. Though only available to a
party completely without fault in causing the emergency, it could be used here
eince D was found by the jury to be faultless. D testified that the brake was
half-pedal but he had enough to stop when he checked it earlier, and the jury
found him without negligence in creating the emergency.

"-ff;:'l.

{; s
~«----201 va.534.
4 / tc,~ ·While shopping 1n D Supermarket, P heard a soft p an~~t a pain in her leg.
Looking down, she saw a piece of glass with a bott cap on it sticking in her leg.
p sued D Bottling Company for damages and during the evidence, testified that the
bottles in her own wagon were intact and she saw nothing prior to the accident
which would indicate where the glass came from. D Supermarket's manager testified
that he found a carton sitting on the floor near the accident, with two broken
TORTS
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TORTS P. 47.
bottles, that the last drink delivery had been 5 days previous, and that customers
often moved the cartons on the display shelf and left the shelf in disarray. The
jury found for P and D appeals on the ground that P failed to show D's negligence
caused the injuty.
Held: Reversed. N~ligence cannot be presumed from the mere happening of an
accident. The doctrine o! res 1psa loquitur does not apply i n the case of an unexplained accident attributable to one of several causes, for some of which the
defendant may not be responsible. In such cases it is incumbant on the plaintiff to
show why an accident happened. Here P showed only that a bottle exploded, not
which bottle or where it was located.
TORTS
207 Va.567.
P owned a farm, bordering on the D railroad's right of way, on which he had a
large tomato crop. In order to kill some weeds within this right of way, D sent tts
spray train past P's farm spraying the right of way with brush killer. P's evidenGe
tended to prove that on the day in question "a pretty good breezett was blowing
which caused the spray to drift onto his crop; that on walking through the fields
the spray could be seen on the tomato plants; that within three or four days after
the spraying the leaves on a substantial number of his plants withered and the
blossoms turned black and dropped off; and that the plants showed no sign of
disease prior to the spraying. D introduced evidence of due care in his spraying
operations and that an examination of the field three months later showed signs of
disease typical of early blight which was confirmed by laboratory tests. The court
gave the following instruction which D claims was error.
"'The Court instructs the jury that if the instrumentality which caused P's damage
was in the control of D, and the damage was such as would not ordinarily occur if
reasonable care was used by D, and D alone had the means of discovering how and
why it happened, the jury may infer that the damage was due to some negl~gence of D.
Held: The fundamental issue in the case was whether the damage was caused by the
spray as P asserted, or by the blight, as D claimed.
The
·
es not a 1 where
i
the
TORTS,~ages

207 Va.602.
D con racted to pave a portion of highway for the State. D in turn contracted with
i to supply crushed rock. X leased some land adjacent to P's farm and began the
operation. D located his asphalt plant on this same land for convenience. P brought
an action of nuisance against the quarry and asphalt plant for damages caused his
farm from substance emitted from the two operations, which settled on his farm.
(1) D contends that since he had contracted with the Commonwealth for the performanc
of public work, he is entitled to share in the immunity of the state from liability
for incidental injuries necessarily involved in the performance of the contract.
(2) D also · contends that P cannot recover because he has failed to show how much
damage, if any, was caused by either X's quarry or D's plant.
Heldt No as to (1) The operation of the asphal t plant an tbe lease ~Fena-s~s as
not essential to the performance of the contract with the state. Onl those
ac 1.
·
1a to the erformance of a corrti:ac...t_w.i:th.__:the__stat arfL.Jmtl:U.ed" to
twmun1tx• onvenience does not amount to necessi ty. Hence there is no immunity in
this case. Aa ~o (2) D's contention is valid. There is a distinction between joint
o rtfeasors and joint contributors to a muisance. Jqint tortfeasors can each be
eld liable for the whole damage whether they_acted-in-conce t-ar--not~ However,
here persons maintaining a nuisance act independently, as did D and X, there must
e evidence on which to apportion the damages resulting from the conduct of each.

~
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For Rule"
207 Va.616
A negl{iently stored 40,000 feet of primacord in a loft of W's factory. w had
stored 50 tons of ammonium nitrate in ,another part of the factory. A fire in the
factory resulted in the explosion of the primacord and the ammonium nitrate which
caused damage to P's home 2 mile away~ Evidence was introduced that primacord will
detonate from a shock of ~ the magnitude required to deonate ammonium nitrate, that
ammonium nitrate can be detonated by fire and heat, but primacord can't. The last
person to view the scene testified that the ammonium nitrate was on fire and burning
fiercely and that the primacord made only a small contribution to the total concussion. The jury returned a verdict for P against both A and w. The trial court
set aside the verdict as to A.
Held: Affirmed. Negligence and an accident do not make a case. A person 1 not
liable unless but for his ne ligent ac thaJha~Quld not have oc~urred. There
must be a ca usa connection. The evidence shows that the ammunium rii~rate was
burning firecely, and that primacord cannot be detonated by fire and heat. Thus P
~
is left only with the argument that the fire caused the loft to collapse, and the
subsequent shock from the fall caused the primacord to detonate, and this in turn~
caused the detonation of the ammonium nitrate. While this is possible, it is only
speculation. The ammonium nitrate could just as easily have caused the detonatiop
of the primacord. Applying the "but fo~' test to thi~ case, only if it could be ~
shown that the primacord detonated first and then detonated the ammunium nitrate,
would A's negligence in storing the primacord have been a cause in fact of the
damages sustained by P's house.
TORTS--" ~t
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TORTS--Malicious Prosecut ion /
207 Va.679.
P and ngr f amily were visiti~Th:~·stopped at D's Supermarket and P
went in to purchase some presents. She pa~d for them and left the store. tater P
returned to D Supermarket where she made another purchase. She removed the prior
pureh.a«ss from her pocketbook, took out some money and paid for the purchases. As
she was leaving the store, P was stopped by a security officer who accused her of
stealing the prior purchaseSJP;owho was Italian and did not speak English fluently, P
protested, but agreed to go to the s tore office. The store manager was called, and
P further protested to him. She was not allowed to go back to the car and get the
sales slip, and no effort was made to go out to the car where P's family waited and
where the sales slip was. The police were called and P was taken into custody,
fingerprinted, photographed and placed in a jail cell. She was later released on
bond. She was tried for petit larceny and promptly acqu·itted~he then filed a
motion for judgment against D Supermarket and asked for compensatory and punitive
damages.
Held: P should be allowed compensatory damages. The ~ as t~se for
prosecution is whether the facts and circumstances known, or made known to the
prosecutor are sufficient to justify a prudent and reasonable man that the accused
is guiltyof the crime chargedF Mere belief or impression that the accused is guilty,
as D argued, is not sufficient. The evidence in this case shows the opportunity of
D to have obtained information which would have invalidated any belief.
legal malice may be inferred from the want of probable cau
The conduct of the
security guard i nvalid
any c a1m tf.lal- - e acted- as a reasonable and prudent man.
His disregard of information communicated to him constituted an aggravatsd circumstance which supports the jury's finding and warranted an inference of legal malice.
~euer, there must be ac
ice in
er to ~~ ran p~niti~e da~ag es. There
must be indication of personal ill will or a r eckless disregard for P's r i ghts.
Although the security officer was not performing his duties in a reasonable manner,
it cannot be said that he acted with actual mali ce. He did not know P and had
never seen her before.
TORTS
207 Va.720.
P suffered a compens~ble injury under the Workman's Compensation Act, while at
work and was sent to the doctor by his employer. After P's injury had healed he
was allowed to leave work to visit the doctor to have the stitches taken out of his
wound. On the way to the doctor's office, in his personal car, P suffered a blackout

TORTS P. 49.
and in the ensuing accident was further injured. P admitted that he had been subject
to these blackouts for a number of years prior to the accident. The Industrial
Commission awarded P compensation for these addition injuries and the employer and
his carrier appeal.
Held: Affirmed. The requirement of the Act that the employer furnish the employee
medical attention is read into the contract between them. When the employer di:;:o:;ta
or authorizes the employee to seek medical attention for a work-connected injury
and the employee follows such direction, they are but fulfilling the reciprocal
obligations of the act and this contract. An additional injury suffered by the
employee while fulfilling such an obligation is work-connected and arises out of
and in the course of employment. Nor is the result changed because P's additional
injuries were caused by a black-out resulting from a vascular condition. This :i. s
analogous to an injury suffered as a result of a fall on the job caused by a bJ ..=,'·•l:-..•
put. The basic rule in a fall ~ e is that the effect of such a fall is compen s-~ ~ L~
if the empl oyment places the employee in a position increasing the dangerous
effects of such a fall, such as on a height, near machinery or in a moving vehi C': ::.2. .~

Yc57 J~

s-c.o

TORTS Deceit
153 S~E.2d 2l b
P's were interested in the purchase of Blackacre, a house and lot. They inqui~ed
of D, the real estate agent and inspected the house casually. In agreeing to purchas£
the house, they signed a form contract of sale, which stated that if termite damage
was discovered, the purchaser could rescind the contract. D addressed a letter to
P's which informed them that a termite inspection bureau reported the house had been
treated for termites after some had been discovered and had continued under treatment for ten years under a guarantee. The letter also said, "If the Bureau's report
did not sp~cify that there was termite damage, then there was no termite damage.
p took possession and discovered extensive termite damage. P then brought an action
against D ~lleging that they were deceived by the report of the bureau and the
statements of the agent and relied on these facts to their detriment. They also introduced evidence to show that D had concealed a report or Orkin which told of
termite damage. They further alleged that, had they known all this, they would have
rescinded the contract.
Held: If a purchaser
given or secures information as to
condition of
a y prudent men~ he is then
un
true eon iti0i1- anacann"()-t'rely upon- the statements
o ~. ~t]ver, the fresence and activity o term1tes are matters _uPQn which
opinions of exper __ are requ1red. Xiso, if the vendor says or does anything to
throw a purchaser off his guard or divert him from making inquiries or examinations
as did D in this case, then the purchaser is not bound to discover the true condition for himself, even though he has information which would excite the suspicions
of reasonably prudent men. The statements of the agent and his concealing of the
Orkin report concerning the termite damage to the house were designed to throw
the P's off guard, Furthermore his statements were of fact and not mere opinion and
the P's were entitled to rely upon them.

TORTS P.SO
TORTS Wilson v. Whittaker ~ u,~;d~-<:-.. /A---"-·" . "' /JIL . . 2t5Tr -Va.lo,a2,.1v/4
In an action under the VlTglnfa death by wroogtuf
~~e~ puni
as'
well as compensatory damages allow~ble?
No, Onlf compensatory Qama.ges are allowable as .:the statute--G~eates-a-new_r.ight-in
1
d~erit reRrea~~tive to be com ensated for the lops; it does not cause decedent~
right of action to survive.
.
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Elder v. Holland

155 S.E.2d 369
administrative hearing repeated defamatory words that another party had spoken about P, the person being investigated.
Is D liable in an action for commo~law defamation and under the Virginia statute
of insulting words?
Testimony during an administrative hearing, as opposed to a judicial proceeding,
is only qualifi·e d privileged, not absolutely privileged, but to recover P must
show actual malice on the part of D.

D, a state police officer, testifying in

~n

TORTS Easterling v. Walton
P was operated on by D, a surgeon. About 1 year later x-raya disclosed a lap pad
sponge embedded in the area of the operation performed by D. ~elies on ~ ipsa
loquitor to show liability.
Held: For P. For the first time Virginia held that when a fa~ign_aubject is left
in-AJ!tient's botcy;~
ne li ence i}3 inferred and expert testimony i,!.__!!Qj; p.ece!'Jsary ~
~oh it.. -~/L
' Jl_. Jli;J t== ~
_
,.__, ,_
RTS

~

208 Va.352.

P, a four year old infant,sustained injuries when she was attacked on a public

~

sidewalk in the city of Norfolk by an unattended and unleashed dog. A Norfolk
ordinance subjects an owner to a fine if his dog shall go at large upon any public
street of the city unless such dog is accompanied by an attendant or held in leash
by a responsible person. Relying on this ordinance P (by her next friend) brought
action to recover damages for her personal injuries. The trial court instructed the
jury that D's violation of the ordinance constituted negligence and that they should
return a verdict for p i f they believed such negligence proximately contributed to
her injuries. The jury found for plaintiff, and D appeals contending the court
erred in instructing the jury that .violation of the ordinance ~o:natituted negligence ,
Held: Judgment affirmed. Under Virginia law, violation of a statute or o.Fd1nance
constitutes negligence per se. But failure to comply with the requirements of a
legislative enactment dQes not "Coiistitute actionabl e neili~ence unless the inJured
~rson is a member of a class (Qr whose benefit the legislation was enac t ed~ The
purpose of the ordinance in question was to protect the public against hazards
created by dog's running at large, including the most obvious hazard>dogbite.
Persons such as P, who might be bitten by dogs running at large are therefor within
the class intended to be protected by the statute.
TORTS-negligence
D became ill while operating his car and
with P's parked car. P then charged D with
Held: For D. Where a person suddenly and
cipate it becomes ill, loses consciousness
negligence.

208 Va.525
lost consciousness, thereby colliding
negligence.
with no prior warning or reason to antiand has an accident, there is no

TORTS--Death by wrongful Acts
159 S.E.2d 650.
F, an experienced firefighter, died of burns suffered while fighting a fire
negligently cause by C & 0. The forest warden who requested F's help testified that
he and F had an understanding that F would help fight such fires, and that F had
in fact helped on previous occasions. For this work F received compensation from
the state. P, F's administratrix, now bri ngs an action for wrongful death against
the C & o.

Held: For

